Three essays in corporate governance, accounting and law by Vázquez López, Antonio
Three Essays in Corporate Governance,
Accounting and Law
by
Antonio Bernardo Vázquez López
           
       
 
  
    
 
        
        
    
             
    
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
        
            
     
  
    
 
 
                
             
    
   
    
the Department of Business Administration in partial fulfillment of theA dissertation submitted to 
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Business and Finance
Advisors
María Gutiérrez Urtiaga 
Josep A. D. Tribó Giné
Tutor
María Gutiérrez Urtiaga
July 2019
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Esta tesis se distribuye bajo licencia “Creative Commons Reconocimiento – No Comercial – 
Sin Obra Derivada”. 
 
 
Se lo dedico a mi familia, sin la que hoy no sería quien soy. En especial a mis padres
(Antonio y Pepi), a mi hermana (Pili) y a mi sobrina (Elena), lo mejor que nunca habría
podido desear. También a mis abuelas (María y Pilar) y abuelos (Bernardo y Pepe) les
dedico este trabajo fruto de muchas alegrías y sufrimientos. Por supuesto, y en especial
también a mis tías (Maria Luisa y Pili) que con cada abrazo que me dan me otorgan un
ánimo y cariño muy necesario. A mis primos, mayores (Bernardo y Rocío) y pequeños
(Currito y María), que tanto os quiero.
En el plano académico no podría sino solamente agradecer el apoyo incondicional de mis
directores, María Gutiérrez Urtiga y Josep A. D. Tribó Giné. Os agradezco tanto las
conversaciones interesantes, como las muestras de apoyo que he tenido la suerte de
disfrutar. También me gustaría hacer una mención especial a Beatriz (Bea) García Osma,
que ha sido para mí como mi tercera directora, aguantando mis angustias y siempre con la
solución al 99.9999% de los problemas. Adicionalmente, debo agradecer el apoyo recibipo
por parte del personal de administración del departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
Muchas gracias Marié, Almu, Begoña, Raquel y Estela porque siempre me habéis ayudado
con una gran sonrisa y con trato muy cariñoso. Por otra parte, tengo que agradecer a mis
compañeros de doctorado, en especial a Silvina Rubio, que me ha enseñado a ser un mejor
investigador y pero también mejor persona.
Finalmente, quiero dedicarle esta tesis a Cristina Grande Herrera, mi “hermana de otros
padres”. ¡Un brindis por tantas aventuras que nos quedan por batallar juntos, compañera!
3
Acknowledgments
I acknowledge financial assistance from the Spanish Ministry of Innovation and Science
(ECO2013-48328, ECO2014-19314, ECO2016-77579, ECO2016-00501-001, and S2015/HUM-
3353, EARLYFIN-CAM) and FEDER (UNC315-EE-3636). I also gratefully acknowledges
the hospitality of the Carroll School of Management at Boston College and Sandra Waddock
while working on this project.
4
Contents
0.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1 Who is Keeping an Eye on Real Earnings Management?
Focused vs. Dispersed Directors 11
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2 Literature review and hypothesis development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.2.1 Independent directors’ incentives to monitor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.2.2 Independent directors and earnings management . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3 Research Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.3.1 Measurement of individual incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.3.2 Alternative measures of director allocation of effort . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.3.3 Measurement of real earnings management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.3.4 Sample and descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.4 Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.5.1 Alternative measures of focused and dispersed directors . . . . . . . 31
1.5.2 Audit committee and chair position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.5.3 Exogenous changes to directors’ classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.5.4 Focused directors and firm complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.5.5 The market value effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5
1.5.6 The impact of focused directors’ departures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.5.7 Director-level characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.5.8 Real earnings management and first-stage controls . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.6 Additional Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.6.1 Focused directors and firms’ information environment . . . . . . . . 39
1.6.2 Focused directors and financial reporting restatements . . . . . . . . 40
1.6.3 Real earnings management and future outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2 Boards of Directors’ Legal Incentives and Firm Outcomes 70
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.2 Theoretical Background and Main Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.3 Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.3.1 Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts as Variation in Boards of Di-
rectors’ Legal Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.3.2 Political Economy of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts . . . . . . 82
2.3.3 Prior Evidence of the Impact of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts 82
2.4 Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.4.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.4.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.5.2 Impact of NSHCAs on Payout Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2.5.3 Impact of NSHCAs on Investment Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2.6 Additional Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
2.6.1 Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts and Litigation Risk . . . . . . 94
2.6.2 Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts and the Investment Horizon of
Institutional Investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6
2.6.3 Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts and Corporate Governance . . 98
2.6.4 Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts and Growth Opportunities . . 99
2.7 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
2.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3 CEO Overboard! Corporate Performance Consequences of CEO Partici-
pation in Other Boards 124
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.2 Data and Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.2.1 Measuring CEO Distraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.3 Empirical Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.4 Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3.5 Additional Results and Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3.5.1 Additional Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3.5.1.1 Impact of positive and negative shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3.5.1.2 Horizon of impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.5.1.3 Committee chairmanship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3.5.1.4 Geographic Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3.5.1.5 CEO outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3.5.2 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3.5.2.1 Alternate measures of performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7
0.1 Summary
This dissertation contains three essays related to the areas of corporate governance, account-
ing and law. Chapter 1 sets out to investigate the intersection of corporate governance and
accounting, where we inspect the impact of a corporate governance institution (indepen-
dent directors) on a measure of accounting quality (real earnings management). Moreover,
Chapter 2 links with the previous chapter in that I inspect the impact of independent direc-
tors and their legal incentives on the decision whether to payout (dividends or repurchases)
or to reinvest. Finally, Chapter 3 connects with the prior two in that it inspects how inside
board members impact corporate performance and we derive some policy implications for
regulators about inside director participation in outside boards.
In the first Chapter titled “Who is Keeping an Eye on Real Earnings Management?
Focused versus Distracted Directors” (joint work with Beatriz García Osma and Cristina
Grande-Herrera), we study the effect of independent directors on real earnings manage-
ment. We focus on real earnings management because the literature has argued that since
the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the early 2000’s in the United States, managers
have switched from managing accruals to managing firms’ operations to obfuscate the earn-
ings signal [113]. We also focus on independent directors as the corporate governance mech-
anism that might be on the lookout for this type of earnings management because other
classical governance institutions might not be on the lookout (auditors) or even generate
the incentives to engage in real earnings management (see for instance, [71, 24, 25]). This
relationship has been explored in the past, but results suggested that there was not a causal
impact of increasing board independence on the use of earnings management [33, 8]. We
predict that not all independent directors have the same incentives to curtail the managing
of operations with the objective of increasing the bottom line. This comes from prior re-
search that suggests that independent directors possess individual incentives to exert their
monitoring roles. The prediction is while some independent directors will have the incen-
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tives to monitor the manager, others will not have clear motivations to engage in such costly
monitoring activities [90]. We reconcile prior lack of results with the fact that the aver-
age impact of independent directors on real earnings management might be two opposing
impacts of directors with and without incentives to monitor. Results suggests that only
independent directors with incentives to monitor managers are linked to lower levels of real
earnings management. This reconciles prior studies in the literature that finds a lack of
impact between board independence and earnings management.
In the second Chapter titled “Boards of Directors’ Legal Incentives and Corporate Out-
comes”, I study the impact of a regulatory shock in the US that lessens boards of directors’
fiduciary duties towards shareholders. In this paper I try to assess the impact of legal
incentives on the decision whether to payout out or keep the cash in the firm. I use agency
theory to predict that an increase in boards’ legal incentives will result in payout and in-
vestment levels that suit better shareholders’ interests. On the other hand, a decrease of
legal incentives will results in a payout and investment level that suits board members
but possibly not shareholders. As a quasi-exogenous source of variation I make use of the
adoption of a set of staggered US state laws that allow boards of directors to divert from
shareholder value maximization. These set of laws are called Non-Shareholder Constituen-
cies Acts, and their adoption would protect boards of directors from further shareholder
scrutiny via derivative or class action lawsuits. Results indicate that a reduction in boards’
legal incentives makes boards adjust their firm’s payout and investment policy to maximize
their own utility versus that of shareholders.
Finally, Chapter 3 comes from a work-in-progress project provisionally titled “CEO
Overboard! Corporate Performance Consequences of CEO Participation in Other Boards”
(joint work with Faiza Majid). We test whether focal
firms whose CEOs sit on multiple boards can suffer decreases in performance due to
transient attention-grabbing events in
firms where CEOs sit as independent directors. We exploit extreme returns (positive and
9
negative), extreme earnings and extreme volatility in firms where CEOs sit as independent
directors and find that such distraction leads to an average decrease of approximately 1%
of focal firms’ ROA, Q, market returns and ROE. This effect is stronger for focal firms that
are geographically more distant to firms where CEOs sit as independent directors, which
suggests that distraction is costlier in such situations. Additionally, we show that distrac-
tion is greater for CEOs that sit on the audit committee or chair a major sub-committee.
Finally, we show that these distraction events also lead to lower CEO compensation and
higher forced turnover. This paper contributes to the current debate on whether or not
shareholders should ban managers from holding board seats in other firms.
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Chapter 1
Who is Keeping an Eye on Real
Earnings Management?
Focused vs. Dispersed Directors
1.1 Introduction
What firm decisions should independent directors monitor? We study whether all
independent directors are equally adept at monitoring and limiting real earnings man-
agement. Real earnings management refers to operating, investment, and financing
decisions taken to affect bottom line earnings. They usually imply sub-optimal ac-
tions like myopic investment or inefficient assets sales [13, 25] that negatively impact
firm value and performance [63, 19]. Despite these high costs, real earnings manage-
ment is on the rise, as managers react to the regulatory crackdown on accrual-based
earnings management by shifting to costly real actions [39, 11, 31].1
1Recent regulations such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and rules promulgated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that mandate independence in
boards and audit committees have focused on limiting accounting-based earnings management to secure
financial reporting quality.
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Intuitively, independent directors may appear able to limit real earnings manage-
ment, as they have incentives to stand up to management to protect the interests of
investors [44, 68], and are able to detect and reduce accrual-based earnings manage-
ment, ameliorating firms’ information environments [79, 95].
However, recent research questions this straightforward answer. [8] do not find
that exogenous increases in board independence lower accrual-based earnings man-
agement, while [33] show greater board independence only curbs earnings manage-
ment in firms that operate in rich information environments.2 This suggests that
directors’ effectiveness hinges critically on the ease of monitoring, casting doubts
over their impact, as it is inherently difficult to monitor real actions aimed at ob-
fuscating the earnings signal [101, 63]. This is because these actions are well within
the discretion of management, and curtailing them requires not only independence,
but also high competence and effort on the side of directors, who should possess:
(1) business knowledge to identify sub-optimal decision-making; and (2) accounting
practical understanding to endeavor to reverse-engineer and interpret the account-
ing outcomes of those decisions. Independent directors may not excel at both, as
directors appointed to monitor the accounting process may not be able to identify
sub-optimal business decisions; and vice versa for directors appointed primarily to
advice management, who may struggle to uncover the accounting motivation under-
pinning a given transaction. Recent research suggests these limitations exist, and
questions if directors are able to both monitor and advice management [48]. Fur-
ther, independent directors may not even consider curbing real actions as part of their
duties, given the recent regulatory emphasis on the monitoring of pure accounting
decisions.
Against this backdrop, we argue that differences in monitoring incentives across
2Existing research usually defines effective board monitoring as board independence, measured simply
by the ratio of independent directors to board size [e.g., 15, 78, 79, 4].
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independent directors are important to explain board of directors’ ability to con-
straint real earnings management. Specifically, we predict that not every indepen-
dent director has the same individual incentives to apply effort in monitoring. We
expect that independent directors concentrate their efforts in monitoring and dis-
couraging real earnings management actions in those firms where the net benefits of
monitoring are greater.
To develop our predictions, we build on the recent literature that suggests moni-
tors possess limited time and attention and must rationally allocate their effort [5],
challenging the view that all independent directors behave as efficient and diligent
monitors [see for instance 110, 107, 89, 90, 91]. In fact, the results in [90] indicate
that the same director may behave differently in different boards and suggest that
independent directors with multiple directorships exert greater effort in the boards of
larger firms, because these directorships provide them with relatively larger prestige
and visibility.
Board monitoring over real earnings management is relevant not only because
of the growth of these practices in recent years and their economic impact, but
also because it links directly with directors’ human capital and present and future
benefits. Adverse events that destroy shareholder value lead to labor market penalties
and lower the likelihood of acquiring new and retaining old directorships [49, 50].
Indeed, whilst directors are unlikely to suffer from non-fraudulent low accounting
quality, as measured by low predictability, comparability, or readability, real earnings
management has business consequences that directly affect firm value, and thus,
directors’ monitoring prestige and the perception of their skills.
Hence, we predict that real earnings management activities are not detected and
prevented unless monitoring effort is high. To test this prediction, we split indepen-
dent directors into those with high incentives to monitor (focused directors, hence-
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forth), and those with low incentives (dispersed directors). Then, we classify each
firm-director pair depending on the ‘relative importance’ of the firm for the director.
Relative importance of firm i for a director j refers to the relative ranking of firm
i among all the directorships in the portfolio of director j, based on market value.3
Thus, the same person (i.e., with the same skills and knowledge) may be classified
as ‘dispersed’ in one firm and as ‘focused’ in another.4 Director-level data is then
aggregated at the firm level to create board-level measures. This is consistent with
the work of [90] and ensures the plausible exogenous nature of the measures, which
are independent to a single firm’s choices, and to a single director’s characteristics,
as the allocation of relative importance by independent directors with multiple di-
rectorships is driven by changes in the market value of other firms in their portfolio.5
Moreover, we identify firms that change relative importance (from focused to dis-
persed, or vice versa) by the changes in the market value of other firm(s) in the
portfolio of the director, and control for the fact that those firms in which we focus
do not change their market value substantially.
Using a large sample of US firms for the period 1987 to 2016, we show that firms
with a higher percentage of focused directors experiment a reduction of real earnings
management. Similar results are obtained when we focus on their presence in the
audit committee or in the chair position of a major committee. In our analyses, we
control for the presence of independent directors with low incentives to exert effort
and monitor, i.e., dispersed directors. We make no predictions for their behavior,
but our evidence suggests that these directors are, on average, worse monitors than
3In unreported results, we use total assets and sales as alternative proxies of a directorship visibility and
obtain virtually the same results.
4It is critical to observe that focused directors are for a given directorship, whilst they are concurrently
classified as dispersed (i.e., those with lower incentives to exert effort and monitor the financial reporting
process) in other directorships. This focus also shifts through time, as changes in the relative importance
of directorships occur.
5See Appendix 1 for a detailed real-life example.
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their counterparts. Overall, our main results indicate that individual incentives are
important determinants of independent directors monitoring efforts. We also control
for board characteristics, real earnings management determinants, and firm controls
such as size, operating performance, and market-to-book, as well as for accruals-based
earnings management, as increased monitoring over one type of earnings management
may create incentives to manage earnings using alternative instruments [38, 113].
To appease endogeneity concerns, we create and validate alternative measures of
focused directors based on the percentage market value of each directorship and ob-
tain consistent results. We further study different settings in which these measures
should behave accordingly. First, we create alternative measures considering shocks
to directorship rankings. A director is identified as changing from dispersed to fo-
cused (and vice versa) when one of their other directorships experiments a change
in market value. We obtain the same results using this plausibly more exogenous
measure. Secondly, our main results also remain unchanged when we control for firm
complexity, albeit focused directors’ impact wanes in more complex environments.
These tests are of interest, as they identify settings where focused directors may need
to exert greater effort, or where their independence may be particularly threatened,
as firm complexity affects outside directors’ monitoring [44]. A further concern is
that these measures are based on the relative size of a directorship, and larger firms
are likely to have more focused directors as they can draw from a larger pool of
talent when hiring [80]. To tackle this issue, we split our sample into market value
quartiles and re-run our main regressions. Our main result remains almost across
all subsamples and are not allocated to the largest firms. We also exploit the deaths
of focused (dispersed) directors to gauge the impact of a departure from the board
unrelated to firm choices. We find that focused directors’ deaths are linked to in-
creases in real earnings management. Moreover, we repeat our main analyses on a
15
firm-year-director level panel with director times year fixed effects to fully account
for unobservable differences among directors. Finally, regarding concerns when using
residual-based measures as dependent variables [see 32, for a detailed discussion], we
include the first-stage factors from estimating real earnings management as controls
in our main analyses to find that our results weaken but remain significant at sensible
levels.
Consistent with the beneficial consequences of focused directors, we find that they
are associated with better firm’s information environment, as measured by greater
future analyst following and trading volume, and lower future analysts’ forecast error
and dispersion, and volatility. This is consistent with evidence provided by [102], who
show that focused directors improve firms’ price informativeness and transparency.
We also find that firms with more focused directors present a lower presence of re-
stated earnings, thus successfully avoiding the labor market penalties of restatements
[103]. More specifically, firms with more focused directors show a lower presence of
restatements that lead to understatements of past earnings.
The issue of what corporate governance mechanisms may be effective in lowering
real earnings management is relatively unexplored.6 We contribute to this area and
to the recent work that questions the effectiveness of board independence in lowering
earnings management [e.g., 8, 33]. In doing so, we reconcile it with the extant prior
research showing beneficial effects of independent directors. Our results indicate that
merely increasing the number of independent directors may not yield clear effects,
as independent directors possess different individual incentives to monitor. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze the relationship between board
independence and earnings management considering individual directors’ incentives
to monitor. Thus, we also contribute to prior studies on the influence of individual
6There is evidence of internal governance mechanisms that influence real activities manipulation such as
key subordinate executives’ horizon within the firm and their influence compared to that of the CEO [35].
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incentives [e.g., 90, 73]. An advantage of focusing on the monitoring over real earnings
management, where both accounting and business knowledge play a key role, is that
we also contribute to the literature on busy directors. This literature suggests that
such directors may be too busy to properly monitor managers [e.g., 40, 52], and thus,
the financial reporting system. It also suggests that busy directors are likely to be
more talented and capable, and that they may compensate their monitoring deficits
by being expert advisors with superior business knowledge [e.g., 54]. Our evidence
is consistent with these busy directors being highly able in those firms where they
exert greater effort, but also, with being below-par in firms that provide them with
limited prestige. This is important evidence that reconciles some of the conflicting
evidence in the prior literature on busy directors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature and
presents our hypothesis. Section 3 describes the method and the sample. Section 4
presents the results. Section 5 and 6 show robustness checks and additional analyses
and section 7 concludes.
1.2 Literature review and hypothesis development
Independent directors are assessed by labor markets. When they are perceived as
experts, they can accrue economic benefits [5]. For example, diligent tough monitors
are more likely to obtain future directorships because it affects the value of their hu-
man capital [49, 50]. This suggests that all independent directors possess incentives
to monitor managerial actions. However, recent research questions this view, indicat-
ing directors carefully consider the costs and benefits of monitoring. [85] argue that if
governance is strong and firms’ boards are willing to protect shareholders’ interests,
directors behave in a shareholder-friendly manner. In contrast, if firms’ boards are
led by managers who want to maintain their power, directors may become manager-
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friendly. This would suggest that monitoring effort, visibility and prestige may not
always be rewarded by labor markets, thereby inducing heterogeneity in monitoring
across independent directors.
1.2.1 Independent directors’ incentives to monitor
Board independence is necessary but not sufficient to guarantee efficient monitoring.
Efficient monitoring requires knowledge and effort, to detect and deter sub-optimal
decision-making. Greater effort leads to better outcomes, but effort is not limitless,
and thus, it requires rational allocation [97, 47].7 Directors with multiple director-
ships face the problem of deciding in which directorships to spend their limited time
and attention. [90] suggest an effort allocation rule and argue that individual direc-
tors’ effort is associated with board visibility. The most visible and prestigious firms
are the largest ones [50], and therefore, [90] predict and provide evidence that inde-
pendent directors exert greater effort in larger firms, where they can extract greater
net benefits from monitoring, as those are the firms where directors can build (or
permanently damage) their prestige as monitors. Other studies that acknowledge
that not all independent directors may have identical incentives to monitor include
[73], who show that directors who have greater career concerns are more likely to
dissent in their individual voting patterns with top management, aligning themselves
with shareholders.
In contrast to this literature, the main body of research showing that independent
directors influence board decisions [e.g., 108, 27] does not question whether all inde-
pendent directors possess identical incentives to monitor and rather focuses on the
7The work of [47] shows that market participants indeed perceive directors’ effort and attention to be
limited. They use sudden deaths of directors as an exogenous shock to another directors’ workload. They
find a negative market reaction for firms whose directors serve also in other boards that experience a sudden
death. Sudden deaths increase the workload in that firm, detracting from the effort directors can exert in
their other appointments.
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differences in incentives between outside and inside directors. This means that the
literature on the impact of independent directors’ individual incentives on accounting
quality is limited, and the existing evidence is mixed [see for instance 107, 89].8
Building on the previously discussed work, we expect that independent directors
have heterogeneous monitoring incentives, and that their monitoring efforts need
not be identical across all of their directorships. Indeed, boards may be composed
of focused independent directors with high incentives to monitor (focused directors),
but also, by the same consideration, by independent directors who are currently
directing their attention to other directorships (dispersed directors). If that is the
case, and the presence of focused directors decreases, managers likely experience an
increase in the scope to engage in self-interested strategies that may damage firm
value, which may go without questioning in board meetings.
1.2.2 Independent directors and earnings management
Managers engage in both real and accrual-based earnings management [63, 100, 81].
This is justified by the importance of earnings for capital markets as a key summary
measure of performance [43], and creates a particular focus of independent boards
of directors and audit committees in reducing earnings management by carefully
monitoring managerial decision-making [e.g., 78, 79].
Independent directors have incentives to curtail earnings management, because
monitoring failures likely lead to future earnings restatements or accounting fraud,
with direct consequences for directors [15, 103]. However, recent studies analyzing
exogenous changes in board independence, where causal links can be established, fail
to find evidence that boards with more independent directors lower earnings man-
agement. These studies analyze the exogenous changes mandated by the NYSE and
8[107] studies ownership incentives of audit committee members and finds a negative link between these
incentives and earnings management, while [89] provide opposite experimental evidence.
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the NASDAQ that require majority independent boards. In particular, [8] use this
shock to analyze the effect of board independence on the firm information environ-
ment. Their results show that an increase of independent directors generates more
corporate transparency; but they fail to find evidence of a reduction in accruals-based
earnings management. [33] use the same shock and similarly find that, overall, firms
do not experience significant decreases in earnings management. [33] show that these
reductions are concentrated in treated firms with low information acquisition costs
(where monitoring is easier). This is consistent with the idea that monitoring effort
plays a significant role on the effectiveness of independent directors.
This prior work focuses almost exclusively on accrual-based earnings manage-
ment, which is fundamentally different from real earnings management in terms of
visibility, risk of detection [113, 81] and economic consequences for the firm. Accruals-
based earnings management serves to misrepresent performance but it does not im-
plicate altering operations, and is likely detected with the help of other corporate
governance mechanisms such as auditors, who are on the look-out for accounting
breaches or unjustified flexing of GAAP. In contrast, real earnings management im-
plies deviations from normal operations, and involves operating, financing, and in-
vestment decisions that may subsequently lower firm performance and value [63, 19].
No legal benchmarks exist to assess and identify real earnings management practices,
making them more difficult to monitor and oppose. Real earnings management may
be highly visible if it involves decisions such as shaving off research and development
expenses [25], selling assets [13], or changing customer credit policies [100]. How-
ever, all these decisions are well within managerial discretion, and constraining them
requires not only expert knowledge of the business to detect these decisions are sub-
optimal, but also, expert knowledge of the financial reporting system, to endeavor to
reverse-engineer their accounting consequences, and to correctly interpret and link
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such decision-making to earnings motives.
This focus on independent directors is merited as it is not clear how other moni-
toring mechanism, if any at all, is on the lookout of real earnings management. Prior
studies highlight how short-term pressure generates the incentives for managers to
focus on the short-run, possibly sacrificing the generation of long-term growth [104].
An example of such studies would be how institutional investors with a short-term
outlook on a firm’s prospects is associated with R&D cuts to offset earnings down-
turns [25]. This is supported by further evidence on the negative impact of takeover
protections on the use of real earnings management, more specifically [114] shows
how staggered boards is associated to lower levels of real earnings management. Ad-
ditionally, other monitoring mechanisms, such as auditors, are not on overseeing or
reviewing operational, financial or investments decisions that underlie beneath real
earnings management strategies In fact, as audit quality increases, firms appear to
engage more often in share buybacks with the purpose to support earnings per share,
which otherwise would have not met analysts’ expectations [24]. Finally, [71] show
that when analyst following exogenously decreases, managers response is to switch
from less visible strategies dealing with cutting discretionary expenses towards us-
ing accrual-based strategies. As focused directors are worried about constructing
and maintaining a prestige as diligent monitors, we expect that they will increase
their monitoring effort in harder-to-monitor actions that directly link to potential
decreases in firm value. Focused directors would not want to relinquish their most
prestigious directorships and, prestige and visibility directly links with firm value.
Therefore, we expect that boards with more focused directors will detect and con-
strain real earnings management which would negatively affect firm value, and thus,
their prestige.
This leads us to the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1. Ceteris paribus, firms with a larger percentage of focused directors
on their boards engage less in real earnings management activities.
Under our differential monitoring hypothesis, if accrual-based earnings manage-
ment reduces firm value, focused directors would also be expected to curtail it. How-
ever, the link with firm value (and thus, with the prestige and visibility of directors)
is not as straightforward as with real earnings management [67, 105, 22]. In addi-
tion, a growing literature shows that accruals-based and real earnings management
decisions may act as substitutes and also, that they are taken sequentially, with
real choices preceding accruals decisions [113]. The evidence in [38] indicates that
governance provisions aimed at strengthening the monitoring over the financial re-
porting system may increase real earnings management, while the results in [39], [11],
[113] and [109] confirm that managers choose among earnings management instru-
ments depending on their expected net costs. Against this backdrop, we make no
prediction on the effect of focused directors over the level of accrual-based earnings
management.
1.3 Research Method
1.3.1 Measurement of individual incentives
We create proxies for focused and dispersed directors following [90]. First, we rank
independent directors’ board seats by market value. A directorship is focused (dis-
persed) for a given director-year, if it represents more (less) than 10% (90%) of the
minimum (maximum) market capitalization in their portfolio of directorships.9 On
average (median), independent directors sit on 1.75 (1) boards. This prevents the
9For these calculations, market value is calculated as closing share price at the firm fiscal year times the
number of shares outstanding, source: Compustat. Additionally, we use other measures of firm visibility or
size (namely total assets and sales) and come to the same conclusions.
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possibility of creating measures based on percentiles.10 Then, we create the per-
centage of directorships (combination of director-year-firm observations) classified as
focused or dispersed, over the total number of directors (both outside and inside direc-
tors) in the board, aggregating incentives at the board level. These percentages indi-
cate the share of focused (Focused_Pct) and dispersed directors (Dispersed_Pct).11
For robustness, we create additional measures, such as indicator variables that equal
one when there is at least one focused director (Focused_Dummy) or dispersed
(Dispersed_Dummy); zero otherwise. We construct these measures also at the audit
committee level, as its duty is to oversee the financial reporting process as well as
for chairpeople whose importance is greater within the board of directors.
These measures capture, for every board, the number of independent directors
with incentives to monitor managers. As these directors hold multiple directorships,
all of them (focused and dispersed) potentially signal greater director talent [91].
However, a benefit of the procedure is that the same director that is classified as
focused in one firm is classified as dispersed in the board of another firm that same
year, but, importantly, this director is equally ‘busy’, and has the same innate talent,
skills, competence, expertise, financial and business knowledge, board connections,
access to networks, etc., in all their board seats.12 Thus, our identification strategy
permits focusing on understanding how the differential effort applied in each board
may differently influence monitoring, as other director-specific features, such as tal-
ent, are identical between the high and low rank seats of each individual director.13
10To check the robustness of the measures, we re-run our main analysis with non-parametric classifications
(minimum and maximum market values) of independent directors’ individual incentives.
11Variable definitions are in Appendix 2.
12A related paper that takes the alternative approach of looking at how individual directors influence
accounting quality (and not how individual directors may behave differently in different boards) is the work
of [36] who study how earnings management spreads between firms via shared directors. They find evidence
of greater earnings management when a firm shares a common director with a firm that manages earnings.
13We use as a robustness check a firm-year-director panel and director times year fixed effects to further
diminish concerns over the influence of individual characteristics of directors. This analysis can be found
in Table 1.10.
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We present an anonymized real example to illustrate the exogeneity of the con-
structs with respect to individual firms’ choices in Appendix 1.14 Director Jane Doe
is an independent director who holds multiple directorships at Firm A Inc., Firm B
Inc., and Firm C Inc. in the period 1999-2003.15 Jane is an independent director in
all these firms. We argue that she will not allocate her effort evenly across all her
seats. Using market value as a proxy for effort, we rank her directorships. The years
2002 and 2003 exemplify how individual incentives measures are largely exogenous.
Jane sits only in Firm A Inc., and Firm B Inc., whose market values suffer a reversal
from 2002 to 2003. Firm A Inc. (Firm B Inc.) is classified in Jane’s portfolio as
a focused (dispersed) directorship in 2002, but as a low (high) rank directorship in
2003. It is fair to assume that Firm A Inc., and Firm B Inc. cannot precisely control
their market values, to be classified as a high rank directorship in the portfolio of
some or all their independent directors. Also, it is not likely that firms can control
whether Jane gets offered additional board seats, which can alter her ranking.
At the board level, independent directors are aggregated according to their clas-
sification and averaged by the total number of directors within the board. These
percentages represent the share of independent directors likely to classify a board-
year observation as focused (dispersed) within their directorship portfolios. We are
confident that a single firm is not able to control its rank within each of its individual
independent directors’ board-seat portfolios.
1.3.2 Alternative measures of director allocation of effort
Our initial classification, as exemplified in our Jane Doe example in Appendix 1,
could lead to misclassification of directors’ allocation of effort, which could bias our
estimations. This is because directorships that are at the same time 10% larger than
14Accompanying figures are presented in Appendix 1.
15Ms. Doe does not hold a directorship in Firm C Inc. from 2002 onwards.
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the minimum market value and 90% smaller than the maximum market value are
classified as both focused and dispersed. To ensure this phenomenon does not affect
our results we proceed as follows.
First, [90] provide alternative measures using the minimum and maximum market
values to proxy for relative importance and show very similar results to their baseline
measures. We replicate our main analyses using those measures (Most_Focused_Pct
and Most_Dispersed_Pct) and find the same results. Second, we calculate alterna-
tive measures of directors’ allocation of effort to further ensure that neither double
counting nor the choice of thresholds drive our results. These alternative measures
are based on the percentage that a single directorship’s market value represents over
the market value of all the directorships in which an independent director partic-
ipates in a year. We assign a high allocation of effort to those directorships that
represent more than 50% (Focused_Pct_50), 70% (Focused_Pct_70) or 90% (Fo-
cused_Pct_90) of the total annual market value of all directorships in which a direc-
tor participates. To account for dispersed directors, we also create measures for low
allocation of effort if the directorship represents less than 50% (Dispersed_Pct_50),
30% (Dispersed_Pct_30), and 10% (Dispersed_Pct_10) of the total market value
of all directorships in which a director participates in a year.16
These three measures capture different circumstances of directors with multi-
ple directorships. Although unlikely, the Focused_Pct_50 (Dispersed_Pct_50)
measure might misclassify firms in which directors are actually indifferent in allo-
cating effort between firms. This may happen, for example, with a director with
two very similar directorships, one that represents 51% and another that represents
49%. It is not obvious that the independent director would differently allocate effort
between them. Focused_Pct_70 (Dispersed_Pct_30) and Focused_Pct_90 (Dis-
16These measures are validated at the director level following Masulis and Mobbs’ (2014) analyses but
are left unreported.
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persed_Pct_10) may better capture instances where directors can be considered as
focused or dispersed. These variables show lower variation than those in [90] given
that they rely on the market value share rather the relative market value position of
a firm.
1.3.3 Measurement of real earnings management
We measure real earnings management following [100]. [100] identifies as real earn-
ings management actions 1) the acceleration of sales through price discounts which
gives rises to abnormally positive levels of cash flows from operations (CFO), 2) the
decrease in discretionary operating expenses (DISEXP ) to increase earnings, and
3) the decrease in cost of goods sold (COGS) by over producing, to lower average
cost of production, and thus, increase unitary profits when recording sales. We first
estimate the normal level of cash flow from operations using the following model for
each industry-year pair (using 2-digic SIC and requiring at least 15 observations per
pair):
CFOt/TAt−1 = α0 + α1(1/TAt−1) + β1(Salest/TAt−1) + β2(∆Salest/TAt−1) + εt (1.1)
where all variables are defined in Appendix 2. The residuals from equation (1)
are our measure of abnormal operating cash flow (AB_CFO). Next, we obtain
the abnormal levels (AB_DISEXP ) of discretionary operating expenses, using the
following specification per industry-year:
DISEXPt/TAt−1 = α0 + α1(1/TAt−1) + β1(Salest−1/TAt−1) + εt (1.2)
where DISEXP is the sum of advertising, research and development, and selling
and general administrative expenses and the other variables are defined in Appendix
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2. Finally, we estimate abnormal production costs (AB_PROD) using the following
specification per industry-year:
PRODt/TAt−1 = α0+α1(1/TAt−1)+β1(Salest/TAt−1)+β2(∆Salest/TAt−1)+β2(∆Salest−1/TAt−1)+εt
(1.3)
Where, PROD is the sum of COGS and change in inventory, and all other vari-
ables are defined in Appendix 2.
We analyze real earnings management for a particular firm-year, as the aggre-
gation of the residuals from the corresponding industry-year regression in equations
(1) , (2) and (3). In particular, we construct our real earnings management proxy
(REM) as:
REMit = AB_PRODit − AB_DISEXPit − AB_CFOit (1.4)
The REM measure is decreasing in abnormal discretionary expenses and abnor-
mal cash flow, which harmonizes the direction of managerial strategies to achieve
artificially higher earnings. In unreported results, we follow [113] and construct an
alternative proxy for real earnings management. According to [113] and [100], cer-
tain managerial strategies directed at increasing earnings have opposite impacts on
the level of operating cash flows. For example, price discounts and overproduction
drive down cash flows, while cutting advertising expenses increases them. As alter-
native measures we use the individual components of the measure of real earnings
management (AB_PROD, AB_DISEXP , and AB_CFO).
1.3.4 Sample and descriptive statistics
Our sample is composed of firms in the cross-section of Compustat, CRSP and
BoardEx. We use BoardEx for data on independent directors, Compustat and CRSP
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for firm accounting and market information, 13F Thomson Reuters for data on in-
stitutional ownership, I/B/E/S for analyst data, and AuditAnalytics for data on
restatements. We exclude firms in the financial (US SIC 6000-6999) and utilities
(US SIC 4900-4999) sectors. This results in a final sample of 38,407 firm-year obser-
vations for the period 1987 to 2016, albeit sample sizes vary for some of our tests.
Table 1.1 Panel A shows descriptive statistics at the independent director level.
The average independent director in our sample holds 1.75 board seats within the
BoardEx universe, with around 60% of independent directors having only one di-
rectorship. On average, they remain in the firm 6.1 years as independent directors
and are approximately 61 years old. The average independent director participates in
1.48 major committees (auditing, nominating, and compensation). The committee in
which more independent directors participate is the audit committee (56%), next the
compensation committee (51%), and finally the nominating committee (42%). Fi-
nally, independent directors are on average the chairperson of a board sub-committee
42% of the time. Table 1.1 Panel B shows the summary statistics for independent
directors with multiple directorships. On average, they hold 4 seats approximately,
with one of those seats being classified as focused and another as dispersed.
Table 1.1 Panel C, shows the firm-level summary statistics. independent directors
represent around 63% of all directors. We can see that an average firm has 13%
(14%) of directors that are independent, hold at least two board seats, and consider
that firm as focused (dispersed). These figures are consistent with previous research
[90, 91, 102]. Given that an average board consists of 6.5 directors, this means boards
have 0.85 focused directors, and 0.91 dispersed directors, as well as 2.5 independent
directors who hold no further seats.
Table 1.2 contains the correlation matrix. The variables that measure focused
directors are negatively and significantly correlated with REM and its components.17
17These correlations and their statistical significance remains qualitatively and quantitatively similar for
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Interestingly, while focused directors are positively and significantly correlated with
the percentage of independent directors on the board (corr = 0.37, pval < 0.01),
dispersed directors present an even larger correlation (corr = 0.39, pval < 0.01).
This suggests that traditional measures of board independence may not capture
monitoring effort, potentially explaining the absence of a significant relationship
between board independence and accounting quality found in recent studies [e.g.,
33].
1.4 Main Results
To test H1, we estimate the following equation:
REMit = α + pii + θt + β
′Incentive_Measures+ λ′Controls+ νit (1.5)
where Incentive Measures is a vector of our measures of directors’ incentives to
monitor. Controls is a vector of incentive and corporate governance measures, as well
as firm level controls that influence REM, derived from prior literature. In particular,
we control for board busyness, board size, the percentage of independent directors,
average director tenure, average director age, percentage of financial experts within
the board of directors, CEO duality, abnormal accruals manipulation (constructed
following Roychowdhury, 2006), institutional ownership, market share, Altman’s Z,
taxes, firm size, growth opportunities, operational performance, and a measure of
pre-managed earnings.18 To the extent that focused directors lower real earnings
management, we expect the coefficient β that relates to focused directors to be
negative and statistically significant. All estimations are the result of fixed effects
estimation and clustering standard errors at both firm- and year-levels following [96].
our alternative measures of real earnings management.
18For variable definitions please go to Appendix 1.2.
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Table 1.3 shows the results from our main analyses. Panel A shows the im-
pact of focused directors on REM and its components while Panel B shows the
impact of alternative measures of focused directors. Panel A shows the results of
regressing REM (columns (1) and (2)) and its components (columns (3), (4), (5) and
(6)). Odd columns use the percetage measures of focused and dispersed directors,
whereas even columns use the indicator variables. The coefficient of the relationship
between focused directors and REM is negative and statistically significant at the
1% significance level. Focused directors are also linked to larger levels of abnor-
mal discretionary expenses (only the indicator variable is significant), lower levels
of abnormal production costs, and larger levels of abnormal cash flows. These indi-
cate that focused directors are linked to lower levels or real earnings manipulation.
Among the different controls it is interesting to point out that the coefficient of board
independence (Ind_Dir_Pct) is not statistically significant, which connects to prior
evidence on the lack of impact from independent directors on earnings management
[8, 33].
The economic significance of these findings is as follows. For a 1% increase in the
percentage of independent directors at the board level that hold multiple director-
ships and consider this firm of relatively high importance, REM decreases by 0.090,
which represents around a 19% of the REM’s standard deviation. Moreover, firms
with at least one focused directors, also show lower levels of REM compared to firms
without focused directors. Table 1.3 Panel B repeats the main analysis in Panel A,
but using as variables the non-parametrical measures using the maximum and mini-
mum market values. Panel B shows the same patterns of Panel A and help to confirm
our hypothesis. The coefficients for dispersed directors in both panels are positive
and statistically significantly linked to REM. This indicates that they are associated
with larger levels of real activities manipulation. This is additional evidence that
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not all independent directors have the same impact on monitoring and therefore, in
reducing real earnings management. It is striking to notice how directors who have
the same fiduciary duties towards shareholders may behave differently in different
boards.
1.5 Robustness Checks
1.5.1 Alternative measures of focused and dispersed directors
As we previously discussed, we create alternative incentive measures based on the
market value weight of single directorships within independent directors’ portfolios.
Table 1.4 shows the results of our main analyses using these alternative measures.
We use as a dependent variable the composite measure of REM (Equation 4), but
in unreported results we test for their impact on the individual items and come
to find very similar conclusions. Again, odd columns show the results of using the
percentage variables, whereas even columns show the results from using the indicator
variables. It is interesting to notice that as we move from Focused_Pct_50 (column
(1)) to Focused_Pct_70 (column (3)) and then to Focused_Pct_90 (column (5)),
one can appreciate that the impact of focused directors increases in magnitude. This
is consistent with how the variables are constructed. We expect that the incentives
to monitor increase as a firm represents a larger share within the directors’ portfolio
of board seats. This phenomenon (increasing impact) is also found for dispersed
directors. This is because the measures with more extreme thresholds seem to capture
clearer differences in the allocation of effort of independent directors with multiple
directorships.
The conclusions from the alternative measures are the same as those obtained with
the baseline analyses reported in Table 1.3. This further supports our hypothesis,
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showing a different impact of independent directors on firms’ real activities manip-
ulation. It also contributes to the literature a novel measure to identify monitoring
incentives of independent directors equivalent to that of [90].
1.5.2 Audit committee and chair position
Board members of the audit committee are charged with the duty of overseeing the
financial reporting process of firms [79]. They are at the appropriate position to
detect and curtail earnings mangement, as they are also required by recent regula-
tion to disclose whether audit committee members possess the necessary accounting
knowledge that would allow them to detect flexing of the GAAP. On the other hand,
real earnings management would entail the manipulation of operational activites
that would require not only accounting knowledge but also industry and business
knowledge. Focused independent directors that participate as members of the audit
committee would have the incentive to monitor the financial reporting process and
more specifically to monitor real activities manipulation. Nonehteless, they might
not possess the sufficient industry and business knowledge to detect non-optimal
business decisions. This is why we do not predict whether the impact of focused
directors will be larger if they are members of the audit committee. We use a similar
reasoning with the position of chairperson of the possible committees available at
the board.
Table 1.5 shows the results of the impact of focused directors on the composite
measure of real earnings management. Columns (1) and (2) show the impact of
focused directors at the audit committee level, whereas columns (3) and (4) show
the impact of focused directors at the chair position. Again, odd columns show
the percentage measures, while even columns show the results from using indicator
variables. The impact of focused audit committee members and focused chairpeople
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are larger but still very similar to that of the baseline specification from Table 1.3.
It is interesting to notice that for dispersed audit committee members and dispersed
chairpeople their impact on real earnings management is around 50% larger than
that of the baseline specification from Table 1.3.
1.5.3 Exogenous changes to directors’ classifications
As we are not able to directly observe independent director allocation of monitoring
effort, we estimate it through a proxy that captures directors’ preferences towards
an allocation of effort that maximizes their utility. Utility is greater when the firm
has greater market value, but arguably, it could also be director compensation, stock
ownership or legal incentives that drive the allocation of monitoring effort. These
measures are largely exogenous to a single firm’s choices, as individual director’s allo-
cation of monitoring effort is independent from firm choices. Indeed, for endogeneity
to bias our results a firm would have to (1) knowingly notice that size (measured as
market value) induces independent directors to allocate more or less effort, (2) be
observant of the rest of boards in which their independent directors participate and
their market values, (3) control its market value to position within its independent
directors’ rankings of directorships, and (4) be able to do it throughout time and
control new directorships in which its directors participate. This is possibly highly
unlikely.
These measures are also independent of individual characteristics of independent
directors. Time-variant and invariant traits such as gender, nationality, financial ex-
pertise, ability, ethics or age, do not influence firm outcomes through these measures
since they are constructed based on the market value of the different directorships
in which the same director participates. In fact, focused and dispersed directors are
the same directors, behaving heterogeneously in different firms. However, we cannot
33
entirely exclude that unobserved factors might bias our estimates and conclusions,
but to further ease concerns about unobserved heterogeneity, we rely on the intu-
ition in [90] and at the director-year level, we identify directorships that change from
dispersed to focused (focused to dispersed), given a 5% drop (increase) in market
value of another firm in their portfolio, the market value of that given firm does not
increase (decrease) more than 10% and no new directorships are added or dropped.19
We then count by firm-year the number of directors that meet the previous con-
ditions and create indicator variables that take the value 1 whenever there is at
least one director in a given firm-year that has reclassified their ranking accordingly
(Dispersed_to_Focused and Focused_to_Dispersed).
Using these plausibly more exogenous measures of directors’ relative effort distri-
bution, we replicate our baseline analyses.20 The results are reported in Table 1.6,
where we find that firms with at least one director that reclassified its ranking from
dispersed to focused present lower levels of real activities manipulation compared
to firms that have no such director. Second, we find that firms with at least one
director that reclassified its ranking from focused to dispersed present larger levels
of real activities manipulation compared to firms that have no such director. This
evidence is in line with our previous results and strengthens our claim that indepen-
dent directors’ incentives have a statistical significant influence on the level of real
activities manipulation through their allocation of effort. Nonetheless, this conclu-
sion should not be freely extrapolated to other instances. This is because only those
directors that are aware of the change in their rankings and rationally change their
19[90] use this definition to create treatment directors, and then apply a diff-in-diff strategy at the firm
level. In unreported results we follow Masulis and Mobbs strategy, but we obtain non-significant results
in our main analysis of REM, except for when we use the Institutional Shareholder Services (formerly
RiskMetrics) dataset, in which case our results are robust to this strategy. [90] only identify directorships
that change from dispersed to focused, whereas we look at the two different effects (from dispersed to
focused, but also from focused to dispersed).
20Variable descriptions are available in Appendix 2.
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allocation of effort will be carrying the impact on real earnings management. This
is a similar issue with treatment compliance and the local average treatment effect
[7]. In fact, the impact is also smaller in magnitude and less statistically significant
when compared to the baseline specification in Table 1.3.
1.5.4 Focused directors and firm complexity
In this subsection, we turn to analyze the impact of focused directors in subsamples
of firms whose operations might be more difficult to monitor. We use firm size, age
and the number of business segments [44] to classify firms as possessing complex
enviroments (above or equal the industry-year median value) or less complex ones
(below the industry-year median values). We perform this test because monitoring
can be more difficult in more complex environments [48]). This could affect the
willingness of the average independent director of exerting an ‘extra’ effort to mon-
itorthe financial reporting process and more specifically real earnings mangement.
We expect not only that focused directors would make that extra effort but we also
expect that the size of their impact might be lessened by the increased complexity.
Table 1.7 provides the results obtained for different levels of firm complexity.
Odd columns represent less complex environments, whereas even columns indicate an
above median level of firm complexity. Columns (1) and (2) measure firm complexity
as firm size (total asset value), columns (3) and (4) use firm age and columns (5) and
(6) use the number of business segments. The impact of focused directors is found
throughout all levels of firm complexity, but their impact in waned in more complex
environments as one would expect. Furthermore, the impact of dispersed directors
is only found in more complex environments, which is of great interest, given that
dispersed directors do not necessarily possess the incentive to support or incentivize
misbehavior, i.e., they do not need to be coopted by the CEO. Dispersed directors
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might be simply not exerting enough effort, which is detrimental to their monitoring
of real earnings management when firms are more complex.
1.5.5 The market value effect
It is likely that large firms look only for independent directors who are good monitors,
as they are exposed to greater exposure and scrutiny. Larger firms are likely to draw
from a larger pool of talent when hiring independent directors [80]. To ensure that
firm size effects do not confound our main results, we divide our sample in four
different portfolios according to market value and re-run our baseline specification.
Furthermore, we regress our composite measure of real earnings management on
market value and obtain the residuals from this estimation, which we later use as a
dependent variable.
Table 1.8 shows the relationship between focused and dispersed directors and
real earnings management considering the impact of market value. Columns (1),
(2), (3) and (4) show the results for the different subsamples that correspond to
the quartiles from the distribution of market value. Focused directors significantly
reduce real earnings management activities in almost all subsamples of market value
except for very large firms. The pattern is the same to that of Table 1.7 if we used
market value as a measure of complexity. The impact of focused directors wanes
as firms become larger in terms of market value. This also ensures that the impact
of focused directors is not driven by firms with large market values. To further
appease concerns of the impact from market value on focused directors, we present
in Table 1.8 column (5) the results of our baseline regression from Table 1.3 with the
residual from a regression of real earnings management on market value as the new
dependent variable. This residual is orthogonal to market value and the impact of
focused directors remain very similar in size and statistical significance.
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1.5.6 The impact of focused directors’ departures
In this subsection, we study the impact of focused directors’ departures on real
earnings management. We use as a proxy for director departure from the board
the actual passing of directors. This setting allows us to inspect whether there
is any difference in the passing of a focused director vs. the passing of a dispersed
director with respect to real earnings management and the monitoring of the financial
reporting process. The death of directors and executives has been exploited as a
shock to the workload a director faces and the distraction it creates for their other
directorships [47]. We exploit the different impact that a focused director passing
would bring with respect to a dispersed one. Thus, we assume that when a focused
director exits the board for reasons unrelated to their performance or any other
unobservable firm choices (death is a likely unrelated scenario), this will lead to an
increase in real earnings management.
Table 1.9 shows the results of focused directors deaths and focused chair deaths
on the composite measure of real earnings management. We also present evidence
of focused directors and chairs deaths for relatively more complex firm environments
where the workload is usually larger. Columns (1) to (4) show the impact of focused
directors’ death on real earnings management, where columns (2) to (4) represent
sub-sets of more complex firms. The impact of focused directors deaths is positive
and statistically significant (except for column (3) in which it is marginally signif-
icant). This implies that the departure of a focused director for reasons unrelated
to their performance or unobservable firm characteristics is linked to larger levels of
real earnings management. On the other hand, dispersed directors’ departures are
not significantly linked to lower levels of real earnings management, except for the
subsamples of larger firms with more number of business segments. We replicate the
same analysis for focused chairpeople and come to find similar results (columns (5)
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to (6)).
1.5.7 Director-level characteristics
In this subsection, we directly tackle the issue of individual director unobservable
characteristics such as ability. Our procedure takes advantage of a firm-year-director
level sample and director times year fixed effects. We run our baseline estimations
from Table 1.3, augmenting the sample and saturating the estimation by using di-
rector times year fixed effects. The impact of focused directors is very similar to that
of the baseline specification, except for the abnormal discretionary component where
now the impact is statistically significant at sensible levels. The conclusion from this
test is that individual director unobservable characteristics do not drive our results,
in fact they might have attenuated a few of our main results.
1.5.8 Real earnings management and first-stage controls
Using a residual as a dependent variable is a very common practice in the earnings
management literature [see for instance 43]. Although a very common practice, it
entails certain risks. Among those risks [32] identify biased coefficients and standard
errors that can lead to incorrect inferences. The authors show that there is attenu-
ation bias when the variable of interest (in our case focused directors) is correlated
with any of the regressors used in the first stage of the procedure (Equations 1, 2
and 3). The worst scenario is when the variable of interest and other covariates
included as controls are correlated with the first stage regressors, in that case the
estimated coefficients and t-statistics can be attenuated, inflated or even biased. As
this problem might bias our interpretation of the results we follow the advice from
[32], and include the first stage controls in our baseline specification from Table 1.3.
Table 1.11 shows the results of including the first-stage regressors from Equations
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1, 2 and 3 in our main specifications from Table 1.3. Main results remain but are
waned both in magnitude and statistical significance, which leads us to conclude that
the risks posed by [32] might be present in similar studies.
1.6 Additional Analyses
1.6.1 Focused directors and firms’ information environment
Prior literature on independent directors indicates that high information acquisi-
tion costs often hinder the monitoring and advising roles of directors [69, 1, 44].
This research stream argues that board independence matters when there are low
information acquisition costs and when outside directors do not suffer from this
asymmetry of information vis-à-vis inside directors [44]. The information environ-
ment is generally assumed to be exogenously given, and thus board independence
adapts accordingly. On the other hand, another stream of the literature [see for
instance 8], argues that board independence influences the information environment
of a firm, i.e., that independent directors can lower the information acquisition costs
or managers can lower information asymmetries to attract independent directors.
Our setting allows us to examine how focused directors might shape the informa-
tion environment. We study in Table 1.12 the impact of focused directors on analyst-
based measures (analyst following, forecast error, and analyst dispersion), and mar-
ket measures (Bid-Ask spread, volatility, and trading volume) following Duchin et
al. (2010). We also use their aggregate index of information acquisition costs. Ta-
ble 1.12 shows the estimations of the lead values of analyst following (column (1)),
analyst dispersion (column (2)), forecast error (column (3)), information acquisition
cost index (column (4)), volatility (column (5)), Bid-Ask spread (column (6)), and
trading volume (column (7)). We use the lead values since effective changes to the
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information environment may take longer than the impact of focused directors on
real earnings management.21 Results show that focused directors decrease informa-
tion asymmetries one period ahead, except for the Bid-Ask spread where the effect is
not significant. This evidence is consistent with recent causal evidence provided by
[8], where an exogenous increase in board independence leads to a more transparent
information environment. There is also more recent evidence provided by [102] who
show that focused directors lead to a more transparent information environment.
1.6.2 Focused directors and financial reporting restatements
A priori, one would argue that earnings restatements arise solely as an outcome
of accounting irregularities. This can be true, but in fact, there is evidence that
prior an accounting restatement firms appear to engage in both accrual-based and
real earnings management [46]. Also, independent directors can suffer harsh labor
market penalties caused by earnings restatements [103]. As one of the lasts analyses,
we examine the impact of focused directors on earnings restatements. Our main
hypothesis focuses on the monitoring real activities versus accrual-based earnings
management, precisely because the latter does not directly link to penalties in terms
of market value. Focused directors work harder and are less willing to relinquish the
directorships they deem more important. Because financial restatements penalize
independent directors and specially audit committee members, focused directors are
expected to be especially motivated to reduce the probability of incurring in activities
that lead to a restatement.
Table 1.13 shows the impact of focused directors on the likelihood of financial
restatements. There is a consistently negative effect of focused directors on all types
of restatements and the likelihood of a SEC investigation taking place. The nega-
tive impact is statistically significant for all types of restatements (column (1)), for
21The impact of focused directors on current levels of information environment remain very similar.
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accounting restatements (column (2)), and for restatements that decrease previously
reported figures (column (5)). On the other hand, dispersed directors seem to lead
to restatements that are linked to fraud cases (column (3)).
1.6.3 Real earnings management and future outcomes
Finally, in this subsection we analyze the impact of focused directors on future out-
comes linked to real earnings management strategies. We focus our anlyses on uncol-
lectible receivables, inventory management, patent activity and quality and perfor-
mance. For instance, if a manager wants to pursue a strategy that could yield a larger
earnings figure they could sell on credit to clients that are not as likely to pay them
in the future. This example shows how managers may sacrifice future outcomes (like
high bad debt expense, accumulated inventory, lower innovation and performance)
for a bump in earnings in the present year. We argued and presented evidence in
favor of focused directors being linked to lower levels of real earnings management.
Focused directors would prefer not to suffer the future consequences of pursuing dif-
ferent strategies of real earnings management. We test the following idea that if
focused directors are present, they will curtail real earnings management and this
would lead to improved outcomes related to real earnings management strategies.
Table 1.14 Panel A and Panel B shows evidence that supports the idea that the
presence of focused directors lead to improved outcomes related to real earnings man-
agement strategies. In Panel A, we show a test of means among two subsamples.
The first subsample (column (1)) is composed of firms that possess at least one fo-
cused director and none dispersed directors, and the second subsample (column (2))
is composed of firms that possess at least one dispersed director and none focused
directors. Columns (3) and (4) present the t-statistic and p-value of the difference
between columns (1) and (2). The results from Table 1.14 Panel A show that when
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compared to firms in the second subsample, those firms that possess at least one
focused director and none dispersed directors show, on average, fewer days in in-
ventory, more patents and citations, larger Tobin’s Q, return on equity and assets,
both three and five years ahead respectively. Moreover, Table 1.14 Panel B shows
that focused directors lead to future decreases in bad debts, days in inventory and
to increases in the number of patents.
1.7 Conclusions
We provide large-sample evidence of how individual incentives of independent di-
rectors to be efficient monitors influence their ability to improve financial reporting
quality. Our main results show that focused directors (those with the incentives to
be efficient monitors) significantly reduce real earnings manipulation. We obtain the
same findings for the audit committee members. We distinguish between focused and
dispersed directors following [90]. As robustness checks, we create and validate alter-
native proxies for focused and dispersed directors. We also show that large firms do
not drive our main results. To deal with additional endogeneity concerns, we account
for shocks to firm value that force dispersed directors to be focused and vice versa.
In additional results, we show that focused directors significantly ameliorate firm
information environment and reduce the probability of the firm engaging in earnings
restatements. Additionally, we find that focused directors significantly reduce the
level of real earnings management along the distribution of overall firm complexity
and are less likely to engage in accounting restatements.
Our analyses contribute to the existing literature showing that within-board het-
erogeneity among independent director’s individual incentives affects monitoring ef-
fectiveness. We argue that within every board of directors there could be both focused
and dispersed independent directors. These two types of directors possess different
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incentives to apply effort and monitor firms’ reporting process, which is likely to
affect firms’ accounting quality. Our work empirically shows that focused directors
reduce firms’ real earnings manipulation. These findings contribute to the literature
analyzing board independence and accounting quality by categorizing independent
directors by their incentives to monitor.
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Appendixes
Appendix 1.1: Measurement of individual incentives: Real life case for a single independent director.
Year Company
Market Minimum Maximum Focused Dispersed
Value ($M) MkV ($M) MkV ($M) Directorship Directorship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1999 Firm A Inc. 6,947 722 8,002 1 1
1999 Firm B Inc. 8,002 722 8,002 1 0
1999 Firm C Inc. 722 722 8,002 0 1
2000 Firm A Inc. 13,870 206 13,870 1 0
2000 Firm B Inc. 7,073 206 13,870 1 1
2000 Firm C Inc. 206 206 13,870 0 1
2001 Firm A Inc. 12,254 337 12,254 1 0
2001 Firm B Inc. 8,958 337 12,254 1 1
2001 Firm C Inc. 337 337 12,254 0 1
2002 Firm A Inc. 10,809 9,374 10,809 1 0
2002 Firm B Inc. 9,374 9,374 10,809 0 1
2003 Firm A Inc. 10,677 10,677 12,456 0 1
2003 Firm B Inc. 12,456 10,677 12,456 1 0
We present an anonymized real example to illustrate the plausible exogenous nature of the constructs with
respect to individual firms’ choices. Director Jane Doe is an independent director who holds multiple directorships
at Firm A, Firm B, and Firm C for the period 1999-2003. Jane is an independent director in all these firms. We
argue that she will not allocate her effort evenly across all her seats. Using market value as a proxy for effort, we
rank her directorships into the maximum and minimum value across their portfolio (columns (3), (4) and (5)). The
years 2002 and 2003 exemplify how individual incentives measures are largely exogenous to the individual choices
of Firm A and Firm B. Jane sits only in Firm A, and Firm B, whose market values suffer a reversal from 2002 to
2003. Firm A Inc. (Firm B) is classified in Jane’s portfolio as a focused (dispersed) directorship in 2002, but as a
dispersed (focused) directorship in 2003. It is fair to assume that Firm A, and Firm B cannot precisely control their
market values, to be classified as a focused directorship in the portfolio of some or all their independent directors.
Also, it is not likely that firms can control whether Jane gets offered additional board seats, which can alter her
ranking.
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Appendix 2. Definition of Variables.
Variables Definition Database
AB_CFO Abnormal cash flow from operations calculated following
Roychowdhury (2006).
COMPUSTAT.
AB_DEXP Abnormal discretionary expenses calculated following Roy-
chowdhury (2006).
COMPUSTAT.
AB_PROD Abnormal production costs calculated following Roychowd-
hury (2006).
COMPUSTAT.
REM Equal to AB_PROD– AB_DEXP – AB_CFO. COMPUSTAT.
AB_ACC Residual of the abnormal accruals estimation following Roy-
chowdhury (2006).
COMPUSTAT.
Focused Director Proxies
Focused_Directorship Calculated for independent directors with multiple director-
ships. It is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the director-
ship is 10% larger than the director’s smallest directorship
measured by the market capitalization of the firm.
BoardEx.
Focused_Pct Calculated for the independent directors. It is the percent-
age of independent directors with high incentives to monitor
calculated as the ratio between the number of independent
directors with multiple directorships that perceive a given
board as a Focused_Directorship, and the number of board
members.
BoardEx.
Focused_Audit_Pct Calculated for the audit committee. It is the percentage of
independent directors with high incentives to monitor calcu-
lated as the ratio between the number of independent direc-
tors with multiple directorships that perceive a given audit
committee as a Focused_Directorship and the total number
directors within the audit committee.
BoardEx.
Focused_Chairperson_Pct Calculated for chairpeople. It is the percentage of chair-
people with high incentives to monitor calculated as the
ratio between the number of independent chairpeople with
multiple directorships that perceive a given board as a Fo-
cused_Directorship and the total number of independent di-
rectors.
BoardEx.
Most_Focused_Directorship Calculated for independent directors. It is an indicator vari-
able that equals 1 if the directorship is the largest in terms
of market capitalization within the director’s portfolio of di-
rectorships.
BoardEx.
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Most_Focused_Pct Calculated for the independent directors. It is the percent-
age of independent directors with high incentives to monitor
calculated as the ratio between the number of independent
directors with multiple directorships that perceive a given
board as Most_Focused_Directorsip, and board size.
BoardEx.
Focused_Dummy Calculated for independent directors. It is an indicator vari-
able that equals 1 when Focused_Pct is larger than 0%.
BoardEx.
Focused_Audit_Dummy Calculated for the audit committee. It is an indicator vari-
able that equals 1 when Focused_Audit_Pct is larger than
0%.
BoardEx.
Focused_Chairperson_Dummy Calculated for the chairpeople. It is an indicator variable
that equals 1 when Focused_Chairperson_Pct is larger than
0%.
BoardEx.
Most_Focused_Dummy Calculated for independent directors. It is an indicator vari-
able that equals 1 when Most_Focused_Pct is larger than
0%.
BoardEx.
Dispersed Director Proxies
Dispersed_Directorship Calculated for independent directors with multiple director-
ships. It is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the director-
ship is 10% smaller than the director’s largest directorship
measured by the market capitalization of the firm.
BoardEx.
Dispersed_Pct Calculated for the independent directors. It is the percent-
age of independent directors with low incentives to monitor
calculated as the ratio between the number of independent
directors with multiple directorships that perceive a given
board as a Dispersed_Directorship, and the number of board
members.
BoardEx.
Dispersed_Audit_Pct Calculated for the audit committee. It is the percentage of
independent directors with low incentives to monitor calcu-
lated as the ratio between the number of independent direc-
tors with multiple directorships that perceive a given audit
committee as a Dispersed_Directorship and the total num-
ber directors within the audit committee.
BoardEx.
Dispersed_Chairperson_Pct Calculated for chairpeople. It is the percentage of chairpeo-
ple with low incentives to monitor calculated as the ratio
between the number of independent chairpeople with mul-
tiple directorships that perceive a given board as a Dis-
persed_Directorship and the total number of independent
directors.
BoardEx.
46
Most_Dispersed_Directorship Calculated for independent directors. It is an indicator vari-
able that equals 1 if the directorship is the smallest in terms
of market capitalization within the director’s portfolio of di-
rectorships.
BoardEx.
Most_Dispersed_Pct Calculated for the independent directors. It is the percent-
age of independent directors with low incentives to monitor
calculated as the ratio between the number of independent
directors with multiple directorships that perceive a given
board as Most_Dispersed_Directorsip, and board size.
BoardEx.
Dispersed_Dummy Calculated for independent directors. It is an indicator vari-
able that equals 1 when Dispersed_Pct is larger than 0%.
BoardEx.
Dispersed_Audit_Dummy Calculated for the audit committee. It is an indicator vari-
able that equals 1 when Dispersed_Audit_Pct is larger than
0%.
BoardEx.
Dispersed_Chairperson_Dummy Calculated for the chairpeople. It is an indicator variable
that equals 1 when Dispersed_Chairperson_Pct is larger
than 0%.
BoardEx.
Most_Dispersed_Dummy Calculated for independent directors. It is an indicator vari-
able that equals 1 when Most_Dispersed_Pct is larger than
0%.
BoardEx.
Double_Count Dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever a di-
rectorship is ranked by an independent director with
multiple directorships as Dispersed_Directorship and Fo-
cused_Directorship.
BoardEx.
Number_of_Board_Seats Number of directorships an independent director holds per
year within the BoardEx universe.
BoardEx.
Num_of_Committees Number of committees an independent director holds per
year within the BoardEx universe.
BoardEx.
Audit_Committee Dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever an inde-
pendent director seats in the audit committee.
BoardEx.
Nominating_Committee Dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever an inde-
pendent director seats in the nominating committee.
BoardEx.
Compensation_Committee Dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever an inde-
pendent director seats in the compensation committee.
BoardEx.
Major_Committee Dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever an indepen-
dent director seats in the audit, compensation or nominating
committee.
BoardEx.
Chairperson Dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever an indepen-
dent director holds the position of chairperson in any given
committee.
BoardEx.
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Sole_Directorship Dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever a director
possesses a single directorship in a given year.
BoardEx.
Sole_Dir_Pct Percentage of independent directors that possess only one
directorship in a given year.
BoardEx.
Independent_Pct Percentage of independent directors. BoardEx.
Board_Size Number of board members for a given year. BoardEx.
Busy_Director Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when an indepen-
dent director participates in more than three boards within
BoardEx.
BoardEx.
Busy_Board It is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the percentage of
independent busy directors is higher than 50%. Busy direc-
tors are those working in 3 or more directorships within the
BoardEx database.
BoardEx.
Age Director age. BoardEx.
Avg_Age Board average of independent directors’ age. BoardEx.
Tenure Number of years a director has been serving in the board. BoardEx.
Avg_Tenure Average number of years independent directors have been
serving on the board.
BoardEx.
Num_Seats Yearly number of board seats within the BoardEx database
in which a director participates.
BoardEx.
CEO_Duality Indicator that takes the value 1 whenever the CEO of a firm
is also the Chairperson of the Board of Directors in a given
year.
BoardEx.
Fin_Exp A dummy variable that takes the value one whenever an
independent director primary employment is an executive
position at another firm.
BoardEx.
Pct_Fin_Exp Percentage of independent directors that are executives at
their primary employments.
BoardEx.
MTB Market-to-book ratio. COMPUSTAT.
ROA Return on Assets calculated as income before extraordinary
items divided by total assets.
COMPUSTAT.
Firm_size Firm’ size calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets. COMPUSTAT.
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets. COMPUSTAT.
Market_Share Company’s sales divided by total sales in the industry using
the 3-digits SIC code.
COMPUSTAT.
Z_Score Altman’s Z defined as in [113]. COMPUSTAT.
IO Institutional ownership. Percentage of institutional owner-
ship.
TR 13F.
Taxes Annual taxes paid over total assets. COMPUSTAT.
Size Natural logarithm of total assets. COMPUSTAT.
MTB Market to book ratio. COMPUSTAT.
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Earn Measure of pre-managed earnings following [113]. It equals
income before extraordinary items minus abnormal accru-
als minus production costs and plus discretionary expenses,
divided by total assets.
COMPUSTAT.
Bid_Ask_Spread Annual measure that captures the difference between Bid
and Ask, weighted by the average Bid and Ask.
CRSP.
Volatility Annual measure that captures the standard deviation of a
firm’s monthly returns.
CRSP.
Analyst_Following Residual from a regression of the natural logarithm of the
number of analysts following a firm on the natural logarithm
of total assets.
I\B\E\S.
Forecast_Error The absolute value of the difference between the actual and
forecasted EPS deflated by the beginning fiscal price of that
year. Multiplied by 1,000.
COMPUSTAT, and
I\B\E\S.
Analyst_Dispersion Standard deviation from the absolute value of the difference
between the median analyst consensus and the actual EPS.
Multiplied by 1,000.
I\B\E\S.
Information_Cost_Index Variable that captures the information acquisition cost
that face outside directors. It is based on the inverse
of Analyst_Following, and Analyst_Dispersion and Fore-
cast_Error, and constructed following Duchin et al., 2010,
i.e. the deciles of each variables are added together and scale
it to range from zero (low) to one (high).
From [44]. COMPU-
STAT, and I\B\E\S.
Market_Value The natural logarithm of market capitalization. COMPUSTAT.
Number_of_Segments Number of business segments. COMPUSTAT.
Firm_Age Number of years a firm has appeared in CRSP. CRSP.
Volume Natural logarithm of the average volume of operations of a
firm stock.
CRSP.
Restatement Dummy variable that indicates a firm is discloses a financial
statement restatement.
AuditAnalytics.
Accounting_Restatement Dummy variable that indicates that the restatement identi-
fied accounting rule application failures.
AuditAnalytics.
Fraud_Restatement Dummy variable that indicates that the restatement identi-
fied financial fraud, irregularities and misrepresentations.
AuditAnalytics.
Clerical_Error Dummy variable that indicates that the restatement identi-
fied material accounting and clerical application errors.
AuditAnalytics.
Adverse_Restatement Dummy variable that indicates whether the net effect to
the financial statements (income statement, balance sheet
or cash flows) was positive.
AuditAnalytics.
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Improve_Restatement Dummy variable that indicates whether the net effect to
the financial statements (income statement, balance sheet
or cash flows) was negative.
AuditAnalytics.
SEC_Restatement Dummy variable that indicates the restatement disclosure
identified SEC investigation of the registrant.
AuditAnalytics.
TA Firm’s total assets. COMPUSTAT.
SALES Firm’s net sales. COMPUSTAT.
Bad_Debt Estimated value of bad debt over total sales. COMPUSTAT.
Days_Inv Average number of days a firm takes to turn its inventory
into sales.
COMPUSTAT.
Patents Number of patents. NBER.
Citations Number of citations. NBER.
Q Tobin’s Q approximation calculated as total assets minus
book value of equity plus market value of equity over total
assets.
COMPUSTAT.
ROE Return on equity, calculated as income before extraordinary
items over book value of equity.
COMPUSTAT.
Alternative Focused Director Proxies
Focused_Directorship_50 Dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever a given
directorship represents more than 50% of the total market
value of all directorships hold by independent directors with
multiple directorships.
BoardEx.
Focused_Directorship_70 Dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever a given
directorship represents more than 70% of the total market
value of all directorships hold by independent directors with
multiple directorships.
BoardEx.
Focused_Directorship_90 Dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever a given
directorship represents more than 90% of the total market
value of all directorships hold by independent directors with
multiple directorships.
BoardEx.
Dispersed_to_Focused_DirectorshipFirm-level indicator that takes the value 1 whenever at least
one directorship changes from Dispersed_Directorship to Fo-
cused_Directorship due to a drop (of at least 5%) in the
market value of other firm(s) in the portfolio of their direc-
tors in a given year, and the present firm does not experience
an increase in market value larger than 10%.
BoardEx.
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Dispersed_to_Focused_Dummy Firm-level indicator variable that takes the value 1 whenever
at least for one director this board seat changes from Dis-
persed_Directorship to Focused_Directorship due to a drop
(of at least 5%) in the market value of other firm(s) in the
portfolio of that director in a given year, and the present
firm does not experience an increase in market value larger
than 10%.
BoardEx.
Focused_Death Dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever at least one
focused director dies in a given year.
BoardEx.
Focused_Chair_Death Dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever at least one
focused chairperson dies in a given year.
BoardEx.
Alternative Dispersed Director Proxies
Dispersed_Directorship_50 Dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever a given
directorship represents less than 50% of the total market
value of all directorships hold by independent directors with
multiple directorships.
BoardEx.
Dispersed_Directorship_70 Dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever a given
directorship represents less than 30% of the total market
value of all directorships hold by independent directors with
multiple directorships.
BoardEx.
Dispersed_Directorship_90 Dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever a given
directorship represents less than 10% of the total market
value of all directorships hold by independent directors with
multiple directorships.
BoardEx.
Focused_to_Dispersed_DirectorshipFirm-level indicator that takes the value 1 whenever at least
one directorship changes from Focused_Directorship to Dis-
persed_Directorship due to an increase (of at least 5%) in
the market value of other firm(s) in the portfolio of their
directors in a given year, and the present firm does not ex-
perience a drop in market value larger than 10%.
BoardEx.
Focused_to_Dispersed_Dummy Firm-level indicator variable that takes the value 1 when-
ever at least for one director this board seat changes from
Focused_Directorship to Dispersed_Directorship due to an
increase (of at least 5%) in the market value of other firm(s)
in the portfolio of that director in a given year, and the
present firm does not experience a decrease in market value
larger than 10%.
BoardEx.
Dispersed_Death Dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever at least one
dispersed director dies in a given year.
BoardEx.
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Dispersed_Chair_Death Dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever at least one
dispersed chairperson dies in a given year.
BoardEx.
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Table 1.1: Panel A. Independent Director Level Summary Statistics
Variable Name
Number of
Mean S.D. P25 P50 P75Observations
Age 269,702 61.34 9.47 55 62 68
Tenure 270,270 6.61 5.92 2 5 9
Number_of_Board_Seats 270,270 1.75 1.53 1 1 2
Sole_Directorship 270,270 0.6 0.49 0 1 1
Num_of_Committees 134,198 1.92 0.86 1 2 2
Audit_Committee 134,198 0.56 0.5 0 1 1
Nominating_Committee 134,198 0.42 0.49 0 0 1
Compensation_Committee 134,198 0.51 0.5 0 1 1
Major_Committee 134,198 1.48 0.79 1 1 2
Chairperson 134,198 0.42 0.49 0 0 1
Table 1.1: Panel B. independent directors with Multiple Directorships Level Summary Statistics.
Variable Name
Number of
Mean S.D. P25 P50 P75Observations
Number_of_board_seats 110,193 3.83 6.61 2 2 3
Focused_Directorship 110,193 0.58 0.49 0 1 1
Dispersed_Directorship 110,193 0.56 0.5 0 1 1
Double_Count 110,193 0.18 0.38 0 0 0
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Table 1.1: Continued. Panel C. Firm-level Summary Statistics.
Variable Name
Number of
Mean S.D. P25 P50 P75Observations
REM 38,437 -0.02 0.48 -0.26 0.00 0.24
AB_CFO 38,437 0.08 0.17 -0.01 0.07 0.17
AB_PROD 38,437 -0.04 0.23 -0.16 -0.03 0.08
AB_DISEXP 38,437 -0.10 0.29 -0.27 -0.09 0.04
Sole_Dir_Pct 38,437 0.38 0.23 0.20 0.39 0.56
Focused_Pct 38,437 0.13 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.22
Focused_Dummy 38,437 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Most_Focused_Pct 38,437 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.17
Most_Focused_Dummy 38,437 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Dispersed_Pct 38,437 0.14 0.16 0.00 0.11 0.23
Dispersed_Dummy 38,437 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Most_Dispersed_Pct 38,437 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.17
Most_Dispersed_Dummy 38,437 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Focused_Pct_50 38,437 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.17
Focused_Dummy_50 38,437 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
Focused_Pct_70 38,437 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.11
Focused_Dummy_70 38,437 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00
Focused_Pct_90 38,437 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
Focused_Dummy_90 38,437 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dispersed_Pct_50 38,437 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.13 0.25
Dispersed_Dummy_50 38,437 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Dispersed_Pct_30 38,437 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.18
Dispersed_Dummy_30 38,437 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Dispersed_Pct_10 38,437 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.10
Dispersed_Dummy_10 38,437 0.27 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00
Independent_Dir_Pct 38,437 0.63 0.25 0.50 0.67 0.83
CEO_Duality 38,437 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
ln_Board_Size 38,437 1.86 0.45 1.61 1.95 2.20
Busy_Board 38,437 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
Avg_Tenure 38,437 7.01 3.59 4.44 6.36 8.83
Financial_Exp_Pct 38,437 0.36 0.19 0.22 0.33 0.50
Avg_Age 38,437 59.90 5.86 56.67 60.43 63.67
Market_Share 38,437 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.04
Z_Score 38,437 4.99 6.87 2.26 3.58 5.76
IO 38,437 0.54 0.29 0.30 0.58 0.78
Taxes 38,437 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.04
ROA 38,437 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.05 0.09
Size 38,437 5.90 1.93 4.51 5.82 7.21
MTB 38,437 2.99 4.03 1.27 2.09 3.57
Earn 38,437 -0.44 0.71 -0.74 -0.32 0.02
AB_ACC 38,437 0.04 0.17 -0.02 0.04 0.10
Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the study. Panel A shows summary statistics at
the independent director level, Panel B shows summary statistics at the multiple directorships level, and Panel C shows
summary statistics at the firm level. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.2.
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Table 1.2: Correlation Table.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25)
(1) REM 1
(2) AB_CFO -0.340 1
(0.000)
(3) AB_PROD 0.912 -0.409 1
(0.000) (0.000)
(4) AB_DISEXP -0.716 -0.330 -0.473 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(5) Sole_Dir_Pct 0.026 -0.002 0.026 -0.022 1
(0.000) (0.699) (0.000) (0.000)
(6) Focused_Pct -0.072 0.209 -0.095 0.073 -0.294 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(7) Focused_Dummy -0.064 0.188 -0.080 0.063 0.205 0.784 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(8) Dispersed_Pct 0.022 -0.034 0.022 0.001 -0.245 0.205 0.238 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.797) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(9) Dispersed_Dummy 0.015 0.002 0.012 -0.014 -0.146 0.254 0.306 0.779 1
(0.005) (0.637) (0.016) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(10)Market_Share 0.032 -0.053 0.041 0.009 -0.132 0.230 0.213 0.058 0.104 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.081) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(11)Z_Score -0.145 0.245 -0.142 -0.017 0.008 0.036 0.036 -0.104 -0.097 -0.075 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.108) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(12) IO -0.071 0.223 -0.088 -0.079 0.024 0.425 0.473 0.209 0.266 0.206 0.045 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(13)Taxes -0.164 0.284 -0.215 -0.062 -0.026 0.123 0.105 -0.095 -0.065 0.047 0.207 0.138 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(14)ROA -0.157 0.372 -0.205 -0.123 0.003 0.111 0.112 -0.072 -0.031 0.123 0.237 0.214 0.286 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.505) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(15)Size 0.012 0.209 -0.028 -0.161 -0.148 0.551 0.526 0.127 0.219 0.454 -0.081 0.633 0.167 0.293 1
(0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(16)MTB -0.169 0.131 -0.137 0.093 -0.036 0.156 0.128 -0.029 -0.005 0.021 0.275 0.085 0.110 -0.008 0.044 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.296) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.115) (0.000)
(17)Earn -0.583 0.362 -0.626 0.262 0.008 0.113 0.010 0.014 0.012 -0.156 0.130 0.099 0.172 0.094 -0.014 0.153 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.105) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
(18)AB_ACC 0.117 0.033 -0.006 -0.213 0.061 0.038 0.033 0.012 0.011 -0.040 0.088 0.028 0.015 0.303 0.014 0.005 0.091 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.216) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.008) (0.330) (0.000)
(19) Independent_Dir_Pct -0.006 0.100 -0.018 -0.062 0.605 0.375 0.356 0.391 0.405 0.037 -0.024 0.383 -0.005 0.025 0.252 0.047 0.082 0.082 1
(0.270) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.332) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(20)CEO_Duality 0.004 0.038 -0.012 -0.036 -0.027 0.056 0.047 -0.034 -0.010 0.087 0.013 0.042 0.051 0.072 0.118 0.007 -0.025 0.009 -0.019 1
(0.466) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.049) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.177) (0.000) (0.064) (0.000)
(21) ln_Board_Size -0.005 0.112 -0.020 -0.071 0.121 0.347 0.437 0.219 0.368 0.246 -0.042 0.410 0.060 0.107 0.538 0.073 0.007 0.043 0.432 0.132 1
(0.307) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.152) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(22)Busy_Board 0.013 -0.013 0.008 -0.004 -0.104 0.044 0.006 0.041 -0.002 0.012 -0.010 -0.014 -0.009 -0.037 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.018 -0.066 -0.014 -0.092 1
(0.011) (0.007) (0.099) (0.464) (0.000) (0.000) (0.259) (0.000) (0.697) (0.021) (0.046) (0.007) (0.069) (0.000) (0.345) (0.206) (0.485) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
(23)Avg_Tenure 0.017 0.018 -0.002 -0.040 0.069 -0.074 -0.079 -0.100 -0.097 0.026 0.042 -0.100 0.069 0.139 -0.016 -0.059 -0.035 0.040 -0.039 0.091 -0.012 -0.015 1
(0.001) (0.001) (0.673) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.003)
(24)Financial_Exp_Pct -0.014 0.042 -0.023 -0.018 -0.308 0.176 0.118 0.131 0.093 0.049 -0.003 0.079 0.006 0.001 0.117 0.039 0.043 -0.012 -0.108 0.072 -0.046 0.006 -0.111 1
(0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.616) (0.000) (0.243) (0.904) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.237) (0.000)
(25)Avg_Age 0.070 0.038 0.038 -0.106 0.174 0.129 0.136 0.140 0.159 0.059 -0.033 0.149 0.023 0.079 0.199 -0.056 -0.036 0.072 0.308 0.013 0.272 0.010 0.344 -0.070 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 1.2 shows the Pearson correlations coefficients and their p-value in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.2.
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Table 1.3: Panel A. Real Earnings Management and Focused vs. Dispersed Directors.
REMt AB_DISEXPt AB_PRODt AB_CFOt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Focused_Pctt -0.090*** 0.012 -0.028*** 0.055***
(-4.910) (0.941) (-2.960) (5.576)
Dispersed_Pctt 0.068*** -0.032** 0.008 -0.027***
(3.470) (-2.267) (0.792) (-2.980)
Focused_Dummyt -0.035*** 0.014*** -0.008** 0.015***
(-6.359) (3.627) (-2.670) (6.292)
Dispersed_Dummyt 0.018*** -0.004 0.006** -0.006**
(3.543) (-1.172) (2.353) (-2.743)
Sole_Dir_Pctt -0.036* -0.039** 0.012 0.027** -0.018** -0.011 0.010 0.005
(-1.998) (-2.493) (0.935) (2.321) (-2.084) (-1.348) (1.163) (0.749)
Ind_Dir_Pctt−1 0.006 0.007 0.002 -0.011 0.004 -0.003 -0.004 0.001
(0.328) (0.382) (0.123) (-0.730) (0.457) (-0.281) (-0.527) (0.073)
CEO_Dualityt−1 0.005 0.005 -0.011*** -0.011*** 0.000 0.000 0.006** 0.006**
(1.038) (1.010) (-2.857) (-2.810) (0.050) (0.056) (2.634) (2.620)
ln(Board_Size)t−1 -0.029*** -0.026** 0.028*** 0.027*** -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006
(-2.782) (-2.534) (3.537) (3.454) (-1.134) (-1.044) (-1.003) (-1.404)
Busy_Boardt−1 0.020 0.018 -0.004 -0.005 0.011 0.010 -0.003 -0.001
(0.504) (0.450) (-0.172) (-0.197) (0.579) (0.514) (-0.236) (-0.094)
Avg_Tenuret−1 -0.002** -0.002** 0.002** 0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(-2.070) (-2.125) (2.446) (2.519) (-1.321) (-1.321) (-0.078) (-0.062)
Financial_Exp_Pctt−1 -0.021 -0.022 0.011 0.010 -0.012 -0.013 -0.003 -0.002
(-0.994) (-1.049) (0.800) (0.719) (-1.323) (-1.441) (-0.405) (-0.271)
Avg_Aget−1 -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001* -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(-3.087) (-2.929) (3.603) (3.559) (-1.724) (-1.643) (-0.552) (-0.764)
Market_Sharet−1 -0.056 -0.060 0.247*** 0.251*** 0.033 0.033 -0.156*** -0.154***
(-0.635) (-0.684) (4.859) (4.896) (0.767) (0.762) (-5.113) (-5.073)
Z_Scoret−1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.001**
(-0.094) (-0.123) (-0.661) (-0.645) (1.259) (1.272) (2.205) (2.256)
Inst_Ownt−1 -0.069*** -0.064*** 0.030** 0.028* -0.017* -0.016* 0.025*** 0.023***
(-3.730) (-3.469) (2.145) (1.973) (-1.933) (-1.833) (3.303) (2.996)
Taxest−1 -0.682*** -0.686*** -0.166*** -0.166*** -0.437*** -0.437*** 0.401*** 0.405***
(-7.919) (-8.035) (-4.812) (-4.828) (-10.877) (-10.855) (8.709) (8.808)
ROAt−1 0.050 0.049 -0.252*** -0.252*** -0.007 -0.007 0.182*** 0.182***
(1.281) (1.271) (-13.050) (-13.024) (-0.351) (-0.350) (9.166) (9.210)
Sizet−1 0.116*** 0.115*** -0.120*** -0.120*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.018***
(11.246) (11.265) (-17.795) (-18.018) (3.673) (3.653) (4.327) (4.532)
MTBt−1 -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000
(-6.240) (-6.285) (7.097) (7.108) (-3.143) (-3.178) (0.952) (1.096)
Earnt−1 -0.342*** -0.341*** 0.149*** 0.149*** -0.154*** -0.154*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(-16.756) (-16.824) (14.345) (14.324) (-14.735) (-14.747) (6.214) (6.193)
AB_ACCt 0.205*** 0.205*** -0.130*** -0.131*** -0.032** -0.032** -0.107*** -0.107***
(5.244) (5.263) (-8.720) (-8.743) (-2.331) (-2.335) (-4.058) (-4.053)
Observations 38,407 38,407 38,407 38,407 38,407 38,407 38,407 38,407
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.170 0.170 0.196 0.196 0.127 0.127 0.125 0.124
Table 1.3 Panel A shows the impact of focused directors on the different measures of real activities manipulation. Odd
columns show the results using the percentage measures of focused and dispersed directors, while even columns show the results
of the same analysis but using the indicator variables for focused and dispersed directors. Robust standard errors (T-stats
in parentheses) are clustered at the firm and year levels. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.2. ***, **, and * represent
significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.3: Continued. Panel B. Real Earnings Management and Most Focused vs. Most
Dispersed Directors.
REMt AB_DISEXPt AB_PRODt AB_CFOt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Most_Focused_Pctt -0.076*** 0.010 -0.023** 0.042***
(-3.444) (0.683) (-2.057) (4.355)
Most_Dispersed_Pctt 0.084*** -0.034** 0.016 -0.038***
(4.011) (-2.607) (1.508) (-4.248)
Most_Focused_Dummyt -0.022*** 0.012*** -0.004 0.007***
(-4.226) (3.464) (-1.514) (3.630)
Most_Dispersed_Dummyt 0.020*** -0.003 0.006*** -0.011***
(4.467) (-0.996) (2.994) (-4.820)
Sole_Dir_Pctt -0.024 -0.027 0.011 0.027** -0.012 -0.007 0.000 -0.005
(-1.156) (-1.633) (0.936) (2.386) (-1.111) (-0.844) (0.053) (-0.592)
Ind_Dir_Pctt−1 -0.004 -0.003 0.002 -0.011 -0.001 -0.006 0.004 0.009
(-0.220) (-0.133) (0.123) (-0.735) (-0.145) (-0.592) (0.608) (1.233)
CEO_Dualityt−1 0.005 0.005 -0.011*** -0.011*** 0.000 0.000 0.006** 0.006**
(1.061) (0.985) (-2.846) (-2.794) (0.073) (0.044) (2.583) (2.645)
ln(Board_Size)t−1 -0.028*** -0.027** 0.028*** 0.027*** -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(-2.773) (-2.610) (3.549) (3.392) (-1.116) (-1.148) (-1.054) (-1.060)
Busy_Boardt−1 0.019 0.017 -0.005 -0.004 0.010 0.010 -0.002 -0.001
(0.479) (0.429) (-0.223) (-0.170) (0.523) (0.511) (-0.131) (-0.077)
Avg_Tenuret−1 -0.002** -0.002** 0.002** 0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(-2.066) (-2.083) (2.452) (2.512) (-1.307) (-1.295) (-0.116) (-0.154)
Financial_Exp_Pctt−1 -0.022 -0.023 0.011 0.010 -0.013 -0.014 -0.002 -0.002
(-1.060) (-1.106) (0.778) (0.741) (-1.408) (-1.467) (-0.271) (-0.179)
Avg_Aget−1 -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001* -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(-3.069) (-2.947) (3.598) (3.575) (-1.717) (-1.647) (-0.586) (-0.748)
Market_Sharet−1 -0.054 -0.057 0.248*** 0.249*** 0.034 0.034 -0.157*** -0.156***
(-0.619) (-0.653) (4.859) (4.874) (0.786) (0.774) (-5.171) (-5.158)
Z − Scoret−1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.001**
(-0.086) (-0.110) (-0.652) (-0.653) (1.275) (1.268) (2.190) (2.239)
Inst_Ownt−1 -0.069*** -0.066*** 0.030** 0.028* -0.017* -0.017* 0.025*** 0.024***
(-3.732) (-3.596) (2.125) (2.016) (-1.953) (-1.902) (3.351) (3.241)
Taxest−1 -0.682*** -0.687*** -0.166*** -0.166*** -0.436*** -0.437*** 0.401*** 0.405***
(-7.902) (-7.975) (-4.809) (-4.825) (-10.847) (-10.811) (8.704) (8.770)
ROAt−1 0.050 0.049 -0.252*** -0.252*** -0.007 -0.007 0.182*** 0.182***
(1.283) (1.257) (-13.043) (-13.008) (-0.349) (-0.355) (9.164) (9.217)
Sizet−1 0.116*** 0.115*** -0.120*** -0.120*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.018***
(11.279) (11.207) (-17.789) (-17.988) (3.686) (3.619) (4.378) (4.565)
MTBt−1 -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000
(-6.241) (-6.298) (7.106) (7.102) (-3.126) (-3.177) (0.964) (1.090)
Earnt−1 -0.342*** -0.341*** 0.149*** 0.149*** -0.154*** -0.154*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(-16.750) (-16.795) (14.331) (14.353) (-14.727) (-14.731) (6.213) (6.184)
AB_ACCt 0.204*** 0.205*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.032** -0.032** -0.107*** -0.107***
(5.227) (5.232) (-8.725) (-8.747) (-2.341) (-2.335) (-4.038) (-4.035)
Observations 38,407 38,407 38,407 38,407 38,407 38,407 38,407 38,407
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.170 0.170 0.196 0.196 0.127 0.127 0.124 0.123
Table 1.3 Panel B shows the impact of alternative measures of most focused directors on the different measures of real
activities manipulation. Odd columns show the results using the percentage measures of focused and dispersed directors, while
even columns show the results of the same analysis but using the indicator variables for focused and dispersed directors. Robust
standard errors (T-stats in parentheses) are clustered at the firm and year levels. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.2.
***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.4: Real Earnings Management and Focused vs. Dispersed Directors: Alternative Measures.
REMt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Focused_Pct_50t -0.079***
(-3.211)
Dispersed_Pct_50t 0.050**
(2.160)
Focused_Dummy_50t -0.022***
(-4.465)
Dispersed_Dummy_50t 0.012**
(2.275)
Focused_Pct_70t -0.084***
(-3.187)
Dispersed_Pct_30t 0.095***
(4.514)
Focused_Dummy_70t -0.018***
(-3.325)
Dispersed_Dummy_30t 0.023***
(4.818)
Focused_Pct_90t -0.107***
(-2.837)
Dispersed_Pct_10t 0.144***
(5.186)
Focused_Dummy_90t -0.017**
(-2.753)
Dispersed_Dummy_10t 0.031***
(5.550)
Sole_Dir_Pctt -0.031 -0.035** -0.015 -0.022 -0.016 -0.019
(-1.498) (-2.240) (-0.838) (-1.317) (-0.909) (-1.110)
Observations 38,407 38,407 38,407 38,407 38,407 38,407
Board Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
REM Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.170 0.169 0.170 0.169 0.170 0.170
Table 1.4 shows the impact of alternative measures of focused directors on the aggregated measure of real activities
manipulation. Odd columns show the results using the percentage measures of focused and dispersed directors, while
even columns show the results of the same analysis but using the indicator variables for focused and dispersed
directors. Board and real earnings management controls are the same as in Table 1.3, but are not presented due to
space. Robust standard errors (T-stats in parentheses) are clustered at the firm and year levels. All variables are
defined in Appendix 1.2. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.5: Real Earnings Management and Focused vs. Dispersed Directors: Audit Committee
and Chairpersons.
REMt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Focused_Audit_Pctt -0.091***
(-4.155)
Dispersed_Audit_Pctt 0.102***
(3.630)
Focused_Audit_Dummyt -0.016***
(-3.638)
Dispersed_Audit_Dummyt 0.017***
(3.525)
Focused_Chairperson_Pctt -0.093**
(-2.811)
Dispersed_Chairperson_Pctt 0.100***
(2.883)
Focused_Chairperson_Dummyt -0.017***
(-3.246)
Dispersed_Chairperson_Dummyt 0.018***
(3.453)
Sole_Dir_Pctt -0.024 -0.026 -0.026* -0.027*
(-1.382) (-1.538) (-1.788) (-1.815)
Observations 24,922 24,922 24,922 24,922
Board Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
REM Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.138 0.137 0.137 0.137
Table 1.5 shows the impact of focused audit committee members (columns (1) and (2)) and chairpersons (columns
(3) and (4)) on the aggregated measure of real activities manipulation. Odd columns show the results using the
percentage measures of focused and dispersed directors, while even columns show the results of the same analysis but
using indicator variables. Robust standard errors (T-stats in parentheses) are clustered at the firm and year levels.
Board and real earnings management controls are the same as in Table 1.3, but are not presented due to space. All
variables are defined in Appendix 1.2. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Table 1.6: Real Earnings Management and Focused vs. Dispersed Directors: Evidence from
plausibly Exogenous changes in the Rankings.
REMt AB_DISEXPt AB_PRODt AB_CFOt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dispersed_to_Focusedt -0.016*** 0.001 -0.005* 0.010***
(-3.272) (0.342) (-2.003) (4.250)
Focused_to_Dispersedt 0.019*** -0.006* 0.003* -0.010***
(4.388) (-1.711) (1.700) (-2.955)
Sole_Dir_Pctt -0.038** 0.026** -0.013 -0.001
(-2.306) (2.212) (-1.547) (-0.126)
Observations 35,016 35,016 35,016 35,016
Board Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
REM Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.170 0.194 0.130 0.121
Table 1.6 shows the impact of plausible exogenous changes in the rankings of individual directors on the measures
of real activities manipulation. Robust standard errors (T-stats in parentheses) are clustered at the firm and year
levels. Board and real earnings management controls are the same as in Table 1.3, but are not presented due to
space. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.2. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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Table 1.7: Real Earnings Management and Focused vs. Dispersed Directors: the Impact of
Complexity.
REMt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Focused_Pctt -0.153*** -0.051** -0.102*** -0.080*** -0.124*** -0.029*
(-4.950) (-2.209) (-3.648) (-2.797) (-4.305) (-1.976)
Dispersed_Pctt 0.030 0.076*** 0.042 0.108*** 0.038 0.116***
(0.979) (3.064) (1.429) (3.380) (1.258) (3.306)
Sole_Dir_Pctt -0.014 -0.029 -0.010 -0.056** 0.004 -0.038
(-0.427) (-1.199) (-0.288) (-2.418) (0.144) (-1.388)
Observations 15,238 15,131 15,187 15,295 10,566 10,730
Measure of Complexity Firm Size Firm Age No Segments
Above Median? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Board Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
REM Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.150 0.252 0.138 0.214 0.180 0.170
Table 1.7 shows the impact of focused directors on the measure of real activities manipulation for different
subsamples of firm complexity. Odd columns indicate subsamples where firms are less complex than the median of a
given industry and year, whereas even columns indicate subsamples where firms are more complex than the median of
a given industry and year. Robust standard errors (T-stats in parentheses) are clustered at the firm and year levels.
Board and real earnings management controls are the same as in Table 1.3, but are not presented due to space. All
variables are defined in Appendix 1.2. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Table 1.8: Real Earnings Management and Focused vs. Dispersed Directors: Market Size Effect.
REMt REM_Rest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Focused_Pct -0.167** -0.106*** -0.067* -0.019 -0.079***
(-2.735) (-2.837) (-1.913) (-0.758) (-4.231)
Dispersed_Pct -0.020 -0.009 0.063* 0.083** 0.057***
(-0.421) (-0.202) (1.993) (2.469) (2.848)
Sole_Dir_Pct 0.013 -0.058 -0.020 -0.011 -0.039**
(0.334) (-1.464) (-0.715) (-0.384) (-2.202)
Observations 9,055 8,918 9,500 9,831 38,407
Market Size Quartile 1 2 3 4 All
Board Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
REM Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.109 0.169 0.162 0.319 0.172
Table 1.8 shows the impact of focused directors on the measure of real activities manipulation for different
subsamples of market value. Column (5) uses as a dependent variable the residuals from a regression of the aggregated
measure of real earnings management on market value. Robust standard errors (T-stats in parentheses) are clustered
at the firm and year levels. Board and real earnings management controls are the same as in Table 1.3, but are not
presented due to space. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.2. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.9: Real Earnings Management and Focused vs. Dispersed Directors: Evidence from
Directors’ Deaths.
REMt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Focused_Deatht 0.054* 0.186* 0.073 0.195***
(1.754) (2.026) (1.650) (4.861)
Dispersed_Deatht 0.032 -0.160** 0.091 -0.227***
(0.437) (-2.285) (0.722) (-6.481)
Focused_Dummyt -0.031*** -0.018* -0.023** -0.017
(-4.822) (-1.993) (-2.727) (-1.623)
Dispersed_Dummyt 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.023*** 0.015*
(5.460) (4.755) (3.444) (1.829)
Focused_Chair_Deatht 0.007 0.032** 0.071 0.251***
(1.656) (2.053) (1.027) (7.632)
Dispersed_Chair_Deatht 0.065 -0.048 -0.083 0.001
(0.104) (-0.626) (-1.122) (0.123)
Focused_Chair_Dummyt -0.017*** -0.010 -0.015** -0.010
(-3.344) (-1.479) (-2.331) (-1.130)
Dispersed_Chair_Dummyt 0.018*** 0.013** 0.017** 0.014
(3.743) (2.196) (2.845) (1.667)
Sole_Dir_Pctt -0.022 -0.021 -0.027 -0.022 -0.022 -0.031 -0.029 -0.020
(-1.385) (-1.085) (-1.365) (-0.934) (-1.356) (-1.675) (-1.536) (-0.926)
Observations 21,511 10,893 10,935 7,726 21,511 10,893 10,935 7,726
Measure of Complexity None Size Age No of Seg None Size Age No of Seg
Board Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
REM Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.159 0.199 0.174 0.150 0.156 0.196 0.173 0.149
Table 1.9 shows the impact of the death of focused directors on the measure of real activities manipulation.
Columns (1) to (4) show the impact of the death of a focused director, whereas columns (5) to (8) show the impact
of the death of a focused chairperson. Columns (2), (3), (4), (6), (7) and (8) contain sub samples of firms that
are potentially more complex (above median values) using the same measures of complexity from Table 1.7. Robust
standard errors (T-stats in parentheses) are clustered at the firm and year levels. Board and real earnings management
controls are the same as in Table 1.3, but are not presented due to space. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.2.
***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.10: Real Earnings Management and Focused vs. Dispersed Directors: Evidence from
Director Level Analysis.
REMt AB_DISEXPt AB_PRODt AB_CFOt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Focused_Pctt -0.084*** 0.027** -0.017* 0.042***
(-4.320) (2.343) (-1.870) (4.394)
Dispersed_Pctt 0.111*** -0.051*** 0.020* -0.044***
(5.496) (-3.929) (1.850) (-5.113)
Focused_Dummyt -0.033*** 0.009** -0.006** 0.019***
(-5.234) (2.437) (-2.225) (5.438)
Dispersed_Dummyt 0.034*** -0.014*** 0.010*** -0.010***
(7.076) (-4.421) (3.211) (-3.878)
Sole_Dir_Pctt -0.007 -0.010 0.008 0.013 0.006 0.008 0.013 0.015*
(-0.381) (-0.690) (0.628) (1.170) (0.661) (1.000) (1.362) (2.038)
Observations 62,628 62,628 62,628 62,628 62,628 62,628 62,628 62,628
Board Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
REM Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Director x Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.188 0.186 0.229 0.228 0.126 0.126 0.111 0.109
Table 1.10 shows the impact of the death of focused directors on the measure of real activities manipulation.
Columns (1) to (4) show the impact of the death of a focused director, whereas columns (5) to (8) show the impact
of the death of a focused chairperson. Robust standard errors (T-stats in parentheses) are clustered at the firm and
year levels. Board and real earnings management controls are the same as in Table 1.3, but are not presented due to
space. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.2. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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Table 1.11: Real Earnings Management and Focused vs. Dispersed Directors: Including First
Stage Controls.
REMt AB_DISEXPt AB_PRODt AB_CFOt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Focused_Pctt -0.053*** 0.011 -0.020** 0.047***
(-2.976) (0.834) (-2.186) (4.664)
Dispersed_Pctt 0.037* -0.029** 0.009 -0.018**
(1.980) (-2.157) (1.080) (-2.134)
Focused_Dummyt -0.020*** 0.012*** -0.005 0.012***
(-3.401) (3.301) (-1.625) (4.830)
Dispersed_Dummyt 0.014** -0.003 0.007*** -0.005**
(2.546) (-0.971) (2.938) (-2.182)
Sole_Dir_Pctt -0.031* -0.029** 0.012 0.026** -0.012 -0.006 0.011 0.005
(-1.919) (-2.169) (0.996) (2.394) (-1.602) (-0.759) (1.219) (0.648)
Observations 36,384 36,384 36,384 36,384 36,384 36,384 38,242 38,242
First Stage Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Board Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
REM Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.286 0.286 0.230 0.230 0.178 0.178 0.149 0.148
Table 1.11 shows the impact of focused directors on the measures of real activities manipulation after controlling
for their first stage controls. Columns (1) and (2) include all controls from Equations 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3. Columns (3)
and (4) include all controls from Equation 1.2. Columns (5) and (6) include all controls from Equation 1.3. Finally,
columns (7) and (8) include all controls from Equation 1.1. Odd columns show the results using the percentage
measures of focused and dispersed directors, while even columns show the results of the same analysis but using the
indicator variables for focused and dispersed directors. Robust standard errors (T-stats in parentheses) are clustered
at the firm and year levels. Board and real earnings management controls are the same as in Table 1.3, but are not
presented due to space. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.2. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.12: Information Environment Quality and Focused vs. Dispersed Directors.
Analyst Analyst Forecast Information
Volatilityt+1
Bid Ask
Volumet+1Followingt+1 Dispersiont+1 Errort+1 Cost Indext+1 Spreadt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Focused_Pctt 2.329*** -0.160*** -0.443** -0.049*** -0.024*** -0.073 0.529***
(4.493) (-3.262) (-2.749) (-4.229) (-2.895) (-0.953) (6.792)
Dispersed_Pctt -3.002*** 0.009 -0.072 0.027* 0.012 0.001 -0.408***
(-5.845) (0.160) (-0.378) (2.027) (1.497) (0.022) (-5.753)
Sole_Dir_Pctt 0.005 -0.091 -0.615*** -0.029** -0.016*** 0.121** -0.018
(0.011) (-1.234) (-3.077) (-2.612) (-2.940) (2.101) (-0.267)
Observations 24,648 23,104 24,641 23,099 24,644 24,644 24,644
Board Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
REM Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.139 0.012 0.010 0.035 0.029 0.002 0.106
Table 1.12 shows the impact of focused directors on different measures of firms’ information environment. Robust
standard errors (T-stats in parentheses) are clustered at the firm and year levels. Board and real earnings management
controls are the same as in Table 1.3, but are not presented due to space. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.2.
***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.13: Accounting Restatements and Focused vs. Dispersed Directors.
Restatementt
Accounting Fraud Clerical Adverse Improve SEC
Restatementt Restatementt Errort Restatementt Restatementt Restatementt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Focused_Pctt -0.097*** -0.092*** -0.002 -0.005 -0.088*** -0.016 -0.004
(-3.680) (-3.547) (-0.462) (-1.145) (-3.393) (-1.388) (-0.459)
Dispersed_Pctt -0.011 -0.018 0.009** 0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.010
(-0.394) (-0.637) (2.129) (0.647) (-0.155) (-0.298) (-1.139)
Sole_Dir_Pctt -0.023 -0.030 0.001 0.012** -0.013 -0.017* -0.001
(-1.001) (-1.278) (0.371) (2.646) (-0.563) (-1.742) (-0.065)
Observations 37,201 37,201 37,201 37,201 37,201 37,201 37,201
Board Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
REM Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.040 0.040 0.011 0.011 0.036 0.020 0.023
Table 1.13 shows the impact of focused directors on different types of restatements. Robust standard errors
(T-stats in parentheses) are clustered at the firm and year levels. Board and real earnings management controls are
the same as in Table 1.3, but are not presented due to space. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.2. ***, **, and
* represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.14: Panel A. Real Earnings Management Future Outcomes for Focused vs. Dispersed:
Difference in Means.
Variables
Average Values
t-stat p valueFocused_Dummy=1 Focused_Dummy=0
Dispersed_Dummy=0 Dispersed_Dummy=1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bad_Debt_3yr 6.797 6.844 -0.173 0.862
Bad_Debt_5yr 6.631 6.704 -0.275 0.783
Days_Inv_3yr 46.394 50.989 -7.001 0.000
Days_Inv_5yr 46.326 50.446 -6.113 0.000
Patents_3yr 3.069 2.156 13.048 0.000
Patents_5yr 3.323 2.442 10.746 0.000
Citations_3yr 3.950 3.091 7.612 0.000
Citations_5yr 4.371 3.527 6.858 0.000
Q_3yr 2.146 1.741 10.488 0.000
Q_5yr 2.035 1.752 7.263 0.000
ROE_3yr 0.082 -0.019 7.824 0.000
ROE_5yr 0.078 0.014 5.534 0.000
ROA_3yr 0.029 -0.034 13.898 0.000
ROA_5yr 0.034 -0.015 12.095 0.000
Table 1.14 Panel A shows the average of real earnings management outcomes and test for their difference in two
subsamples. The first subsample (column (1)) contains firms with at least one focused director and none dispersed
directors, whereas the second subsample (column (2)) contains firms with at least one dispersed director and none
focused directors. Column (3) shows the t-statistics from the difference of means between columns (1) and (2).
Finally, column (4) shows the p-value of said difference. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.2.
68
Table 1.14: Panel B. Real Earnings Management Future Outcomes for Focused vs. Dispersed:
Regression Evidence.
Bad Days
ln(1+Patents)t+1 ln(1+Citations)t+1Debtt+1 Invt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Focused_Dummyt -0.526* -3.930** 0.099** 0.106
(-1.886) (-2.335) (2.172) (1.374)
Dispersed_Dummyt -0.884 -17.352 -0.074** -0.091*
(-1.143) (-1.195) (-2.509) (-1.889)
Sole_Dir_Pctt -0.237 -39.295 0.106 0.280
(-0.359) (-1.285) (0.981) (1.341)
Observations 27,685 29,811 6,730 6,730
Board Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
REM Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.001 0.002 0.068 0.022
Table 1.14 Panel B shows the impact of focused directors on different real earnings management outcomes.
Robust standard errors (T-stats in parentheses) are clustered at the firm and year levels. Board and real earnings
management controls are the same as in Table 1.3, but are not presented due to space. All variables are defined in
Appendix 1.2. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Chapter 2
Boards of Directors’ Legal Incentives
and Firm Outcomes
2.1 Introduction
In this paper, I investigate the impact of change in the legal incentives of boards of
directors on firms’ payout and investment policies. I exploit the adoption of a set of
United States laws known as Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts (NSHCAs, here-
after) as a source of plausible exogenous variation in the legal incentives of boards of
directors.1 These laws allow boards of directors to deviate from their fiduciary duties
to shareholders in favor of other non-shareholder constituencies, i.e., creditors, em-
ployees, customers, and the community.2 I exploit this plausible source of exogenous
variation to test a direct and measurable channel through which the legal incentives
of the board affect corporate outcomes in the US legal setting. The estimates sug-
gest that firms with positive payouts incorporated in a state that adopts an NSHCA
exhibit an average net payout yield that is 10.8% smaller after the passage of the
1These laws are also known as Director Duties [75], Stakeholder Laws, Non-Monetary Factor Provisions
[12] or Expanded Constituency Laws [28].
2For example, Ohio’s act states that in the event of a change in control, i.e., a takeover, the board of
directors can reject an offer based on the increased utility of non-shareholder stakeholders that could occur
if the offer was rejected. NSHCAs can also be applied to operational decisions [12].
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law.
Boards of directors are in charge of overseeing the structural and operational de-
cisions of firms [2]. According to US corporate law, boards of directors hold fiduciary
duties towards the shareholders of the corporation. These fiduciary duties are the
duty of loyalty and duty of care. On the one hand, the duty of loyalty states that
directors should run a firm’s operations in the interest of the shareholders instead
of their own. On the other hand, the duty of care indicates that directors need to
pay careful attention in their decision making process, i.e., directors must try to
make good decisions [20]. Unfortunately, boards of directors possess a different util-
ity function from shareholders. Shareholders are the diversified residual claimants of
corporations, whereas board members could have undiversified and fixed claims on
the corporation. Given this conflict of interests, the effectiveness of boards of direc-
tors critically relies on their incentives to uphold their fiduciary duties [16]. These
incentives include remuneration, reputation and legal incentives, which have received
vast attention in the corporate governance literature. First, remuneration incentives
should align the interests of the board with those of the shareholders but are limited
and controversial.3 Additionally, reputation incentives can work against sharehold-
ers’ interests provided that board members might wish to create manager-friendly
reputations if their future career outcomes depend on the managers’ decision [86].
Finally, legal incentives indicate that boards of directors are expected to uphold their
fiduciary duties given that their decisions could be subjected to judicial review by
courts ([83], [23]).
3Boards members receive heterogenous remuneration incentives, i.e., managerial compensation based on
a fixed salary, short-term bonuses and equity awards, whereas outside directors receive a combination of
fixed fees and variable remuneration in the form of shares or derivatives of shares. [111] shows not only that
remuneration incentives can be strong for outside directors but also that these incentives are controversial
as boards set their own pay.
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In this paper, I focus on the legal incentives of boards of directors for two reasons.
First, evidence regarding the legal incentives of boards of directors in the US set-
ting is scarce [see for instance 64] probably because the disclosure of directors’ and
officers’ insurance information (commonly known as D&O insurance) is not compul-
sory. For instance, in China and Canada, the reporting of D&O insurance premiums
and coverage is mandated by the regulator, which spurred an increased number of
published papers regarding the legal incentives of boards ([34], [88], [87], [112]). The
caveat is that the institutional and legal settings in China might endanger the ex-
ternal validity of their results, but this concern is lower in studies conducted using
Canadian data. Furthermore, even if D&O insurance information was available in
the US, the fact that its contract is a firm choice adds to the difficulty of identi-
fying the causal impact of lessened legal incentives. Even Canadian studies suffer
from the lack of plausible exogenous variation in D&O insurance. Second, compared
to the possible heterogeneous impact of remuneration and reputation incentives on
different board members, legal incentives should affect all board members the same.
To circumvent both issues, I exploit the staggered adoption of NSHCAs in the US.
These laws state that boards of directors may consider making their decisions in the
interests of stakeholders other than shareholders, which can imply a deviation from
their role as shareholders’ fiduciaries. The adoption of NSHCAs can act as plausible
exogenous variation in the level of the legal incentives of boards as their decisions
could be shielded from judicial review.
The results show that the passage of an NSHCA leads to lower dividends, re-
purchases, and total and net payout yields. Specifically, on average, adopting an
NSHCA leads to a 15.5% lower total payout yield (15.1% of the net payout of capital
issues) in a sample of firms with positive payout levels. Thus, NSHCAs likely have a
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statistically significant impact on boards’ decision-making processes. These results
show that NSHCAs have a positive impact on non-CAPEX and net investment,
while increasing the presence of focused M&As (less suspect of being the outcome of
managerial empire building). I also document the positive impact of NSHCAs on Q
and negative impact on firm risk. These findings are consistent with the prediction
that boards of directors will pursue more investment and less payout levels when
allowed by lessened legal incentives. This option is preferred by stakeholders due to
the profile of their payoffs. Finally, I show that NSHCAs have a positive impact on
firms’ social and environmental performance, which is a testament to the increased
utility of stakeholders other than shareholders.
Additionally, I discuss the case of firms in settings that are subjected to high lev-
els of shareholder litigation. The impacts of NSHCAs on shareholder remuneration
and investment seem to suggest that firms subjected to high levels of litigation risk
benefit more from the decreased judicial review of their decisions. Thus, I examine
the impact of NSHCAs on a subset of firms that belong to industries with high levels
of litigation [77]. These results show that the impact of NSHCAs on firms in settings
that are prone to litigation is greater than that on firms in other settings in which
the ex-ante litigation risk is not as high. Furthermore, I test whether NSHCAs have
a larger impact on payout and investment levels in settings in which shareholders
might have short-term investment horizons. In these settings, the conflict among
shareholders, corporate officers and directors can be more acute as insiders usually
possess longer investment horizons. As expected, NSHCAs have a stronger effect
on investment in settings in which firms possess relatively low levels of ownership
by long-term institutions as defined by [26]. Additionally, I inspect the impact of
NSHCAs on firms with different levels of governance to assess whether this shift in
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payout and investment could respond to the increased leeway of the corporate exec-
utives that could be using the NSHCAs to extract rents from shareholders. These
results suggest that the impact of the adoption of an NSHCA does not differ between
firms with high and firms with low governance levels. However, compared to firms
with high governance not subjected to an NSHCA, firms with high governance that
are subjected to the statutes show lower levels of total payout and increased levels
of investment, which could suggest that it is not a governance issue that drives the
impact of NSHCAs on payout and investment levels. Finally, I show that the adop-
tion of an NSHCA leads to significantly lower (higher) levels of payout (investment)
in firms that possess high growth opportunities compared to those in firms that are
subjected to the statutes but do not have as many positive NPV projects to invest
in.
The impact of NSHCAs on payout policy is robust in a set of checks that test
the quality of the empirical setting and the strength of the shock. Following advice
from [9], I examine the treatment dynamics of NSHCAs on payout policy. Using
binary variables that capture the impact of NSHCAs at specific moments in time, I
show that there is no impact in the years immediately prior to the adoption of an
NSHCA, which strengthens the case of a causal impact.4 The effect starts occurring
only 3 years after adoption and onwards. The key assumption in a difference-in-
differences setting is that without the shock, the treated observations would have
evolved exactly as those in the control group, i.e., the groups would exhibit parallel
trends. To increase confidence that the control group is comparable to the treatment
group, I proceed to eliminate all observations that are never treated from the sample.
Then, I exploit [14]’s definition of statute strength in the case of NSHCAs to inspect
4Please, see Figure 2.
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the impact of strong NSHCAs against the adoption of a weak NSHCA. The results
suggest that the states that possess a strong NSHCA are carrying the weight of the
impact of NSHCAs on payout and investment. Finally, I test the main analyses
using a sample of firms matched in terms of industry, headquarter state, firm size,
leverage, profitability, market-to-book, sales growth and cash to total assets. The
negative (positive) impact of NSHCAs on payout (investment) levels holds in this
matched samples of firms.
This study contributes to the literature on the effects of boards of directors’
legal incentives on payout and investment policies by identifying a clear and direct
channel through which shareholders are affected. Specifically, I attempt to identify
the effects of change in litigation risk on the managerial decision-making process
that negatively affects payout policy and increases investment. This study provides
evidence supporting the negative impact of possible excessive payouts to shareholders
that could be used to improve firm value through new investment opportunities.
In section 2, I analyze the theoretical background of legal incentives and payout
and investment policies and derive a testable prediction. Section 3 reviews NSHCAs
and argues that NSHCAs measure variation in boards of directors’ legal incentives.
Section 4 presents the data and methodology, Section 5 presents and discusses the
main results, Section 6 presents additional analyses, and Section 7 reports the ro-
bustness checks. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2.2 Theoretical Background and Main Prediction
Payout policy is irrelevant in a perfect capital market setting without any frictions.
In contrast, a firm’s investment policy is important (Modigliani and Miller, 1961).
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However, consistently throughout time, dividends and repurchases have represented
a large share of firms’ net earnings. In fact, without considering share issues, firms in
the S&P 500 index paid approximately $6.4 trillion (approximately 93% of the firms’
net income) during the period 2005-2014 [59].5 These figures are the result of boards
of directors’ choices, which interact with several other policies, such as corporate
investment. There are alternative explanations for such popularity of dividends and
repurchases, such that their serving as a signal of future cash flows [18], the cost of
capital [66], their ability to mitigate agency problems [65, 45, 72], etc.
Boards of directors react to their incentives when they set both the payout level
and the investment level of their firm [106]. By nature, boards of directors’ utility
is aligned with that of other non-shareholder constituencies because the average
director possesses a payoff function similar to that of a non-shareholder constituency.
For instance, the human capital or directors and employees is mostly tied to the firm,
whereas shareholders can diversify their claims more effectively at a lower cost. In
the context of payout and investment policy decisions, boards of directors face a clear
trade-off between reimbursing shareholders and reinvesting cash flow into the firm.
Boards of directors possess incentives that align their utility with that of shareholders.
For instance, boards of directors could possess share-based compensation that could
induce them to make decisions that maximize shareholder value. Moreover, directors
face career concerns that could act as reputation incentives to make shareholder-
friendly decisions that benefit the shareholder value because directors can feel that
their human capital is threatened by shareholders. Alternatively, the objective of this
paper is to evaluate whether legal incentives are a source of motivation for boards of
5Fried and Wang show that these figures do not induce firms to stop investing as suggested and that
equity and debt issues supply enough capital to increase investment and innovation.
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directors to set a payout and investment policy that suits shareholders.
Prior evidence of the impact of legal incentives relies on both information asym-
metries that exist between shareholders and managers and the potential moral haz-
ard generated by Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) insurance for corporate officers and
outside directors. [30] analyze a sample with detailed proprietary information about
the amount of D&O insurance contracted at the time of those firms’ initial pub-
lic offering. The authors found that the post-IPO performance is negatively linked
to the level of D&O insurance, indicating that insiders possess information about
long-run firm performance. Insiders act on their information by acquiring a larger
level of D&O insurance, which the authors argue protects them against increased
shareholder litigation. Alternatively, D&O insurance can generate moral hazard by
shielding directors and officers from future potential litigation associated with their
behavior. For instance, [88] show that high levels of D&O insurance are associated
with worse acquisition outcomes, such as higher acquisition premiums and lower syn-
ergies. Moreover, creditors react negatively to high levels of D&O insurance as they
perceive such insurance as a potential signal of increased credit risk [87]. Finally,
[34] provide evidence that D&O insurance is positively associated with shareholders’
required return. The authors explain that there can be two main channels through
which legal incentives (proxied by D&O insurance levels) could affect the cost of
equity. First, legal incentives effectively capture the disciplining effect of shareholder
litigation, and by decreasing such incentives through high levels of D&O insurance,
directors and officers are effectively shielded from such litigation. Second, a decrease
in legal liability stemming from D&O insurance can lead corporate directors and
officers to take more risks.
In a standard setting, there is a cost for not distributing the earnings back to
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shareholders, i.e., litigation-related costs enable shareholders to enforce their desired
level of dividends and investment to maximize their utility. A classical judiciary
example of this is the case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company6. At the beginning
of 1917, the Ford Motor Company possessed over $ 59 million in free cash flow,
which Henry Ford (Ford Motor Company’s president) wanted to use to re-invest
into the firm. Henry Ford wanted to decrease the dividends to Ford Motor Com-
pany’s shareholders, acquire new fixed assets and increase the employees’ salaries
with the objective to dramatically increase the production of their Model T car.
Henry Ford believed that this strategy could increase the long-term performance of
the firm, but minority shareholders (including the Dodge brothers) disagreed. The
Michigan Supreme Court held the opinion and ruled against Henry Ford’s plans,
stating that it was his duty to maximize shareholder profit. Given this information,
my prediction is that change in boards of directors’ legal incentives could lead to
changes in the levels of payout and investment. More specifically, I expect that an
increase (reduction) in legal incentives could lead to higher (lower) levels of payout
and lower (higher) levels of investment because managers and corporate directors
who are shielded from shareholder litigation could deviate from maximizing share-
holder value towards maximizing their own utility. The latter is consistent with lower
levels of payout and overinvestment.
6Dodge v. Ford Motor Company 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919)
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2.3 Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts
2.3.1 Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts as Variation in Boards of
Directors’ Legal Incentives
NSHCAs are a set of laws enacted in the US from the early 1980s until the 2000s.
These acts aim to expand the fiduciary duties of corporate directors to a broader
set of stakeholders, i.e., non-shareholder stakeholders. Their aim is to provide a
legal basis for justifying decisions that do not maximize shareholder value. These
acts have been cited in over 800 court cases from 1983 to 2013 [62]. For instance,
Pennsylvania’s NSHCA general rule of board of directors’ exercise of power states
the following:
“In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of direc-
tors, committees of the board and individual directors of a business corpo-
ration may, in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider to
the extent they deem appropriate: (1) The effects of any action upon any
or all groups affected by such action, including shareholders, employees,
suppliers, customers and creditors of the corporation, and upon communi-
ties in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located.
(2) The short-term and long-term interests of the corporation, including
benefits that may accrue to the corporation from its long-term plans and
the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued in-
dependence of the corporation...” (15 PA. CONS. STAT. §1715-16 (Supp.
1991)7)
7Available at: http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/LI/consCheck.cfm?txtType=HTM&ttl=
15&div=0&chpt=17
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As in the case of Pennsylvania’s NSHCA, many of these laws intend not only
to deter takeovers but also to include stakeholders’ interests in operational deci-
sions to redistribute gains among the firm’s various constituencies [12]. Boards of
directors may decide to favor both operational and structural decisions that benefit
stakeholders’ interests over those of the shareholders. Alternatively, some NSHCAs
allow boards to either benefit stakeholders and/or consider the long-term interests
of companies, including the possibility that these long-term interests may be best
served by the continued independence of the board of directors from shareholders
[12]. Furthermore, these statutes are permissive in that they indicate that directors
may attend to stakeholder interests in lieu of shareholder interests.8 This reinforces
the fact that NSHCAs might have no impact on corporate policy or specifically,
payout and investment policy.
NSHCAs are usually identified as anti-takeover laws. Anti-takeover legislation
emerged in the United States of America in the late 1960s after the adoption of the
Williams Act. In 1968, the Williams Act amended the SEC Act of 1934 to require an
increased level of disclosure in tender offers with the objective to protect target share-
holders. At the state level, various states adopted extensions of the Williams Act to
regulate the spread of mergers and acquisitions. These first-generation anti-takeover
laws were declared unconstitutional by a US Supreme Court decision in Edgar v.
MITE Corp in 1982, where an Illinois anti-takeover act was declared unconstitu-
tional under the Supremacy and Commerce clauses of the Federal Constitution. The
previous ruling indicated that the jurisdiction of the Illinois anti-takeover act could
not be extended to out-of-state incorporated firms since this imposes excessive bur-
8Only the state of Connecticut mandates that directors within their duty of care must evaluate the
impact of structural decisions on all firm stakeholders [12].
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dens in terms of securities and corporate control of inter-state commerce.
Within four years of the Supreme Court ruling, 21 US states adopted new anti-
takeover laws that do not violate the Federal Constitution, i.e., laws that only ap-
ply to firms incorporated in those states. In addition to NSHCAs, these second-
generation anti-takeover laws were Business Combination9, Fair Price10, Control
Share Acquisition11, and Poison Pill12 laws. These laws were declared constitutional
in a US Supreme Court decision CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America in 1987.
In this decision, Indiana’s Control Share Acquisition act was deemed constitutional
on the grounds that the act applied only to shareholders of the state of Illinois and
not other shareholders.
Although NSHCAs are considered anti-takeover legislation, [94] states that the
theoretical foundations of NSHCAs can be traced to stakeholder theory and the
original corporate social responsibility debate. Furthermore, [75] and [29] argue
that none of the second-stage anti-takeover laws seem to be effective mechanisms
deterring takeovers. The authors of the first study argue and show that most previous
studies using Business Combinations laws as negative shocks to governance failed
to account for first-generation anti-takeover legislation and that institutional and
political characteristics drive most of the results in prior studies. The second study
defines Poison Pill laws more explicitly and shows that poison pills are the most
9Most Business Combination laws impose a moratorium of five years since the initial acquired status of
influential shareholders (typically over 10%) for a broad range of transactions in addition to mergers.
10Most Fair Price laws prohibit business transactions between firms and influential shareholders, i.e.,
usually shareholders with over 10% of shares unless one of two conditions is met. The acquirer either needs
to pay a very high price to minority shareholders or acquire the approval of a supermajority of shareholders
(not including the acquirer’s stock).
11Almost all Control Share Acquisition acts state that shares acquired in a share acquisition with the
purpose of taking control will receive no voting rights unless the shareholders approve. Consequent to
shareholders’ approval, the acquires’ shares could receive voting rights. However, the acquirers must attempt
to convince non-interested shareholders to gain a foothold in the target firm.
12Poison Pill laws offer the right to set up poison pill defenses for firms under the coverage of the statute.
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effective takeover deterrents.
2.3.2 Political Economy of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts
One concern is that NSHCAs were introduced by a coalition of parties interested in
takeovers, making it more difficult to argue for the exogenous nature of such legisla-
tion with respect to individual firms. [98] argues that the anti-takeover statutes were
not adopted because of coalition pressure. [14] also argues that the statutes were
adopted in many cases to protect a local firm amidst a battle for corporate control.
Managers of such corporations thought it better to champion anti-takeover legislation
than amend their corporate charters perhaps because these statutes granted them
greater flexibility than that shareholders would have approved [14]. This is more im-
portant in the context of NSHCAs as it could be in non-shareholder constituencies’
interests to actively engage in the adoption of such statutes. Nonetheless, stakehold-
ers do not seem to have actively participated in the adoption of NSHCAs [37]. [74]
and [61] provide further evidence regarding the characteristics of second-stage anti-
takeover legislation lobbying. These authors show that individual firms rather than
groups of firms were key players in facilitating anti-takeover statutes in the US. For
instance, Pennsylvania’s NSHCA was lobbied for by Armstrong World Industries in
response to a tender offer by known “greenmailers” [70] and not by a group of firms
seeking lower shareholder compensation for my purposes.
2.3.3 Prior Evidence of the Impact of Non-Shareholder Constituencies
Acts
The first study to investigate the impact of NSHCAs was conducted by [99], who
evaluates the shareholder value impact of the adoption of NSHCAs using an event
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study methodology. Roberta Romano’s conclusions are that NSHCAs have no ap-
parent effect on shareholder value, which she attributes to their likely lack of impact
on takeover rather than the lack of a clear date to identify such an impact.13 Con-
sistent with [99], [3] inspects the impact of the Poison Pill statutes and NSHCAs
on the likelihood of receiving a takeover bid. He finds that Poison Pill statutes lead
to decreases (increases) in the probability of receiving a bid (implementing a poison
pill). However, the author finds no significant (negative) impact on the probability of
receiving a bid (implementing a poison pill). Alternatively, [62] studies the impact of
NSHCAs on the investment behavior of high fiduciary duty institutional investors.
The authors argue that high fiduciary duty institutional investors in any organi-
zation should respond to a change in fiduciary duties toward shareholders. These
authors fail to find a statistically significant impact of NSHCAs on high fiduciary
duty institutional investors’ investing behavior.
In contrast to previous studies, [10] finds that NSHCAs increase firm value and
innovation, albeit only in settings with strong corporate governance. The author
examines the interaction between the impact of NSHCAs and Business Combination
laws and finds that only states that adopted an NSHCA and not a Business Combi-
nation law show an increase in innovation and firm value. This finding suggests that
managers in firms with weaker governance exploit NSHCAs to entrench themselves
and extract private rents from both shareholders and stakeholders. Consistent with
[10], [58] provide further evidence regarding the impact of NSHCAs on innovation.
These authors show that the adoption of an NSHCA leads to increases in the number
of patents and patent citations. This effect is driven by greater experimentation and
13The author seeks to identify the impact of NSHCAs using both the adoption and newspaper dates to
no avail. Her conclusion is consistent with that of [75] and [29], who contend that firms have the proper
takeover-deterrence mechanisms in the form of poison pills.
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enhanced employee productivity.
Furthermore, [60] show that NSHCAs lead to a decrease in the cost of debt financ-
ing. The authors cite the adoption of an NSHCA as the mechanism of the reduction
in firm risk, which is consistent with the alignment of boards’ interests with those
of non-shareholder constituencies. Additionally, in the context of banks, [84] show
that banks incorporated in states that adopted an NSHCA are less risky, lend to
safer borrowers, and fared better during the recent financial crisis. Furthermore, [93]
study the impact of corporate social responsibility on firm value when managers are
monitored by long-term shareholders. The authors measure corporate social respon-
sibility using NSHCAs and define long-term shareholders as institutional investors
with a three-year horizon turnover smaller than 35%. The study shows that cor-
porate social responsibility has a positive impact on shareholder value only when
long-term shareholders monitor managers. Other papers that measure (or instru-
ment) corporate social responsibility using NSHCAs include [56] and [57]; the former
shows that corporate social responsibility increases the probability of obtaining pro-
curement contracts, and the latter indicates that corporate social contracting leads
to increases in firm value among other outcomes.
2.4 Data and Methodology
2.4.1 Data
The main data analyzed in this paper were derived from Compustat, which is pro-
vided by Standard and Poor’s. I use Compustat data to calculate the payout mea-
sures and define the staggered treatment effects of NSHCAs. Regarding NSHCAs,
I employ the 2017 state of incorporation information provided by Compustat. This
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information was reported in the year 2017 and may have changed at some time in
the past. Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence shows that state reincorporations are rare
[99]. This approach is similar to the approaches used in most studies employing
state-level legislation in the US as a quasi-exogenous shock [see, for instance, 17].
The sample comprises all publicly quoted US-incorporated firms from 1982 to 2017.
The sampling begins in 1982 because open-market share repurchases in the US were
not common until 1982 perhaps because of legal restrictions [6]. After the adoption
of Rule 10b-18 in 1982 (also known as the safe harbor rule), firms could be confident
that SEC prosecution would not follow certain forms of share repurchases.
2.4.2 Methodology
I examine the impact of NSHCAs on payout policy using a difference-in-differences
framework. I estimate the following baseline equation:
Yit = αNSHCAjt + βSSLjt + κXit−1 + pii + ρt + εit (2.1)
where Yit is the dependent variable of firm i in year t, NSHCAjt is an indicator
that assumes a value of one whenever a state j adopts an NSHCA, SSLjt is a
set of indicators that assume a value of one whenever a state j adopts a second-
stage antitakeover law, such as a Business Combination, Fair Price, Control Share
Acquisition or Poison Pill law, Xit−1 is a set of lagged firm-level standard controls,
such as firm size, leverage, cash holdings, book-to-market, operating profitability and
sales growth, pii represents firm fixed effects, and ρt represents time t fixed effects.
Finally, my focus is on the sign and statistical significance of α, which is the estimate
of the plausible causal impact of NSHCAs.
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Studies using difference-in-differences usually explain the setting using an exam-
ple similar to the following. If one wishes to calculate the impact of the adoption
of Massachusetts’ NSHCA in 1989 on the level of payout in firms incorporated in
Massachusetts, we need to subtract the average payout in Massachusetts prior to the
passage of the law from that after the law’s adoption, which is the end of the process
if we are certain that no other event occurred in 1989 that affected firms’ payout
policy. This setting is unlikely to occur, and thus, we need to define a proper con-
trol group. We could select firms incorporated in Maine as a suitable control group
because these firms might have been affected by similar economic shocks in 1989.
After selecting a suitable control group, e.g., Maine, we proceed to repeat the first
step (calculate the average payout of Maine firms after and before 1989); then, we
subtract Maine’s difference from Massachusetts’ difference to obtain the difference-
in-difference estimate of the effect of the adoption of Massachusetts’ NSHCA on
firms’ payout policy. Using panel data regression techniques accounts for the fact
that NSHCAs are staggered over time, i.e., that observations bound to be treated
in the future belong to the control group until that time. These techniques increase
confidence in the suitability of the control group as a close approximation of the
treatment group. In a robustness check, equation (1) is estimated when the sample
is defined as firms incorporated in states that eventually pass an NSHCA (Table 2.9
Panel A).
There are several concerns related to the use of a difference-in-differences method-
ology. The main requirements that should be met to ensure the plausibility of the
causal estimation of the impact of a shock include an as-if-random assignment to the
treatment, the parallel trends assumption, covariate balance, and the only through
condition [9]. The standard assumption in a difference-in-differences setting is that
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the assignment to the treatment should be as good as random, i.e., that firms cannot
self-select into either the treatment or control group. One concern is that regulation
does not occur in a vacuum, i.e., regulators do not appear to randomly adopt laws.
In the NSHCA setting, one could argue that groups of firms or stakeholders seeking
a change in the legal landscape that would favor them combined to promote the
adoption of NSHCAs. However, this situation is unlikely as [98] and [75] argue that
lobbying for anti-takeover legislation has been performed by single actors (firms). In
fact, [75] reproduces a list of firms that lobbied for the passage of an NSHCA, and
I proceed to verify that none of the firms that lobbied for an NSHCA are a part of
my sample.
The second concern is that there are no pretreatment parallel trends in the out-
come variable for the treated and control units, which could indicate that there are
differences that could explain why some states adopt an NSHCA while others do not.
The availability of panel data allows me to test for pretreatment parallel trends by
using the leads-and-lags model [9] and visually represent the pretreatment trends of
the treatment and control groups. In Figure 2, I show the coefficients of the leads and
lags estimation of the impact of NSHCAs on firms’ payout policy in the treatment
and control groups from three years prior to the adoption of an NSHCA to three
years after adoption. It appears that there are similar trends in the net payouts be-
fore the adoption of an NSHCA. Finally, one additional step is to generate placebo
shocks before and after the treatment. In Figure 4, I show the distribution of the
test statistics from 10,000 replications of the main equation of payout policy with
randomly generated NSHCAs. The conclusion drawn based on the placebo test is
that the t-statistic obtained in the main regression of the impact of NSHCAs on the
net payout yield is sufficiently large to consider that it was randomly generated.
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The third concern is that there could be pretreatment differences in the level of a
set of covariates that could suggest unobservable differences between the treatment
and control groups. As shown in Table 2.2, I present the pretreatment differences
in Firm Size, Leverage, MTB, Sales Growth, ROA, and Cash to Assets. I calcu-
late the t-stats of the pretreatment differences between the never-treated units and
eventually-treated units. In the first three columns, I show the pretreatment sample
one year before the adoption of an NSHCA in an unmatched sample of firms (the
main sample), and in the last three columns, I present the pretreatment sample one
year before the adoption of an NSHCA with a propensity score obtained by matching
the sample of firms. There is covariate balance in all covariates, except for ROA,
where the never-treated units seem to have lower return on asset ratios than the
eventually-treated units in the unmatched sample of firms, which might not be a
concern for several reasons. First, because of the staggering of NSHCAs, firms in
the eventually-treated group are both control and treatment units at different time
points. Second, I visually test for the treatment dynamics of NSHCAs on the differ-
ent sets of covariates. In Figure 3, I show that the treatment and control groups show
similar trends before and after the adoption of an NSHCA. This finding reinforces
the notion that there are no differences in the growth of the covariates prior to the
adoption of an NSHCA that could affect the likelihood of a state receiving the treat-
ment. Finally, based on a robustness check, I show that the main effect of NSHCAs
on payout policy is retained after removing all observations that are never treated
from the control group.14 Removing these never-treated observations suggests that
the control group comprises observations that will eventually be treated, thus rein-
14The pretreatment covariate balance tests do not include firms incorporated in Delaware, which would
belong to the never-treated group because these firms are abnormally larger and present more growth
opportunities CITEP DAINES.
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forcing the notion that the treatment and control groups are similar in unobservable
characteristics that could bias the difference-in-differences estimate. Nevertheless, I
proceed to create a sample of matched firms based on their propensity of eventually
receiving the treatment. Table 2.2 Columns (4), (5) and (6) show that after balanc-
ing the sample of unmatched firms, there are no pretreatment covariate differences
between the never-treated and eventually-treated units. Further evidence presented
in Table 2.9 Panel C shows that the main results are retain after using the matched
sample. The final concern is the only through condition of the impact of NSHCAs on
payout policy. This condition states that there could be contemporaneous laws that
might drive the results. In the setting of NSHCAs, other anti-takeover laws, such as
the following laws, are contemporaneous: Business Combination, Fair Price, Control
Share Acquisition and Poison Pill laws. To account for these contemporaneous laws,
I proceed to control for these laws in all analyses performed. In the unreported tests,
I retain only states that eventually adopted an NSHCA in a year other than that
during which any other major second-stage anti-takeover law was adopted or that
only possess one NSHCA and find that the main results are consistent.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables (for a description,
see Appendix A) used in the analyses. The number of observations changes with
the sample size used in the analysis in which a variable was used, and all continuous
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to reduce the impact of extreme
outliers. On average, a given firm exhibits a dividend yield of 2.5%, a repurchase
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yield of 2.8%, a total payout yield of 5.2%, and a net payout yield of 4.6%. Most of
these figures are similar to those reported by [21]. The average firm has a log total
asset value of 6.42, a debt-to-equity ratio of 1.01, a market-to-book of 2.37, a sales
growth of 4.4%, and operating profitability of 3.7%, and the firm’s cash represents
8% of its total assets. Furthermore, in Table 2.2, I report the pretreatment averages
of the firm size, leverage, market-to-book, sales growth, profitability, and cash to
total assets of firms incorporated in states that never adopt an NSHCA and those
that eventually adopt an NSHCA. Table 2.2 presents the same information one year
before the adoption of an NSHCA in an unmatched sample and a propensity score
matched sample. In the first three columns of Table 2.2, I present evidence regarding
the unmatched sample and show that the never-treated firms are larger and have a
lower book-to-market ratio than those that eventually receive the treatment. This
finding might pose a serious problem if these pretreatment differences account for
the propensity to adopt an NSHCA. However, given the staggered nature of NSH-
CAs, this finding does not pose such a serious threat to the difference-in-differences
estimate as the control group consists of firms that are never treated and those that
will eventually receive the treatment, i.e., a firm’s state of incorporation eventually
adopts an NSHCA. Further evidence eases the concern regarding the differences in
the pretreatment covariates as Figure 3 reports the average values of the covariates
(firm size, leverage, profitability, market-to-book, sales growth and cash to assets) in
the eventually-treated and never-treated groups before and after the treatment. No
apparent differences in the trends are apparent between the treatment and control
groups. Finally, I test the pretreatment covariate balance in a sample of eventually-
treated firms that were matched to the never-treated sample. I proceed to match
firms based on their propensity to receive the treatment, i.e., the propensity to even-
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tually adopt an NSHCA. I match the firms based on industry, firm size, leverage,
profitability, book-to-market, sales growth and cash to total assets. In Table 2.2, the
last three columns (Columns (4), (5) and (6)) show that after the matching proce-
dure, there are no pretreatment covariate differences between the eventually-treated
and never-treated observations.15
2.5.2 Impact of NSHCAs on Payout Policy
There are two arguments suggesting that NSHCAs should have no impact on payout
policy. The first argument is advanced by [12] as follows: NSHCAs are mere codifi-
cations of prior state and federal laws and should not modify firms’ behavior. The
second argument is that even if NSHCAs modify firm behavior, this impact is likely
attenuated by the voluntary directives in most state statutes. This first alternative
is supported by [98], who finds no significant impact on share prices following the
announcement or adoption of NSHCAs. Further evidence supporting the no-effect
alternative is provided by [3] and [62] as follows: the first study finds no impact
of NSHCAs on takeover behavior, and the second finds, again, finds no impact of
NSHCAs on the investment behavior of institutional investors. I find statistically
significant evidence that does not support this first alternative and, thus, supports
the alternative that NSHCAs have a statistically significant impact on firm behavior
and outcomes.
In Table 2.3, I show the relevance of these arguments by evaluating the impact of
NSHCAs on firms’ dividend, repurchase, total payout and net payout yields. Table
2.3 shows the analysis of the impact of NSHCAs on payout policy in a sample of
15Further robustness checks (Table 2.9 Panel C) show the main regression analyses using the matched
sample. The main results are consistent in the propensity score-matched sample.
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firms with positive payout levels.16 I measure payout in yields to avoid size issues
and consider both compensation mechanisms (cash dividends and repurchases) to
account for their possible complementarity and the payout measure net of equity
issues as suggested by [21] and [6]. The coefficient of interest in Table 2.3 is NSHCA,
which is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one if an NSHCA was adopted
in the state of incorporation of a given firm. All regressions reported in Table 2.3
include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. In this and all subsequent tables, I
allow for clustering of the error term at the state of incorporation level to account for
the presence of autocorrelation of the dependent variable at the state of incorporation
level, and all controls are lagged to overcome the issue of poor controls.
The results reported in Table 2.3 contradict the previous no-effect argument and
support the main prediction that a decrease in legal incentives due to the adoption
of an NSHCA shields corporate directors and managers from shareholder litigation
and related costs. Therefore, such protection against potential shareholder litigation
and control separate board members’ interests from those of shareholders. Table 2.3
shows that NSHCAs have a consistently statistically significant negative impact on
dividend (Column (1)), repurchase (only in the estimation without controls in the
unreported results), total payout (Column (3)) and net payout (Column (4)) yields.
The point estimate of the impact of NSHCAs on the net payout yield represents a
10.8% (Table 2.3 Column (4)) negative difference in the net payout in the treatment
group compared with that in the control group. This impact represents nearly more
than two one standard deviations of the average net payout yield from the firms in
the sample.17 All lagged controls shown in Table 2.3 behave as expected with respect
16In the unreported results, I use a sample of firms with non-negative payout levels and arrive at the
same conclusion drawn using the sample of firms with positive payout levels.
17The difference between a sample of firms with positive and non-negative payout levels can be acute. In
92
to payout policy18 as larger firms, firms with low leverage, mature firms (small sales
growth and market-to-book ratios), profitable firms and firms with higher liquidity
are more likely to distribute more to shareholders.
2.5.3 Impact of NSHCAs on Investment Policy
I evaluate the impact of NSHCAs on CAPEX, R&D, Acquisitions, Total Investment
and Net Investment in Table 2.4, Columns (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5). These re-
sults indicate that NSHCAs lead to high levels of CAPEX, R&D and Acquisitions,
although only the results of CAPEX are statistically significant. Considering all
previous forms of investment combined, I observe that the adoption of an NSHCA
leads to statistically significant higher levels of total investment. The results also
indicate that NSHCAs lead to higher levels of investment, including net of sale as-
sets. These results are at least partially consistent with those provided by [10] and
[58], whereas [10] shows that NSHCAs lead to increases in value in states that only
adopt an NSHCA; however, his results are found in a general sample without condi-
tioning NSHCAs on states that do not adopt a Business Combination law. As [58]
present evidence regarding the impact of NSHCAs on innovation outputs (patents
and patent citations), I present evidence regarding the positive impact of NSHCAs
(although not statistically significant) on R&D.19
Evidence regarding the impact of NSHCAs on payout policy and investment pol-
icy seems to support my main prediction that a decrease in the legal incentives of
the unreported results, the coefficient of NSHCAs in firms with non-negative payout levels are smaller in
economic terms as observations with zero levels of payout are included.
18Except for ROA and leverage in the dividend yield regression, more profitable and less levered firms
appear to be associated with lower levels of dividend yield.
19In the unreported results, I explore the impact of NSHCAs on changes in R&D expenditures and find
that the impact of NSHCAs is statistically significant and positive.
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boards of directors leads to decreases in shareholder remuneration and increases in
investment. The issue becomes whether this trade-off represents a decrease in the
value of shareholders’ claims. I inspect this issue in further analyses in which I check
whether these results differ in sub-samples of firms that possess a different ex-ante
litigation risk, type of shareholder according to their investment horizon, level of
governance (proxied by the right to adopt a poison pill) and growth opportunities.
2.6 Additional Analyses
2.6.1 Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts and Litigation Risk
In this subsection, I test the impact of NSHCAs on payout and investment in a
cross-section of firms in settings prone to high litigation risk. The results shown
in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 suggest that there might be a trade-off between distributing
rents to shareholders and investment. I test whether the impact of NSHCAs is larger
in settings in which firms might be subjected to high litigation risk and, therefore,
present levels of payout and investment that suit shareholders. I follow [77] in defining
industries that have a high ex-ante probability of litigation. These industries include
the biotechnological industry, which is defined as having SIC codes 2833-2836 or
8731-8734; the computer industry, which is defined as having SIC codes 3570-3577 or
7370-7374; the electronics industry, which is defined as having SIC codes 3600-3674;
and the retail industry, which is defined as having SIC codes 5200-5961. I expect
that NSHCAs decrease litigation risk in these industries and, therefore, present lower
(higher) levels of payout (investment).
In Table 2.5, I inspect the impact of NSHCAs in subsamples of firms with
different levels of litigation risk. I examine the interaction between an indicator
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of firms subjected to NSHCAs and another indicator of firms not subjected to
NSHCAs (Non_NSHCA) with two indicators of litigation risk (High_Lit_Risk and
Low_Lit_Risk). Then, I compare the following four groups: NSHCA×High_Lit_Risk,
NSHCA × Low_Lit_Risk, Non_NSHCA × High_Lit_Risk and Non_NSHCA ×
Low_Lit_Risk. By not including one of these groups in the regression, I am compar-
ing the relative levels of payout and investment among the three groups against the
one omitted from the regression. Table 2.5 Panel A shows the results of regressing
three interactions while removing NSHCA × Low_Lit_Risk from of the regression.
I show the coefficients of the group NSHCA × High_Lit_Risk to compare the dif-
ference among firms subjected to NSHCAs with different levels of litigation risk.
Compared to firms with a low litigation risk that are subjected to NSHCAs, those
with a high litigation risk that are subjected to NSHCAs show lower levels of payout
and higher levels of investment. In contrast, in Table 2.5 Panel B, I remove the
group of firms that are not subjected to NSHCAs and possess a high level of litiga-
tion risk from the regression. In this case, compared to firms that have a high level
of litigation risk but are not subjected to NSHCAs, those subject to NSHCAs show
lower levels of net payout and larger levels of investment. The conclusion drawn from
analyzing the impact of NSHCAs on payout and investment policy in firms subjected
to different levels of litigation risk is that firms subjected to a high litigation risk
decrease (increase) their payout (investment) levels beyond those of firms with lower
levels of litigation risk. This finding is consistent with the expectation that NSHCAs
shield corporate officers and directors from a judicial review of their choices. This
evidence further supports the main prediction that a change in the legal incentives
of directors could be used by insiders to change corporate outcomes, such as payout
and investment levels.
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2.6.2 Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts and the Investment Horizon
of Institutional Investors
In this subsection, I test the impact of NSHCAs on payout and investment in a cross-
section of firms that possess an above the median level of ownership by institutional
investors with a long-term outlook on the firm. Again, the results in Tables 2.3 and
2.4 suggest that there might be a trade-off between distributing rents to shareholders
and investment, and given that the optimal level of payout and investment could
differ between shareholders and corporate directors, a relaxation in the incentives
(in this case, legal incentives) could lead to a new level of payout and investment.
However, there are differences in the desired level of payout and investment between
shareholders with different investment horizons. Long-term oriented shareholders are
willing to forgo current reimbursements for future long-term growth, whereas short-
term-oriented shareholders may prefer a quick reimbursement [106]. I test whether
the impact of NSHCAs is greater in settings in which firms might be subjected to
long-term institutional investors, who might be willing to forgo current cash flows for
future growth. I follow [26] in defining long-term institutional investors as institutions
with low diversification and turnover (dedicated investors) and those with highly
diversified portfolios and a low turnover (quasi-indexers).
In Table 2.6, I inspect the impact of NSHCAs in subsamples of firms with
different levels of long-term institutional investors. I examine the interaction be-
tween an indicator of firms subjected to NSHCAs and another indicator of firms
that are not subjected to NSHCAs (Non_NSHCA) with two indicators of a large
(small) presence of long-term oriented shareholders (High_LT_Shareholders and
Low_LT_Shareholders). Then, I compare the following four groups: NSHCA ×
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High_LT_Shareholders, NSHCA× Low_LT_Shareholders, Non_NSHCA×High_LT_Shareholders
and Non_NSHCA× Low_LT_Shareholders. By not including one of these groups in
the regression, I compare the relative levels of payout and investment among the three
groups against the group removed from the regression. Table 2.6 Panel A shows the
results of regressing three interactions without NSHCA × High_LT_Shareholders.
I show the coefficients of the group of NSHCA × Low_LT_Shareholders to compare
the difference among firms subjected to NSHCAs with different levels of pressure
to select a level of payout and investment that deviates more from the desired level
of corporate directors. Compared to firms with high long-term shareholders that
are subjected to NSHCAs, those with low levels of long-term shareholders that are
subjected to NSHCAs show lower levels of payout. There are no differences in the
investment levels. However, in Table 2.6 Panel B, I remove the group of firms that
are not subjected to NSHCAs and possess a low level of long-term institutional
shareholders from the regression. In this case, compared to firms with a low level of
long-term shareholder ownership that are not subjected to NSHCAs, those subjected
to NSHCAs show lower levels of payout. The conclusion drawn from analyzing the
impact of NSHCAs on payout and investment policy in firms subjected to different
levels of long-term investor ownership is that firms subjected to low levels of owner-
ship by long-term institutional investors decrease their payout levels more than firms
with high levels of ownership by long-term institutional investors. This finding is
consistent with the expectation that NSHCAs have a stronger impact in the absence
of shareholders that may desire a payout level closer to that of corporate officers and
directors. This evidence further supports the main prediction that a change in the
legal incentives of directors could be used by insiders to change corporate outcomes,
such as payout levels, in the absence of shareholders with a desired level of payout
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close to that of the board of directors.
2.6.3 Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts and Corporate Governance
In this subsection, I test the impact of NSHCAs on payout and investment in a cross-
section of firms that possess different levels of governance. My expectation is that
the adoption of an NSHCA does not have the same impact or a lower impact in firms
with a high level of corporate governance. I test whether the impact of NSHCAs is
smaller in settings in which firms might be subjected to high corporate governance
that could make boards set a payout and investment level similar to the levels that
would be chosen by shareholders through their formal control rights. I follow [75] in
defining high corporate governance as firms that are incorporated in states that have
not adopted or will never adopt a Poison Pill statute, i.e., firms that do not have the
right to adopt a poison pill or do not possess a “shadow pill” [41].
In Table 2.7, I inspect the impact of NSHCAs in subsamples of firms with dif-
ferent levels of governance. I examine the interaction between an indicator of firms
subjected to NSHCAs and another indicator of firms not subjected to NSHCAs
(Non_NSHCA) with two indicators of a high (low) level of governance (High_Governance
and Low_Governance). Then, I compare the following four groups: NSHCA ×
High_Governance, NSHCA× Low_Governance, Non_NSHCA×High_Governance
and Non_NSHCA × Low_Governance. By not including one of these groups in the
regression, I compare the relative levels of payout and investment among the three
groups against the one removed from the regression. Table 2.7 Panel A shows the
results of regressing three interactions without NSHCA × Low_Governance. I show
the coefficients of the group of NSHCA × High_Governance to compare the dif-
ference among the firms subjected to NSHCAs with different levels of pressure to
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select a level of payout and investment that would deviate more from the desired
level of corporate directors due to a difference in corporate governance. Compared
to firms with low governance that are subjected to NSHCAs, those with high levels
of governance that are subjected to NSHCAs do not show statistically significant
differences in both payout and investment levels. However, in Table 2.7 Panel B, I
remove the group of firms that are not subjected to NSHCAs and possess a high level
of corporate governance from the regression. In this case, compared to firms with a
high level of corporate governance that not subjected to NSHCAs, those subjected to
NSHCAs show lower levels of total payout and larger levels of total investment. The
conclusion drawn from analyzing the impact of NSHCAs on payout and investment
policy in firms subjected to different levels of governance is that firms subjected to
different levels of governance do not show different levels of payout or investment,
but only in those firms that have a high level of governance, there is some marginal
evidence suggesting that the adoption of an NSHCA leads to lower levels of total
payout and investment.
2.6.4 Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts and Growth Opportunities
In this subsection, I test the impact of NSHCAs on payout and investment in a
cross-section of firms that possess an above the median level of growth opportunities,
representing available positive NPV projects in which the firm could invest. Once
again, the results in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 suggest that there might be a trade-off between
distributing rents to shareholders and investment. Given that the optimal level of
payout and investment differ based on whether firms have positive NPV available,
I inspect whether some firms (high growth firms) could benefit from the increased
leeway procured by NSHCAs and increase their investment levels while decreasing
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payouts to shareholders. There could be differences in the desired level of payout and
investment between shareholders and corporate officers and directors even if we hold
the growth of the firm constant at a high level. For instance, if these investments take
a long time to produce returns and shareholders have a shorter outlook on the firm,
investment may be forgone. I test whether the impact of NSHCAs is larger in settings
in which firms might have more positive NPV projects available and might be willing
to forgo current cash flows for future growth. I define growth opportunities using
the market-to-book ratio of equity to proxy firms whose market value captures the
current value of their investment, which is larger in growing firms than the historical
cost of such investments (captured by the book value).
In Table 2.8, I inspect the impact of NSHCAs in subsamples of firms with differ-
ent levels of growth opportunities. I examine the interaction between an indicator of
firms subjected to NSHCAs and another indicator of firms not subjected to NSHCAs
(Non_NSHCA) with two indicators of a large (small) presence of growth opportuni-
ties (High_Growth and Low_Growth). Then, I compare the following four groups:
NSHCA × High_Growth, NSHCA × Low_Growth, Non_NSHCA × High_Growth
and Non_NSHCA × Low_Growth. By not including one of these groups in the
regression, I compare the relative levels of payout and investment among the three
groups against the one group removed from the regression. Table 2.8 Panel A shows
the results of regressing three interactions without NSHCA × Low_Growth in the
regression. I show the coefficients of the group NSHCA × High_Growth to compare
the difference among firms subjected to NSHCAs with different levels of growth op-
portunities. Compared to firms with low growth opportunities that are subjected
to NSHCAs, those with high levels of growth opportunities that are subjected to
NSHCAs show lower levels of payout and larger levels of investment. In contrast, in
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Table 2.8 Panel B, I remove the group of firms that are not subjected to NSHCAs
and possess a high level of growth opportunities from the regression. In this case,
compared to firms with a high level of growth opportunities that are not subjected
to NSHCAs, those subjected to NSHCAs show lower levels of payout and increased
levels of investment. The conclusion drawn from analyzing the impact of NSHCAs
on payout and investment policy in firms subjected to different levels of growth op-
portunities is that firms that have many positive NPV projects available decrease
their payout levels and increase their investment levels more than firms with fewer
positive NPV projects. This finding is consistent with the expectation that NSHCAs
have a stronger impact in the presence of several NPV-positive projects that require
financing. This finding suggests that these firms (growing firms subjected to NSH-
CAs) take advantage of the decreased litigation risk to direct cash from shareholders
to new investments possibly due to the lower cost of this internal source of capital
compared to external sources. This evidence further supports the main prediction
that a change in the legal incentives of directors could be used by insiders to change
corporate outcomes, such as payout levels, in the presence of growth opportunities.
2.7 Robustness Checks
In Table 2.9 Panels A, B, C and D, I present evidence assessing the robustness of
the main results of the paper. Panel A presents evidence from an alternative control
group comprising only observations that are eventually treated. This new sample
is obtained by eliminating firms that are incorporated in a state that never adopts
an NSHCA. By removing these firms from the sample, the remaining control firms
eventually will be subjected to an NSHCA, which eases concerns that the unobserved
101
differences between the treatment and control groups determine both the adoption
of an NSHCA and the levels of payout and investment. Under this stricter sample,
the control group comprises firms that will eventually receive the treatment and be
subjected to the same unobserved characteristics. The results shown in Table 2.9
Panel A suggest that the unobserved differences between the firms that are never
subjected to an NSHCA and those that are eventually subjected to an NSHCA
do not account for the full effect of NSHCAs on payout and investment policies.
Alternatively, Panel B exploits the definition of statue strength proposed by [14].
In her paper, the author assigns an intensity to NSHCAs that ranges from weak to
strong depending on the level of protection that these statutes confer to corporate
boards against judicial review of their decisions. I exploit these intensity definitions
and explore the heterogeneous impact of the adoption of an NSHCA of different
intensity or strength. The results shown in Panel B reveal that firms incorporated in
a state that adopts a strong NSHCA show lover levels of total payout and increased
levels of investment compared to firms incorporated in states that adopt a weak
NSHCA. These results are consistent with the decrease in litigation risk, which is
expected to be higher with stronger statutes.
Moreover, Panel C shows the results obtained from applying propensity score
matching to the sample of treated firms immediately before the year of the adoption
of a given NSHCA. Table 2.2 shows that in an unmatched sample of firms the year
before the adoption of an NSHCA, the treatment and control groups differ in the level
of ROA. If the firms differ in the level of ROA, there is a possibility that the treatment
and control groups also differ in more covariates, including unobservable covariates.
Therefore, I match the treatment firms the year before the adoption of an NSHCA
with firms from never-treated states a year before the adoption of an NSHCA on their
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propensity to receive the treatment, i.e., adopt an NSHCA. I use the propensity score
of the controls used in the main analyses as determinants and introduce industry
and headquarter controls. Table 2.2 also shows that after balancing, there are no
observable differences between the never-treated units and eventually-treated units.
However, to ease concerns regarding the use of an unmatched sample of firms in the
main analyses of the paper, I proceed to perform the main tests again using this
matched sample of firms. Table 2.9 Panel C shows the results of the main analyses
using the matched sample, and the conclusion drawn is that even with such a reduced
sample, there seems to be marginal evidence that the adoption of an NSHCA leads to
lower levels of payout and increased levels of investment. Finally, I exploit different
fixed effect structures to explore the robustness of the main results of the paper.
Table 2.9 Panel D shows the results of the impact of NSHCAs on net payout and net
investment in estimated equations that include either year times headquarter fixed
effects, year times industry fixed effects or both simultaneously. The interpretation
of the coefficient of NSHCA shown in Table 2.9 Panel D Column (1) is the following:
compared to firms that are not subjected to an NSHCA and have a headquarter in
the same state in a given year, firms that are subjected to an NSHCA show a 10.3%
decrease in the net payout yield. This interpretation applies the same reasoning in
the remaining columns in Table 2.9 Panel D.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper aimed to investigate the impact of boards of directors’ legal incentives on
firms’ payout and investment policies. I use the adoption of a set of staggered laws
in the US to measure the decrease in boards’ legal incentives. These laws are Non-
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Shareholder Constituencies Acts (NSHCAs) that state that boards of directors can
make decisions that harm shareholders for the benefit of stakeholders, i.e., employees,
creditors, customers, and the community. I investigate the impact of NSHCAs on
payout policy and find that the adoption of NSHCAs leads to lower levels of payout
yield. Nonetheless, the undistributed rents from shareholders are rather reinvested
in the firm. NSHCAs lead to increases in CAPEX and total and net investment.
The impact on payout and investment seems to be larger in settings in which firms
are subjected to high litigation risk, higher levels of short-term investor ownership
and more investment opportunities. These results are consistent even after using
alternative control groups that are possibly less tainted by sources of endogeneity
and different fixed effect structures.
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Appendix A: Description of Variables
Variable Description Source
Dependent Variables
Div DVC/(PRCC_F*CSHO) Capital IQ Compustat
Rep PRSTKC/(PRCC_F*CSHO) Capital IQ Compustat
Total Payout (DVC+PRSTKC)/(PRCC_F*CSHO) Capital IQ Compustat
Net Payout (DVC+PRSTKC-
SSTK)/(PRCC_F*CSHO)
Capital IQ Compustat
CAPEX CAPX/AT Capital IQ Compustat
R&D XRD/SALE Capital IQ Compustat
Acquisitions AQC/SALE Capital IQ Compustat
Total Investment (AQC + XRD + CAPX)/SALE Capital IQ Compustat
Net Investment (AQC + XRD + CAPX - SP-
PIV)/SALE
Capital IQ Compustat
Explanatory Variables and
Controls
NSHCA Dummy variable assume the value of
one if a firm is incorporated in a state
that has adopted a Non-Shareholder
Constituency Act by time t. Source:
[75, 28]
Capital IQ Compustat
Non_NSHCA Dummy variable assume the value of
one if a firm is not under the in-
fluence of a Non-Shareholder Con-
stituency Act. Source: [75, 28]
Capital IQ Compustat
Firm Size ln(AT) Capital IQ Compustat
Leverage (DLC+DLTT)/CEQ Capital IQ Compustat
MTB CEQ/(PRCC_F*CSHO) Capital IQ Compustat
Sales Growth (SALE-L.SALE)/L.SALE Capital IQ Compustat
ROA IB/AT Capital IQ Compustat
Cash to Assets CH/AT Capital IQ Compustat
Interaction Variables
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High_Lit_Risk is defined as a dummy variable that
assumes the value of one if a firm be-
longs to any of the following indus-
tries: SIC codes (2833-2836), (8731-
8734), (3570-3577), (7370-7374), (3600-
3674), or (5200-5961); otherwise, its
value is 0.
Capital IQ Compus-
tat, [77]
Low_Lit_Risk is defined as a dummy variable that as-
sumes the value of one if a firm does
not belong to any of the following in-
dustries: SIC codes (2833-2836), (8731-
8734), (3570-3577), (7370-7374), (3600-
3674), or (5200-5961); otherwise, its
value is 0.
Capital IQ Compus-
tat, [77]
High_LT_Shareholders is defined as a dummy variable that as-
sumes the value of one if a firm pos-
sesses a level of ownership by long-term
institutional investors above the indus-
try and year median. Long-term insti-
tutional investors are defined as ded-
icated and quasi-indexer investors by
[26]
TR 13 F
Low_LT_Shareholders is defined as a dummy variable that as-
sumes the value one if a firm possesses a
level of ownership by long-term institu-
tional investors below the industry and
year median. Long-term institutional
investors are defined as dedicated and
quasi-indexer investors by [26]
TR 13 F
High_Governance is defined as a dummy variable that as-
sumes the value of one if a firm pos-
sesses a right to introduce a poison pill
due to the adoption of a Poison Pill
Statute following [75].
Capital IQ Compustat
Low_Governance is defined as a dummy variable that as-
sumes the value one if a firm does not
possess the right to introduce a poison
pill due to the adoption of a Poison Pill
Statute following [75].
Capital IQ Compustat
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High_Growth is defined as a dummy variable that as-
sumes the value of one if a firm shows a
level of MTB above that of the industry
and year median.
Capital IQ Compustat
Low_Growth is defined as a dummy variable that as-
sumes the value of one if a firm shows a
level of MTB below that of the industry
and year median.
Capital IQ Compustat
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Appendix B: Adoption of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts.
Figure 1: States Adopting Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts.
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State (Year of Adoption)
Arizona (1987)
Connecticut (1988)
Florida (1989)
Georgia (1989)
Hawaii (1989)
Idaho (1988)
Illinois (1988)
Indiana (1986)
Iowa (1989)
Kentucky (1988)
Louisiana (1988)
Maine (1985)
Maryland (1999)
Massachusetts (1989)
Minnesota (1987)
Mississippi (1990)
Missouri (1986)
Nebraska (1988)20
Nevada (1991)
New Jersey (1989)
New Mexico (1987)
New York (1987)
North Carolina (1993)
North Dakota (1993)
Ohio (1984)
Oregon (1989)
Pennsylvania (1990)
Rhode Island (1990)
South Dakota (1990)
Tennessee (1988)
Texas (2003)
Vermont (1988)
Wisconsin (1987)
Wyoming (1990)
Source: Karpoff and Wittry (2015) and annotated state codes.
20Nebraska adopted an NSHCA in 1988, repealed it in 1995, and readopted it in 2007.
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Figure 2: Leads and Lags Model of the Impact of NSHCAs on Payout Policy.
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Figure 2 continued :
All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. This set of figures shows
the estimates of NSHCAs in the three, two and one years prior to the adoption of
an NSHCA, the year of the adoption of an NSHCA, and three years after having
adopted an NSHCA on the dividend, repurchase, total payout and net payout yields
in firms with positive levels of payout.
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Figure 3: Evolution of the Controls in the Treatment and Control Groups.
Graphs.png
All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. This figure shows the average
values of Firm Size, Leverage, MTB, Sales Growth, ROA, and Cash to Assets in the
treatment and control groups in the three, two and one years prior to the adoption
of an NSHCA, the year of the adoption of an NSHCA, and three years after having
adopted an NSHCA.
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αln(Net Payout)it = αNSHCAjt + βSSLjt + κXit + pii + ρt + εit
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics.
Number of
Observations
Mean S.D.
Quartiles
Q1 Q2 Q3
Div 76138 0.025 0.030 0.000 0.018 0.034
Rep 67792 0.028 0.047 0.000 0.008 0.034
Total Payout 76328 0.052 0.058 0.018 0.034 0.063
Net Payout 76328 0.046 0.053 0.014 0.030 0.057
Firm Size 76328 6.423 2.150 4.966 6.456 7.905
ROA 76328 0.037 0.084 0.010 0.037 0.076
MTB 76328 2.365 4.445 1.077 1.627 2.633
Leverage 76328 1.011 2.388 0.116 0.526 1.189
Sales Growth 76328 0.044 0.302 -0.010 0.064 0.143
Cash to Assets to Assets 76328 0.080 0.116 0.013 0.035 0.096
CAPEX 162841 0.122 0.397 0.013 0.033 0.077
Acquisitions 156895 0.028 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.002
R&D 85072 0.629 3.355 0.001 0.033 0.137
Investment 162808 0.425 1.768 0.025 0.077 0.204
Net Investment 162841 0.418 1.755 0.024 0.074 0.199
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the main sample used in the analyses. The
number of observations of the control variables (Firm Size, ROA, MTB, Leverage, Sales
Growth and Cash to Assets to Assets) vary according to the test described in each table.
In Table 2.1, I show the number of observations used in the main analysis shown in Table
3. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A.
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Table 2.2: Pre-treatment Covariate Balance.
Unmatched Sample Matched Sample
Never Eventually Never Eventually
Treated Treated t-stat Treated Treated t-stat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Size 5.415 5.429 -0.244 5.314 5.241 1.119
Leverage 1.077 1.107 -0.557 1.006 1.032 -0.460
MTB 1.768 1.828 -0.864 1.740 1.743 -0.052
Sales Growth 0.045 0.042 0.313 0.061 0.052 1.129
ROA 0.032 0.043 -5.243 0.040 0.045 -0.904
Cash to Assets 0.055 0.049 0.400 0.055 0.053 1.044
Observations 2648 3989 2382 2352
All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. This table shows the covariate bal-
ance between the never-treated observations and eventually-treated observations before the
passage of the NSHCAs. Table 2.2 shows the average values of Firm Size, Leverage, MTB,
Sales Growth, ROA, and Cash to Assets in the sample used in the main analysis. The first
three columns include information obtained one year before the adoption of an NSHCA in
the unmatched sample, whereas the last three columns contain information obtained one
year before the adoption of an NSHCA in a matched sample of firms. I used a propensity
score matching procedure with the nearest neighbor and no replacement using all control
variables plus industry and headquarters state dummies. The state of Delaware (incor-
poration code 10 in Compustat) is not included in the previous tests, although including
firms incorporated in this state only changes the significance of the t-test in the unmatched
sample since Delaware firms are larger and more profitable on average [42].
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Table 2.3: Impact of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts on Payout Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Div) ln(Rep) ln(Total P.) ln(Net P.)
NSHCA -0.076** -0.078 -0.141*** -0.108**
(-2.164) (-0.844) (-2.964) (-2.280)
ROAt−1 -0.388*** 0.839*** 0.943*** 1.026***
(-5.044) (14.018) (19.630) (15.811)
Firm Sizet−1 0.071*** 0.277*** 0.246*** 0.194***
(4.865) (10.955) (9.958) (6.864)
Leveraget−1 0.031*** -0.006 0.005 -0.000
(4.442) (-1.323) (1.338) (-0.033)
Cash to Assetst−1 0.210** 0.655*** 0.568*** 0.680***
(2.228) (8.612) (11.631) (9.062)
Sales Growtht−1 -0.150*** -0.194*** -0.221*** -0.214***
(-6.312) (-10.037) (-12.692) (-8.268)
MTBt−1 -0.020*** -0.005** -0.012*** -0.010***
(-7.294) (-2.268) (-4.188) (-2.713)
Observations 64,045 58,253 91,782 76,328
2nd Stage Laws? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents evidence supporting the effect of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts
on payout policy. Table 2.3 presents the results of the sub-sample of firms with a positive
level of payout. For the variable descriptions, please see Appendix A. Standard errors are
clustered at the state of incorporation level. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.4: Effect of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts on Investment Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CAPEX R&D Acquisitions Total Inv. Net Inv.
NSHCA 0.019** 0.053 0.002 0.091*** 0.089***
(2.469) (0.990) (0.932) (3.291) (3.260)
ROAt−1 0.039*** -0.426*** 0.021*** -0.224*** -0.206***
(3.299) (-5.724) (6.456) (-5.677) (-5.890)
Firm Sizet−1 0.007** 0.080*** -0.002*** 0.024** 0.030***
(2.182) (3.395) (-7.070) (2.542) (3.297)
Leveraget−1 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.005* -0.005*
(-4.709) (-0.005) (-9.581) (-1.768) (-1.784)
Cash to Assetst−1 0.208*** 0.982*** 0.063*** 0.878*** 0.894***
(10.538) (9.086) (15.827) (11.259) (11.679)
Sales Growtht−1 -0.037*** -0.525*** -0.001 -0.250*** -0.245***
(-8.440) (-8.248) (-1.277) (-9.472) (-9.318)
MTBt−1 0.002*** 0.003** 0.001*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(5.152) (2.415) (13.291) (3.813) (3.849)
Observations 162,841 84,811 158,296 162,801 162,841
2nd Stage Laws? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2.4 presents evidence supporting the effect of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts
on investment policy. The constant is not reported. For the variable definitions, please see
Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation level. *, **, and
*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Effect of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts on Corporate Outcomes in
Firms with Different Litigation Risk Levels
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4)
Comparison group: ln(Total P.) ln(Net P.) Total Inv. Net Inv.
NSHCA × Low_Lit_Risk
NSHCA × High_Lit_Risk -0.246*** -0.113** 0.282*** 0.287***
(-5.389) (-2.142) (4.385) (4.439)
Observations 94,418 78,735 164,868 164,906
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Interactions? Yes Yes Yes Yes
2nd Stage Laws? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4)
Comparison group: ln(Total P.) ln(Net P.) Total Inv. Net Inv.
Non_NSHCA × High_Lit_Risk
NSHCA × High_Lit_Risk -0.022 -0.114* 0.284*** 0.278***
(-0.405) (-1.713) (5.455) (5.413)
Observations 94,418 78,735 164,868 164,906
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Interactions? Yes Yes Yes Yes
2nd Stage Laws? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2.5 presents evidence supporting the effect of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts
on corporate outcomes in firms with different litigation risk levels. Litigation risk is proxied
by industries that are subjected to higher levels of litigation following [77]. For the variable
definitions, please see Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorpora-
tion level. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table 2.6: Effect of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts on Corporate Outcomes in
Firms with Different Investor Bases
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4)
Comparison group: ln(Total P.) ln(Net P.) Total Inv. Net Inv.
NSHCA × High_LT_Shareholders
NSHCA × Low_LT_Shareholders -0.102*** -0.100*** 0.010 0.011
(-2.649) (-2.815) (0.583) (0.625)
Observations 55,066 46,053 87,192 87,192
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Interactions? Yes Yes Yes Yes
2nd Stage Laws? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4)
Comparison group: ln(Total P.) ln(Net P.) Total Inv. Net Inv.
Non_NSHCA × Low_LT_Shareholders
NSHCA × Low_LT_Shareholders -0.142** -0.113* 0.024 0.023
(-2.313) (-1.808) (0.745) (0.722)
Observations 55,066 46,053 87,192 87,192
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Interactions? Yes Yes Yes Yes
2nd Stage Laws? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2.6 presents evidence supporting the effect of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts
on corporate outcomes with institutional investors with different investment horizons. The
investment horizon of institutional investors follows [26]. For the variable definitions, please
see Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation level. *, **,
and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.7: Effect of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts on Corporate Outcomes in
Firms with Different Levels of Governance
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4)
Comparison group: ln(Total P.) ln(Net P.) Total Inv. Net Inv.
NSHCA × Low_Governance
NSHCA × High_Governance 0.007 0.025 0.045 0.044
(0.175) (0.515) (0.911) (0.896)
Observations 91,782 76,328 162,801 162,841
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Interactions? Yes Yes Yes Yes
2nd Stage Laws? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4)
Comparison group: ln(Total P.) ln(Net P.) Total Inv. Net Inv.
Non_NSHCA × High_Governance
NSHCA × High_Governance -0.129** -0.077 0.070* 0,069
(-2.464) (-1.443) (1.658) (1.637)
Observations 91,782 76,328 162,801 162,841
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Interactions? Yes Yes Yes Yes
2nd Stage Laws? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2.7 presents evidence from the robustness checks of the effect of Non-Shareholder
Constituencies Acts on corporate outcomes in firms with high or low levels of corporate
governance. The proxy for corporate governance is the adoption of a Poison Pill statute
because strong evidence suggests that such statutes are effective anti-takeover mechanisms
[75]. For the variable definitions, please see Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at
the state of incorporation level. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.8: Effect of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts on Corporate Outcomes in
Firms with Different Levels of Growth Opportunities
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4)
Comparison group: ln(Total P.) ln(Net P.) Total Inv. Net Inv.
NSHCA × Low_Growth
NSHCA × High_Growth -0.178*** -0.195*** 0.069*** 0.071***
(-11.261) (-9.438) (3.401) (3.335)
Observations 91,782 76,328 162,801 162,841
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Interactions? Yes Yes Yes Yes
2nd Stage Laws? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4)
Comparison group: ln(Total P.) ln(Net P.) Total Inv. Net Inv.
Non_NSHCA × High_Growth
NSHCA × High_Growth -0.311*** -0.282*** 0.182*** 0.182***
(-6.374) (-5.544) (5.446) (5.356)
Observations 91,782 76,328 162,801 162,841
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Interactions? Yes Yes Yes Yes
2nd Stage Laws? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2.8 presents evidence from the robustness checks of the effect of Non-Shareholder
Constituencies Acts on corporate outcomes in firms with high or low levels of growth op-
portunities. The proxy for growth opportunities is the MTB. For the variable definitions,
please see Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation level. *,
**, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.9: Effect of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts on Corporate Outcomes:
Robustness Checks
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4)
Eventually Treated Firms ln(Total P.) ln(Net P.) Total Inv. Net Inv.
NSHCA -0.120*** -0.092** 0.065** 0.063**
(-2.671) (-2.031) (2.342) (2.262)
Observations 38,333 32,709 58,655 58,680
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
2nd Stage Laws? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4)
Shock Strength ln(Total P.) ln(Net P.) Total Inv. Net Inv.
NSHCA*Strong -0.166*** -0.102 0.070** 0.068**
(-2.619) (-1.562) (2.277) (2.247)
NSHCA*Medium -0.033 -0.034 0.022 0.020
(-0.567) (-0.550) (0.658) (0.609)
Observations 38,333 32,709 58,655 58,680
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
2nd Stage Laws? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.9 continued
Panel C (1) (2) (3) (4)
Propensity Score Matched Sample ln(Total P.) ln(Net P.) Total Inv. Net Inv.
NSHCA -0.115* -0.125* 0.038* 0.039*
(-1.787) (-1.887) (1.879) (1.914)
Observations 16,686 15,113 18,684 18,684
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
2nd Stage Laws? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Different FE Structures ln(Net Payout) Net Investment
NSHCA -0.103** -0.083** -0.094** 0.074** 0.089*** 0.077**
(-2.242) (-2.022) (-2.460) (2.310) (3.444) (2.329)
Observations 75,755 76,206 75,629 160,146 162,761 160,055
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2nd Stage Laws? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Headquarter FE? Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Year×Industry FE? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Table 2.9 shows the results of several robustness checks of the impact of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts on corporate
outcomes. Panel A shows the impact of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts on corporate outcomes in a sub-sample of firms
that eventually receive the treatment, i.e., firms incorporated in states that eventually adopt an NSHCA. Panel B shows the
different impacts of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts on corporate outcomes in states in which the NSHCA had a strong
influence against states in which it had a weak influence. Panel C shows the impact of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts
on corporate outcomes in a sub-sample of firms matched based on pretreatment covariates the year before the adoption
of an NSHCA, i.e., firms matched across Firm Size, ROA, MTB, Leverage, Sales Growth, Cash to Assets, industry and
headquarter state. The sub-sample of matched firms in Panel C does not include firms incorporated in Delaware since
these firms are larger and have different investment opportunities than the remaining firms incorporated in other states [42].
Finally, Panel D shows the impact of Non-Shareholder Constituencies Acts on corporate outcomes based on estimations
including a different array of fixed effects structures. For the variable definitions, please see Appendix A. Standard errors
are clustered at the state of incorporation level. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Chapter 3
CEO Overboard! Corporate
Performance Consequences of CEO
Participation in Other Boards
3.1 Introduction
Don’t go “overboard”! In their recent policy papers, two of the largest U.S. proxy
advisors strongly recommend against directors who sit on too many boards. Glass
Lewis, for instance, terming it as “overboarding”, said they would only recommend
directors who serve on no more than five boards, instead of six. The limit is much
more stringent for CEOs serving on boards which just got updated from three to
two seats. BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, cast 168 votes against
directors this year owing to overboarding concerns [82]. These policy updates by
proxy advisors are reflective of the rising concern that the directors may be stretching
themselves too thin due to directorships becoming more time consuming. In the U.S.,
the number of hours devoted to the duties pertaining to directorship has increased by
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18% over the previous decade. Indeed, recent research had highlighted the negative
consequences of directors being too busy or distracted.
Most of the prior research has exclusively focused on the distraction of directors
and how it affects the firms on whose board they sit [51, 53, 55, 92]. In contrast
to the literature, in this paper we focus on the how the CEOs sit as directors on
boards of other firms impacts the profitability of the focal employing firm. If CEOs
are distracted due to their responsibilities as directors in other firms, the employing
firms could be affected significantly.
We follow the intuition from [76] to measure CEO distraction. For each CEO, we
first measure a shock as a variable that takes on a non-zero value if one of the firm
in CEO’s portfolio as independent director (not including the focal firm) receives an
extreme positive or negative returns. We then weight this variable with the weight of
each of these firm in the CEO’s independent director portfolio (including the CEO’s
focal firm) and with how unimportant the CEO’s focal firm is important to them.
Thus, we give more weight to instances where the shocked directorship is relatively
larger or focal firm is relatively smaller as such attention-grabbing event will have a
greater impact. This measure of CEO distraction, by definition is orthogonal to the
focal firm characteristics and actions of the CEO undertaken at their focal firm.
We then use a difference-in-difference strategy to estimate the impact of CEO
distraction on the firm profitability. In all our specification, we include the firm and
year fixed effects to rely on the within firm variation to estimate the impact of CEO
distraction. Additionally, we control for whether the CEO sits on in another board
and the market value of the firms in which CEO sits as an independent director. This
implies that we are comparing changes in firm performance among firms that have a
distracted CEO with changes among firms that do not have a distracted CEO while
controlling for whether the CEO sits in another board as an independent director.
We find that the CEO’s focal firm is significantly negatively affected when the
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CEOs are distracted. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the CEO
distraction results in a 0.023 lower return-on-asset for the focal firm compared to
firms with a non-distracted CEO. The effect is economically sizable as the effect is
comparable to the effect generated by having a one standard deviation increase in
the proportion of busy directors sitting on the board. These results suggest that the
attention-grabbing events at the other firms in which CEO sits as an independent
director have an impact on the performance of the CEO’s focal firm. The effect is
transient in nature and lasts for up to two years after the year in which CEO became
distracted.
We present heterogeneity tests that inform us when are CEOs more distracted.
First, we distinguish between extreme positive and negative returns to analyze which
shocks lead to a greater impact on the CEO’s focal firm. We find that both the
extreme positive and negative returns have a significant negative impact on the
CEO’s focal firm. In addition, we find that the impact is stronger if the CEO serves
as a chair of the audit, compensation, and nominating committees in the other firm,
with being chair of the audit committee resulting in the strongest negative impact
on the CEO’s focal firm. Finally, we find that the CEOs focal firm suffers more if
the extreme returns occur at the firm which is geographically further away from the
CEO’s focal firm.
The results are robust to different ways of measuring distraction, and firm per-
formance. In the baseline specification, we define shock as a dummy variable taking
value of one if the firm on which CEO sits as an independent director receives an
extreme return defined as top or bottom 15% of the returns. We show that the
results are similar if instead we define shock equal to one for top or bottom 10%, 5%,
and 1% of the returns. In the baseline specification, we concentrate on the firm’s
return-on-asset to measure firm performance. We show that the focal firm of the
CEO under-performs other firms if we measure performance using annual market
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returns, Tobin’s Q, and return-on-equity.
Finally, we shed light on how CEO distraction impacts the CEO’s outcomes. We
find that the CEO distraction does not impact the salary and bonus received by the
CEO. However, it impacts the total compensation received by the CEO. In addition,
a higher CEO distraction results in a higher likelihood of forced CEO turnover.
This paper contributes to the vast body of literature on the importance of the
CEOs. Several papers have shown that CEOs matter for the firm, and we contribute
by showing that when CEOs are temporarily distracted by their outside directorships
at other firms, their focal firm suffers a drop in performance. We also contribute to
the limited attention literature in behavioral finance by showing that CEOs have
limited attention and the distribution of this attention can alter corporate outcomes
such as performance. Finally, we contribute to the literature on the executive and
board of directors distraction [90, 92], where we show that CEOs acting as directors
in other firms allocate their effort accordingly whenever they are affected by an
attention shock in one of their outside directorships.
The remaining paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the data and
sample used in the study as well as the description of the main measures of CEO
distraction. Section 3 explores the empirical setting and our main specification while
Section 4 presents our main results. Section 6 discusses alternative analyses and
robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Data and Sample
The focus of this paper is on CEOs that hold outside directorships at other boards.
These individuals are presumably allocating most of their time and effort on the firm
where they hold their CEO title. This is consistent with the strong monetary and
reputational incentives CEOs possess. Nonetheless, we focus on attention-grabbing
events that happen at other firms where CEOs participate as outside members and
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we argue that these shocks generate enough distraction for the CEO that the per-
formance of the focal firm worsens.
Data on CEOs and directors is obtained from BoardEx, a database that gathers
biographical information about board members around the globe. BoardEx ana-
lysts gathers individuals’ full history regarding employment, their education and
other activities such as memberships, not-for-profit activities. BoardEx obtains its
information from the United States from different sources such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), companies press releases, corporate websites, the
NASDAQ and the NYSE. The database covers not only publicly traded firms, which
represent around 70% of BoardEx but also privately held firms and other type of
institutions such as universities and foundations. BoardEx allows to track how indi-
viduals are connected across organizations, which is key in our study as we focus on
CEOs that are connected with other boards through their role as independent board
members. BoardEx starts tracking individuals from 1999, increasing the scope of
their data through to nowadays.
We also obtain market prices from CRSP, and financial accounting data and ZIP
codes from Compustat. In additional analyses we make use of executive compensa-
tion data from Execucomp and use the United States Census Bureau 2018 Gazetteer
Files for the translation of ZIP codes to geographical coordinates.1
We proceed as follows to match the different databases: first, we obtain informa-
tion about directors’ employment within BoardEx using their employment history to
identify CEOs. Also, we identify in the same file whether CEOs hold the role of in-
dependent director in another firm simultaneously to that of CEO. Second, we merge
the information on directors and board level controls obtained from BoardEx with
the attention-grabbing shocks and controls from CRSP and Compustat. Throughout
the paper we have data available for 4260 unique firms that we track over the period
1We obtain data on the latitude and longitude for US Zip codes from the US Census Bureau from the
following URL: https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/gazetteer2018.html
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1999-2016, although we do not have a balanced panel dataset.
3.2.1 Measuring CEO Distraction
Our main variable of interest is a firm-level proxy for how much the CEO is distracted
in a given year due to their role as independent director at another firm. We are
inspired by studies such as [90], which exploit independent directors’ preferences of
effort allocation over their different directorships and [76], which study how institu-
tional investors get temporarily distracted by attention grabbing shocks. We call this
proxy “distraction" and it is defined such that higher values of this measure indicate
when CEOs are more distracted in their focal firms. In terms of our distracted CEO
hypothesis, a higher distraction implies temporarily less attention to the operations
of the focal firm.
The intuition behind CEO distraction and our measure is the following: a given
CEO c in a focal firm i is more likely to be distracted if there is an attention-grabbing
event in another firm where such CEO participates as an independent director, and
that if that other firm is important for the CEO, i.e., the firm represents a large
percentage of relative market value over the portfolio of different directorships in
which the CEO participates in a given year [90]. These attention grabbing events
should at the same time create less distraction for CEOs if their focal firm (where
they hold the CEO status) is of relative importance in the portfolio of different
directorships in which the CEO participates in a given year, i.e., if the relative
market value of the focal firm with respect to the whole portfolio is greater. We first
compute the weighted distraction that every independent directorship d generates
for a CEO in a given year t, and later we aggregate it at the focal firm level i as:
Distractionit = (1− ωit)×
D∑
d
Shockdt × ωdt, (3.1)
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where Shockdt captures whether an attention-grabbing event occurs in a directorship
other than the one where the CEOs hold their status as chief officer and ωdt represents
how much CEO c cares about the shocked directorship. The weight (1−ωit) captures
how important focal firm f is in CEO i ’s portfolio.
More specifically, we start calculating ωdt, which indicates the market value weight
a directorship d represents over the total portfolio of directorships (including the
focal firm where CEOs hold their CEO status) in a given year t.2 Secondly, we
define Shockdt as a firm-level measure that indicates whether there is an attention-
grabbing event going on in firm d at time t. In most of our tests, Shockdt is an
indicator variable that takes the value one whenever a directorship shows extreme
neutral returns. We define extreme neutral returns for a given firm d at year t where
CEOs sit as independent directors as the top or bottom 15%, 10%, 5% or 1% returns
from the distribution of firm d. These two terms measure whether there is something
happening that could attract the time and attention from CEO c and whether this
event happens at a firm that is of relative importance for such CEO. Finally, we
define (1−ωit) where ωit is the relative importance of the focal firm i in the portfolio
of directorships for CEO c in year t. We give more weight to instances where the
shocked directorship (focal firm) is relatively larger (smaller) and thus the attention-
grabbing event will have a greater impact. We weight the measure twice as it could
be that a CEO participates in three different directorships (including the focal firm),
and including both weights provide a more complete view of the importance of the
CEO distraction. Therefore, we define:
ωdt =
MVdt
MVit +
∑D
d MVdt
, (3.2)
and
2Market value is calculated as prcc_f*csho from Compustat.
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ωit =
MVit
MVit +
∑D
d MVdt
, (3.3)
where MVit and MVdt are the market value of the focal firm and a firm where the
CEO participates as an independent director.
To sum up, our measure of CEO distraction (Equation 3.1) depends on whether
there are attention-grabbing events at other firms in which CEOs participate, whether
those firms are of relative importance for the CEO and whether the focal firm is of
relative unimportance for the CEO.
3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics for the main variables used in the paper. We
see that mean of the CEO distraction according to the baseline measure is 0.02. We
see that 26% of the CEOs sit as an independent director in another firm in a given
year, with around 4% of the CEOs sitting as an independent director in another firm
within the same industry.
3.3 Empirical Setting
In this section we discuss the main empirical strategy. We are interested in evaluating
the impact of CEO distraction due to extreme returns at the other firm in which the
CEO sits as an independent director. We estimate the following equation:
ROAi,t = α + βDistractioni,t + γ
′Controlsi,t−1 + pii + τt + εit,
where ROAi,t is the return-on-asset for firm i in the year t. Distractioni,t is the mea-
sure of CEO distraction which takes on a non-zero value if the CEO is distracted. In
the baseline specification, we measure the distraction variable using different defini-
tions of neutral shocks at 15%, 10% and 5% i.e. bottom and top 15%, 10% and 5%
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performance in the firms where the CEO holds an independent director position. In
the augmented specification, we explore whether the CEO’s are more distracted due
to positive or negative shocks. Controlsi,t−1 are one-period lagged firm controls. We
include board controls such as the proportion of independent directors, proportion
of busy directors in the focal firm, board size and board tenure; firm controls such
as the firm size, market-to-book value, leverage, cash and sales growth; and CEO
controls such as the tenure of the CEO, age and gender of the CEO.
Additionally, to account for differences in firm performance among firms that in
which the CEO sits in another board, we control for whether the CEO holds a seat
in another board as an independent director (Outside Seat) and the proportion of
firms where CEOs sit as independent board members that are in the same industry
(Pct Same Industry). To account for market size of the firms in which the CEO sits
as an independent director, we control for the log of the average market value of
firms where CEOs sit as independent directors (Mkv Other).
pii denotes the firm fixed effects. This expression absorbs all the firm-specific time-
invariant factors that may explain firm performance. Factors such as the location
and the industry of the firm are absorbed by this term. τt accounts for the year
effects which absorb shocks which are common to all the firms in a given year. This
term absorbs shocks such as the business cycle fluctuations.
Our main parameter of interest is β. β measures how the performance of the focal
firm changes with respect to a unit increase in the distraction of the CEO. For β to
reflect an impact of distracted CEO and not some CEO or firm-specific factors, the
measure of distraction needs to be orthogonal to the CEO and focal firm. Given that
we focus on the attention-grabbing events at other firms in which CEOs participate,
it is likely that these events are uncorrelated with the characteristics of the focal
firm.
132
3.4 Main Results
Table 3.2 shows the main results. In all specifications, we include firm and year fixed
effects and cluster the standard errors at the firm level. We see that a higher CEO
distraction results in a lower firm performance for the focal firm. We see that a unit
increase in the CEO distraction results in a 0.042 lower return-on-asset. This implies
that a one standard deviation increase in the distraction results in a 0.023 standard
deviation lower return-on-asset for the focal firm.
The effect is similar across the different definitions of CEO distraction. We mea-
sure CEO distraction using 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1% neutral returns in Columns 1,
2, 3, and 4, respectively. We see that the firms with distracted CEOs as measured
according to 10%, 5%, and 1% extreme events in the firm where the CEO is an in-
dependent director leads to 0.038, 0.045, and 0.037 lower return-on-asset in the focal
firm of the CEO.
We also see that the proportion of CEOs sitting in the board of other firms in the
same industry do not have an impact on the performance of the focal firm. We see
that a higher proportion of busy directors is associated with a 0.046 lower return-
on-asset. Since the magnitudes and standard deviations of CEO distraction and
busy directors are similar, these estimates suggest that the impact of a one standard
deviation increase in the CEO distraction on the focal firm is similar to the impact
of a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of busy directors.
3.5 Additional Results and Robustness
3.5.1 Additional Results
3.5.1.1 Impact of positive and negative shocks. In this section, we analyze
how to positive and negative shocks at the firm in which CEO sits as a director. Are
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CEOs more reactive to positive or negative shocks? In Table 3.3, we test whether
the positive shocks grab more CEO attention than negative shocks. In Panel A, we
see the estimates from the neutral shocks i.e. both positive and negative shocks. We
see that these shocks lead to a 0.042 lower return-on-asset. In Panel B, we see how
negative shocks at the firm in which CEO sits as director impacts CEO’s focal firm.
We see that negative shocks at the other firm in which CEO sits as a director leads
to a 0.032 lower return-on-asset. In Panel C, we see how positive shocks impact
CEO’s focal firm. We see that positive shocks at the other firm in which CEO
sits as a director leads to a 0.049 lower return-on-asset. The impact of a positive
shock is 50% larger in magnitude compared to the negative shock. The results are
robust across different definitions of positive and negative shocks. In Panel D, we
test whether volatility shocks at the firm in which CEO sits as a director impact the
firm performance at the focal firm. We see that the volatility shocks also result in
lower firm performance at the CEO’s focal firm. A standard deviation of return-on-
asset at the top or bottom 10% leads to a 0.043 lower return-on-asset in the CEO’s
focal firm. These results paint a consistent picture that the CEO distraction due to
positive, negative, and volatility shocks at the firm in which CEO sits as a director
lead to a lower firm performance in the CEO’s focal firm.
3.5.1.2 Horizon of impact. In this section, we analyze the dynamic impact of
CEO distraction on firm performance. Table 3.5 shows the impact of CEO distrac-
tion on firm performance in the subsequent years. We see that the impact of CEO
distraction lasts for two years i.e. the year and the year following the year in which
CEO is distracted. We see that the firms with distracted CEO have a 0.016 lower
return-on-asset in the year following the year in which CEO was distracted due to
extreme events at the firm in which CEO sits as an independent director. The impact
in the subsequent year is around 40% of the impact of CEO distraction in the year
in which CEO is distracted.
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We see a similar dynamic pattern across different definitions of firm performance.
We see that the impact of a distracted CEO on annual market returns last for two
years as well. The annual market return are 1 percentage point lower in the year
following the year in which CEO is distracted. These estimates are three times
larger than the impact of CEO distraction on the annual market return in the year
in which CEO is distracted. This suggests that it takes some time for the impact of
CEO distraction to reflect into the market returns.
In Panel C, we measure the impact of CEO distraction on the long-term firm
performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. We see that the impact of CEO distrac-
tion on firm performance lasts for three years following the CEO distraction. CEO
distraction results in a 0.161 and 0.096 lower Tobin’s Q in the year t + 1 and year
t + 2, respectively. Finally, in Panel D, we see that the impact of CEO distraction
on return-on-equity does not extend to the subsequent years. Together, these results
show that the impact of CEO distraction on firm performance lasts for one year after
the distraction.
3.5.1.3 Committee chairmanship. The CEO distraction stemming from CEOs
sitting on board of other firms maybe more if these individuals have important role
in the board. In this section, we test whether CEOs having an important role in
the board leads to a greater loss in firm profitability in the focal firm. Specifically,
we analyze CEO distraction due to role of CEO as a chairperson of one of the three
committees: audit, compensation, and nomination.
Table 3.6 shows the results. We see that a shock in the profitability of the firm in
which CEO sits as an independent director leads to a 0.060 lower return-on-asset in
the CEO’s focal firm if the CEO is chairperson of one of the three committees. On
the contrast, similar shock leads to a 0.038 lower return-on-asset in the CEO’s focal
firm if the CEO is not the chairperson of one of the three committees.
The three key committees: audit, compensation, and nomination committees may
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require different level of attention as a result of a shock to the firm profitability. In
Columns 2 to 5, we specifically test how the impact on the focal firm differs depending
on whether the CEO is a chairperson of each of these three different committees. In
Column 2, we see that the return-on-asset of the focal firm decreases by 0.047 if
the CEO is chairperson of the audit committee compared to 0.039 if the CEO is
not chairperson of the audit committee. Similarly, we see that the return-on-asset
decreases by 0.019 and 0.044 if the CEO is the chairperson of the compensation and
nomination committee respectively, relative to 0.048 and 0.042 if the CEO is not
the chairperson of the compensation and nomination committee respectively. These
results suggest that being the chairperson of the audit and nomination committees
require more CEO attention relative to the compensation committee.
3.5.1.4 Geographic Distance. The CEO distraction maybe greater or lower
depending on the geographic distance of the firm in which CEO sits as an independent
director. Firms which are close maybe easier to monitor and consume less time and
attention of the CEO. In this section, we test whether CEOs are more distracted by
firms which are geographically close to their focal firm.
Table 3.7 shows the results. We define far and near as dummy variables equal to
one if the geogprahic distance between the firm in which CEO sits as an independent
director and focal firm of the CEO is less than median and greater than the median,
respectively. We see that the shock to firm in which CEO sits as an independent
director results in a greater decrease in firm profitability if the firm is geographically
far from the CEO’s focal firm. We see that a shock results in a 0.045 lower return-
on-asset if the firm is geographically further away from the CEO’s focal firm, while
it results in a 0.028 lower return-on-asset if the firm is geographically close to the
CEO’s focal firm.
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3.5.1.5 CEO outcomes. Does CEO distraction result in any change in CEO
outcomes? In this section, we explore whether CEO distraction impacts the CEO
outcomes. Specifically, we are interested in whether the distraction impacts the CEO
compensation and CEO turnover. Table 3.8 shows the impact of distraction on CEO
outcomes. We see that CEO distraction does not impact the salary (Column 1) and
bonus (Column 2) of the CEO. On the other hand, we see that CEO distraction re-
sults in a lower total compensation. We see that the total compensation of distracted
CEOs is 593 lower (Column 3).
In Columns 4 to 6, we study whether the CEO turnover is affected by the CEO
distraction. We see that CEO distraction does not change the probability of uncondi-
tional CEO turnover (Column 4). However, once we condition the CEO turnover on
the market return or return-on-asset, we see that CEO distraction leads to a higher
CEO turnover. Specifically, we see CEO distraction leads to a 2.3 and 2.2 percent-
age points higher CEO turnover conditioning for market returns and return-on-asset
increases, respectively. These results suggest a 10% increase in the probability of
CEO turnover for an average firm.
3.5.2 Robustness
3.5.2.1 Alternate measures of performance. In this section, we show that
the results are robust to alternate ways of measuring firm performance. Table 3.4
shows the results. In Panel A, we measure the performance using annual market
return. We see that firms with distracted CEOs have a 0.3 to 1.6 percentage points
lower annual market return depending on the definition of distraction. In Panel B,
we see measure the impact of CEO distraction on firm’s long term performance as
measured by Tobin’s Q. We see that firms with a distracted CEO has a 0.45 to 0.28
lower Tobin’s Q according to different definitions of distraction. Finally, in Panel
C, we measure the impact of CEO distraction on firm performance using return-on-
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equity as a measure for firm performance. We see that a distracted CEO results in
0.069 to 0.094 lower return-on-equity according to different measures of distraction.
These results together show that the impact of CEO distraction on firm performance
is robust not only to different cut-offs of defining CEO distraction, but also to various
different measures of firm performance.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the impact of CEO distraction on firm performance. We
measure CEO distraction as the transient extreme positive or negative returns in the
firms in which CEO sits as an independent director. We find that the CEO’s focal
firm suffers as a result of these attention-grabbing events in the firms among CEO’s
directorship portfolio. A one standard deviation increase in the CEO distraction
results in a 0.023 standard deviation lower return-on-asset in the CEO’s focal firm.
The effect is stronger if the CEO serves as a chair in one of the committees in the
other firm and the firm is geographically distant from the CEO’s focal firm. We also
show that these distraction events also lead to lower CEO compensation and higher
forced turnover. These results suggest that CEO distraction can be costly for the
focal firm.
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Table 3.1: Sample Descriptive Statistics.
Observations Mean Std Dev P25 P50 P75
ROA 25708 -0.02 0.22 -0.02 0.04 0.08
Return 25468 0.02 0.03 0 0.01 0.03
Tobin_Q 25708 1.92 1.61 0.97 1.42 2.23
ROE 25705 -0.01 0.65 -0.03 0.08 0.16
Distraction_15/85_Neutral 25708 0.02 0.12 0 0 0
Distraction_10/90_Neutral 29223 0.02 0.09 0 0 0
Distraction_5/95_Neutral 32437 0.01 0.07 0 0 0
Distraction_1/99_Neutral 34163 0 0.05 0 0 0
Distracted_15/85_Neutral 25708 0.07 0.26 0 0 0
Distraction_15/85_Negative 29896 0.01 0.09 0 0 0
Distraction_15/85_Positive 32163 0.01 0.08 0 0 0
Distraction_15/85_Volatility 31755 0.01 0.08 0 0 0
Salary 12821 776.51 344.72 519.62 737.31 996.44
Bonus 12821 326.50 696.59 0 0 332.46
Compensation 12769 5494.63 5477.78 1761.37 3796.37 7156.47
Turnover 25708 0.20 0.40 0 0 0
Forced_Turnover (Return) 25708 0.03 0.18 0 0 0
Forced_Turnover (ROA) 25708 0.04 0.19 0 0 0
Pct_Same_Industry 25708 0.04 0.2 0 0 0
Pct_Busy 25708 0.07 0.11 0 0 0.12
Pct_Ind 25708 0.71 0.17 0.6 0.75 0.86
Outside_Seat 25708 0.26 0.44 0 0 1
Mkv_Other 25708 6.67 2.48 4.97 6.52 8.16
CEO_Tenure 25708 9.02 7.81 3 7 12
CEO_Age 25708 55.69 8.22 50 56 61
Female_CEO 25708 0.03 0.17 0 0 0
Board_Tenure 25708 6.99 3.45 4.5 6.44 8.86
Board_Size 25708 8.58 1.30 7.02 9.03 9.97
Firm_Size 25708 6.1 1.99 4.67 6.07 7.48
MTB 25708 3.24 4.77 1.36 2.25 3.81
Leverage 25708 0.2 0.2 0.01 0.15 0.31
Cash 25708 0.22 0.23 0.04 0.14 0.32
Sales_Growth 25708 0.14 0.45 -0.02 0.07 0.2
ROA is measured as the ratio between net income before special items (ib) over total assets (at). ROE is measured as the ratio between
net income before special items (ib) over the book value of common equity (ceq). Tobin_Q is measured as the ratio between the market value
of equity (csho*prcc_f), plus debt in short-term liabilities (dlc), plus long-term debt (dltt), plus the liquidating value of preferred shares (pstkl)
and plus the accumulated tax deferrals (txdb), over the book value of total assets (at). Return is the yearly-average return at the fiscal year
end. Distraction_15/85_Neutral is the measure of CEO distraction generated by extreme positive and negative returns in firms where the
CEO holds an independent director position. These shocks are defined as the bottom or top 15% of the sample time series distribution of a firms’
return for Distraction_15/85_Neutral. Distraction_10/90_Neutral is the measure of CEO distraction generated by extreme positive and
negative returns in firms where the CEO holds an independent director position. These shocks are defined as the bottom or top 10% of the sample
time series distribution of a firms’ return for Distraction_10/90_Neutral. Distraction_5/95_Neutral is the measure of CEO distraction
generated by extreme positive and negative returns in firms where the CEO holds an independent director position. These shocks are defined as
the bottom or top 5% of the sample time series distribution of a firms’ return for Distraction_5/95_Neutral. Distraction_1/99_Neutral is
the measure of CEO distraction generated by extreme positive and negative returns in firms where the CEO holds an independent director position.
These shocks are defined as the bottom or top 1% of the sample time series distribution of a firms’ return for Distraction_1/99_Neutral.
Distracted_15/85_Neutral is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 whenever there are extreme positive or negative returns in firms where
the CEO holds an independent director position. These shocks are defined as the bottom or top 15% of the sample time series distribution of a firms’
return for Distracted_15/85_Neutral. Distraction_15/85_Negative is the measure of CEO distraction generated by extreme negative returns
in firms where the CEO holds an independent director position. These shocks are defined as the bottom 15% of the sample time series distribution of a
firms’ return for Distraction_15/85_Negative. Distraction_15/85_Positive is the measure of CEO distraction generated by extreme positive
returns in firms where the CEO holds an independent director position. These shocks are defined as the top 15% of the sample time series distribution
of a firms’ return for Distraction_15/85_Positive. Distraction_15/85_Volatility is the measure of CEO distraction generated by extreme volatility
(volatility is calculated as the annual standard deviation of monthly returns) in firms where the CEO holds an independent director position. These
shocks are defined as the top 15% of the sample time series distribution of a firms’ volatility for Distraction_15/85_Volatility. Salary is the
inflation-adjusted annual fixed salary (in thousands of USD) of a CEO. Bonus is the inflation-adjusted annual bonus (in thousands of USD) of a CEO.
Compensation is the inflation-adjusted total annual compensation (in thousands of USD) of a CEO. Turnover is an indicator variable that takes
the value one whenever CEOs are in the final year of their tenure. Forced_Turnover (Return) is an indicator variable that takes the value one
whenever CEOs are in the final year of their tenure and the firm’s market return in the previous year is at the bottom quartile of the industry-year
distribution. Forced_Turnover (ROA) is an indicator variable that takes the value one whenever CEOs are in the final year of their tenure and
the firm’s ROA in the previous year is at the bottom quartile of the industry-year distribution. Pct_Same_Industry measures the percentage of
firms where CEOs sit as independent board members and that are classified in the same 2-digit SIC code as the CEO focal firm. Pct_Busy is the
percentage of independent directors that hold at least three board seats in a given year. Pct_Ind is the percentage of independent directors in a given
year. Outside_Seat is an indicator variable that takes the value one whenever the CEO holds a seat in another board as an independent director.
Mkv_Other is the natural logarithm of the average market value of firms where CEOs sit as independent directors. CEO_Tenure is the number of
years that a CEO has held their role as CEO. CEO_Age is the age of the CEO. Female_CEO is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the
CEO is of female gender. Board_Tenure is the average number of years that Independent Directors have held their role in the firm. Board_Size
is the number of board members in a given firm and year. Firm_Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (ln(at)). MTB is the market-to-book
ratio calculated as the ratio between a firm’s market value of equity (prcc_f*csho) and book value of equity (ceq). Leverage is the ratio between
total debt (dlc + dltt) and total assets (at). Cash is the cash-to-assets ratio measured as cash (ch) divided by total assets (at). Sales_Growth is
the growth rate of sales ((salet-salet−1)/salet).
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Table 3.2: The Effect of CEO Distraction on Operating Performance.
Dep. Var: ROA (1) (2) (3) (4)
Neutral Shocks 15/85 10/90 5/95 1/99
Distraction -0.042*** -0.038*** -0.045*** -0.037*
(-5.109) (-3.981) (-3.192) (-1.945)
Pct_Same_Industry 0.007 0.004 0.010 0.012
(0.746) (0.466) (1.063) (1.311)
Pct_Busy -0.046*** -0.057*** -0.055*** -0.052***
(-3.100) (-3.846) (-3.818) (-3.725)
Pct_Ind 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.055***
(3.648) (3.621) (3.808) (3.654)
Outside_Seat -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.013***
(-4.122) (-4.147) (-3.747) (-3.536)
Mkv_Other 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.009***
(7.508) (7.239) (6.564) (6.229)
CEO_Tenure -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001*
(-2.062) (-2.169) (-1.955) (-1.850)
CEO_Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.762) (1.046) (0.858) (0.724)
Female_CEO -0.018 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012
(-1.420) (-1.159) (-1.143) (-0.992)
Board_Tenure 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(3.643) (3.361) (3.291) (3.410)
Board_Size 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.013
(0.096) (0.473) (0.824) (1.359)
Firm_Size -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.016***
(-3.131) (-2.681) (-3.425) (-3.968)
MTB 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(4.399) (4.801) (4.925) (5.222)
Leverage -0.033* -0.040** -0.041** -0.046***
(-1.844) (-2.330) (-2.392) (-2.698)
Cash -0.000 0.002 -0.004 -0.004
(-0.008) (0.137) (-0.220) (-0.250)
Sales_Growth 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004
(0.646) (0.838) (0.533) (1.029)
Constant -0.071* -0.095*** -0.078** -0.065*
(-1.902) (-2.671) (-2.187) (-1.871)
Observations 25,708 29,223 32,437 34,163
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.0167 0.0153 0.0141 0.0141
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects estimation of the following equation:
ROAi,t = α+ βDistractioni,t + γ
′Controlsi,t−1 + pii + τt + εit
For Column (1) the measure of CEO distraction is Distraction_15/85_Neutral, for Column (2) the
measure is Distraction_10/90_Neutral, for Column (3) is Distraction_5/95_Neutral and for Col-
umn (4) is Distraction_1/99_Neutral. Neutral shocks are defined as the bottom or top 15% of the
return distribution of a given firm. Coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. Robust stan-
dard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. ***, **, and * represent
significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.3: Alternative Shocks to CEO Distraction.
Dep. Var: ROA
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy Indicator (Neutral Shocks) 15/85 10/90 5/95 1/99
Distracted -0.007** -0.007* -0.005 -0.002
(-2.140) (-1.939) (-1.105) (-0.291)
Observations 25,708 29,223 32,437 34,163
Adj. R2 0.0158 0.0148 0.0137 0.0140
Panel B
Negative Shocks 15 10 5 1
Distraction -0.032*** -0.029*** -0.035** -0.037*
(-3.433) (-2.731) (-2.030) (-1.945)
Observations 29,896 31,707 33,422 34,163
Adj. R2 0.0150 0.0146 0.0140 0.0141
Panel C
Positive Shocks 85 90 95 1
Distraction -0.049*** -0.039*** -0.051** -
(-4.041) (-2.758) (-2.216)
Observations 32,163 33,860 35,356 36,341
Adj. R2 0.0153 0.0140 0.0134 0.0133
Panel D
Volatility Shocks 85 90 95 1
Distraction -0.025 -0.043*** -0.036* -
(-1.454) (-2.581) (-1.655)
Observations 31,755 33,497 35,140 36,341
Adj. R2 0.0128 0.0120 0.0133 0.0133
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects estimation of the following equation:
ROAi,t = α+ βDistractioni,t + γ
′Controlsi,t−1 + pii + τt + εit
Panel A uses a dummy indicator that takes the value one whenever a CEO that participates as an independent director in another board
that is affected by a neutral shock. Neutral shocks are defined as the bottom or top 15% (Column (1) panel A), 10% (Column (2) panel
A), 5% (Column (3) panel A) and 1% (Column (4) panel A) of the return distribution of a given firm. Panel B uses as shocks to CEO
distraction negative events defined as the bottom 15% (Column (1) panel B), 10% (Column (2) panel B), 5% (Column (3) panel B) and
1% (Column (4) panel B) of the return distribution of a given firm. Panel C uses as shocks to CEO distraction positive events defined
as the top 15% (Column (1) panel C), 10% (Column (2) panel C), 5% (Column (3) panel C) and 1% (Column (4) panel C) of the return
distribution of a given firm. Panel D uses as shocks to CEO distraction extreme volatility events defined as the top 15% (Column (1) panel
D), 10% (Column (2) panel D), 5% (Column (3) panel D) and 1% (Column (4) panel D) of the volatility distribution of a given firm’s
returns. All regressions include firm FE and year FE and Controls from Table 3.2. Coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.4: Alternative Measures of Performance.
Neutral Shocks (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Market Return 15/85 10/90 5/95 1/99
Distraction -0.003** -0.004** -0.008*** -0.016***
(-2.071) (-2.149) (-2.862) (-3.538)
Observations 25,465 28,980 32,195 33,921
Adj. R2 0.0306 0.0429 0.0577 0.0737
Panel B: Tobin’s Q 15/85 10/90 5/95 1/99
Distraction -0.448*** -0.411*** -0.280*** -0.301***
(-8.089) (-6.221) (-3.760) (-3.447)
Observations 25,709 29,224 32,438 34,164
Adj. R2 0.128 0.121 0.116 0.115
Panel C: ROE 15/85 10/90 5/95 1/99
Distraction -0.094*** -0.072** -0.071* -0.069
(-2.877) (-2.012) (-1.676) (-1.183)
Observations 25,705 29,218 32,430 34,156
Adj. R2 0.0157 0.0138 0.0147 0.0148
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects estimation of the following equation:
Performancei,t = α+ βDistractioni,t + γ
′Controlsi,t−1 + pii + τt + εit
Panel A uses as dependent variable (performance measure) market returns, Panel B uses Tobin’s Q
and Panel C uses return on equity. For Column (1) the measure of CEO distraction is Distrac-
tion_15/85_Neutral, for Column (2) the measure is Distraction_10/90_Neutral, for Column (3) is
Distraction_5/95_Neutral and for Column (4) is Distraction_1/99_Neutral. Neutral shocks are
defined as the bottom or top 15% of the return distribution of a given firm. All regressions include firm
FE and year FE and Controls from Table 3.2. Coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. ***, **, and
* represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.5: Horizon of the Impact of CEO Distraction on Performance.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt+3 ROAt+4
Distraction_15/85_Neutral -0.016** -0.003 0.006 0.006
(-2.007) (-0.429) (0.795) (0.792)
Observations 22,590 19,919 17,655 15,389
Adj. R2 0.00822 0.00864 0.00858 0.0121
Panel B Returnt+1 Returnt+2 Returnt+3 Returnt+4
Distraction_15/85_Neutral 0.010*** 0.003 0.004 0.002
(3.873) (1.045) (1.522) (0.663)
Observations 22,408 19,785 17,551 15,323
Adj. R2 0.0436 0.0139 0.00972 0.00335
Panel C Tobin_Qt+1 Tobin_Qt+2 Tobin_Qt+3 Tobin_Qt+4
Distraction_15/85_Neutral -0.161*** -0.096* -0.003 -0.056
(-2.926) (-1.726) (-0.041) (-0.955)
Observations 22,591 19,920 17,656 15,390
Adj. R2 0.0553 0.0270 0.0219 0.0170
Panel D ROEt+1 ROEt+2 ROEt+3 ROEt+4
Distraction_15/85_Neutral -0.020 -0.014 0.026 0.025
(-0.524) (-0.338) (0.834) (0.706)
Observations 22,587 19,915 17,654 15,386
Adj. R2 0.00630 0.00472 0.00393 0.00457
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects estimation of the following equations:
ROAi,(t+y) = α+ βDistraction_15/85_Neutrali,t + γ
′Controlsi,t−1 + pii + τt + εit; y = 1, 2, 3, 4. (Panel A)
Returni,(t+y) = α+ βDistraction_15/85_Neutrali,t + γ
′Controlsi,t−1 + pii + τt + εit; y = 1, 2, 3, 4. (Panel B)
Tobin_Qi,(t+y) = α+ βDistraction_15/85_Neutrali,t + γ
′Controlsi,t−1 + pii + τt + εit; y = 1, 2, 3, 4. (Panel C)
ROEi,(t+y) = α+ βDistraction_15/85_Neutrali,t + γ
′Controlsi,t−1 + pii + τt + εit; y = 1, 2, 3, 4. (Panel D)
Table 3.5 shows the impact of CEO distraction generated by neutral shocks defined as extreme positive and negative
events at boards where the CEO participates as an independent director. Neutral shocks are defined in this Table as
the bottom or top 15% returns from the return distribution of a given firm. All regressions include firm FE and year
FE and Controls from Table 3.2. Coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.6: The Impact of Chair and Subcommittee Participation.
Dep. Var.: ROA (1) (3) (4) (5)
Distraction_15/85_Neutral*Chair_Yes -0.060***
(-2.842)
Distraction_15/85_Neutral*Chair_No -0.038***
(-4.398)
Distraction_15/85_Neutral*Audit_Comm_Yes -0.047***
(-3.486)
Distraction_15/85_Neutral*Audit_Comm_No -0.039***
(-3.967)
Distraction_15/85_Neutral*Comp_Comm_Yes -0.019
(-1.416)
Distraction_15/85_Neutral*Comp_Comm_No -0.048***
(-5.188)
Distraction_15/85_Neutral*Nom_Comm_Yes -0.044
(-0.970)
Distraction_15/85_Neutral*Nom_Comm_No -0.042***
(-5.087)
Observations 25,708 25,708 25,708 25,708
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.0168 0.0167 0.0169 0.0167
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects estimation of the following equation:
ROAi,t = α+ β1Interaction1,,i,t + β2Interaction2,i,t + γ
′Controlsi,t−1 + pii + τt + εit
Table 3.6 shows the cross-sectional differences of CEO participation in sub-committees of firms where they hold
an independent director position. CEO distraction is generated by neutral shocks defined as extreme positive and
negative events at boards where the CEO participates as an independent director. Neutral shocks are defined in
this Table as the bottom or top 15% returns from the return distribution of a given firm. Chair_Yes is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 whenever the neutral shock stems from a board in which the CEO holds the title
of Chairperson of a major subcommittee (audit, compensation or nominating committee). Chair_No is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 whenever the neutral shock stems from a board in which the CEO does not hold the title
of Chairperson of a major subcommittee (audit, compensation or nominating committee). Audit_Comm_Yes is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever the neutral shock stems from a board in which the CEO participates
as a member of the audit committee. Audit_Comm_No is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever
the neutral shock stems from a board in which the CEO does not participate as a member of the audit committee.
Comp_Comm_Yes is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever the neutral shock stems from a board in
which the CEO participates as a member of the compensation committee. Comp_Comm_No is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 whenever the neutral shock stems from a board in which the CEO does not participate as a
member of the compensation committee. Nom_Comm_Yes is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever
the neutral shock stems from a board in which the CEO participates as a member of the nominating committee.
Nom_Comm_No is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever the neutral shock stems from a board in
which the CEO does not participate as a member of the nominating committee. All regressions include firm FE and
year FE and Controls from Table 3.2. Coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in Table 3.1 except for those defined above. ***, **,
and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.7: The Impact of Geographical Distance.
Dep. Var.: ROA (1) (2) (3) (4)
Neutral Shocks 15/85 10/90 5/95 1/99
Distraction*Far -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.053*** -0.048**
(-4.822) (-3.832) (-3.168) (-2.211)
Distraction*Near -0.028** -0.021 -0.013 0.012
(-1.963) (-1.252) (-0.711) (0.352)
Observations 25,708 29,223 32,437 34,163
Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.0168 0.0153 0.0141 0.0142
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects estimation of the following equation:
ROAi,t = α+ β1Distraction ∗ Fari,t + β2Distraction ∗Neari,t + γ′Controlsi,t−1 + pii + τt + εit
Table 3.7 shows the cross-sectional differences of CEO participation in sub-committees of firms where
they hold an independent director position. CEO distraction is generated by neutral shocks defined
as extreme positive and negative events at boards where the CEO participates as an independent
director. Neutral shocks are defined in this Table as the bottom or top 15% returns from the
return distribution of a given firm. Far is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever
the geographical distance from the focal firm to the shocked firm is above the median geographical
distance between focal firms and the firms where CEOs (of the focal firm) participate as independent
board members. Near is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever the geographical
distance from the focal firm to the shocked firm is above the median geographical distance between
focal firms and the firms where CEOs (of the focal firm) participate as independent board members.
All regressions include firm FE and year FE and Controls from Table 3.2. Coefficients are reported
with t-statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables
are defined in Table 3.1 except for those defined above. ***, **, and * represent significance levels
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
145
Table 3.8: The Impact of CEO Distraction on CEO Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forced Forced
Salary Bonus Compensation Turnover Turnover Turnover
(Return) (ROA)
Distraction_Neutral_15/85 2.791 -32.443 -593.263** 0.020 0.023** 0.022*
(0.239) (-0.818) (-2.240) (0.860) (2.196) (1.694)
Observations 12,821 12,821 12,769 25,709 25,709 25,709
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.0909 0.0132 0.0336 0.0263 0.0190 0.0105
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects estimation of the following equation:
CEO_Outcomei,t = α+ βDistraction_Neutral_15/85i,t + γ
′Controlsi,t−1 + pii + τt + εit
For Column (1) the measure of CEO outcome is Salary, for Column (2) the measure is Bonus, for Column (3) is
Compensation, for Column (4) is Turnover and for Columns (5) and (6) the measures are Forced Turnover
(Return) and Forced Turnover (ROA). Neutral shocks are defined as the bottom or top 15% of the return
distribution of a given firm. All regressions include firm FE and year FE and Controls from Table 3.2. Coefficients
are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are
defined in Table 3.1. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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